GRANT AS A GENERAL.
The clearest conception of the characters of Generals Sherman and
Thomas is obtained by contrasting them. A correct estimate of General
Grant may be had by forming in the imagination a character combining
the peculiarities of both Sherman and Thomas; for in the person of
the lieutenant general the very opposite qualities which distinguish
the others meet and combine with singular grace and felicity. General
Grant does not make so effective, or, so to speak, so dramatic a
picture as Sherman, nor does he present so dignified, that is to say,
so stately an appearance as Thomas; yet he combines in himself the
originality and energy of the first, with the deliberation, coolness,
and pertinacity of the latter. Without the constant fire and fury
of Sherman, without the occasional sudden, fiery impulse of Thomas,
Grant, always cool, calm, and dispassionate, is also always firm,
always decided, and always progressive. Sherman is as mercurial as a
Frenchman, and as demonstrative as an Italian; Thomas as phlegmatic
as a Dutchman, and as tenacious as an Englishman; while Grant in
every characteristic, in doggedness, pertinacity, positiveness, and
taciturnity, is thoroughly American, and nothing else. Grant is a true
sailor, in that he dreads both the storm of battle and the calm of
inactivity, and his appropriate motto is "_In medio tutissimus ibis._"
Thomas delights most in calm--is always calm himself, even in the midst
of roughest seas. Sherman, on the contrary, delights in tempests, and
would now be nothing if there had been no storm. Professor Mahan, who
was the tutor of Grant and Sherman, has furnished a very handsome
illustration of the contrast between them by comparing the first-named
to a powerful low-pressure engine "which condenses its own steam and
consumes its own smoke, and which pushes steadily forward and drives
all obstacles before it," while Sherman belongs to the high-pressure
class of engines, "which lets off both steam and smoke with a puff
and a cloud, and dashes at its work with resistless vigor." Grant
has Sherman's originality of mind, and, like him, gave expression to
several new and striking thoughts upon the subject of the rebellion and
its suppression, but they were invariably clothed in the full, rounded,
and stately periods of Thomas rather than the sharp, curt, and nervous
language of Sherman. He has planned several campaigns with not less of
originality than that displayed by Sherman, but they have always been
executed with the deliberation and persistence which is so prominent
a characteristic of Thomas. Sherman has given us several splendid
illustrations of strategy and logistics, as witness his marches in
Mississippi, Georgia, and the Carolinas, but his battles will never be
quoted as brilliant examples of grand tactics. Thomas has displayed
abilities chiefly in the tactics of the battle-field, and has given
us at Mill Spring and Nashville two splendid illustrations of the
offensive, and at Chickamauga a magnificent example of defensive
battle; but his marches, which are always slow and labored, are never
likely to become famous. Grant has excelled in both these important
branches of the art of war, and has given us brilliant examples of
each, proving himself a master in each branch of the art of war. He
uses the strategy of Sherman to reach his chosen battle-field, and then
employs the grand tactics of Thomas to win the victory. At the risk of
becoming tedious in endeavoring to impress this idea on the mind of
the reader, I can not here repress the desire to again call attention
to the natural and singular manner in which the three great generals
of the war alternately appear in contrast and comparison as the great
strategist, the great tactician, and the great general of the age.
[Illustration: ROBERT E. LEE.]
After the great success of Grant below Richmond, culminating in the
surrender of Lee, the rebels, though they had persistently ignored
any latent greatness in Grant, were delighted to frequently discover
similarities between the victor and the vanquished, and numerous
were the comparisons which were instituted commendatory of Lee, and
patronizingly of Grant. The two, as men and as generals, should rather
have been placed in contrast; for, save in the silent, observant
thoughtfulness which distinguishes both, they have hardly a trait
in common. It is impossible to compare the most positive man of the
war with the least resolute of the rebellion; the strongest of the
true with the weakest of the false cause; the grandest character
with the most contemptible; a great and successful general on the
offensive with a weak and unsuccessful general on the defensive. As
a general, Grant always assumed the offensive, and was uniformly
successful. The opposite is strictly true of Lee. Lee's first offensive
campaign in Western Virginia against McClellan was a failure; his
first defensive efforts against the same leader a great success.
His second offensive movement against Pope failed, and his third
offensive movement, culminating at Antietam, was a great disaster. His
second and third defensive battles, Fredericksburg against Burnside,
and Chancellorsville against Hooker, were successful. His fourth
offensive campaign signally failed at Gettysburg. His next campaign was
defensive. It was fought in a country naturally strong for defensive
purposes, in opposition to the man to whom he is compared, where he
should be contrasted. Though conducted with energy and stubbornness,
it was finally a great defeat, and annihilated Lee's army as it should
have done, his pretensions to great generalship. Lee saw fit only to
be a soldier and obey, not a leader to direct. He had none of the
attributes of a revolutionist or of greatness; else, when seeing and
declaring that the cause of the rebel leaders was hopeless, he would,
as morally the strongest man in the South, and practically the head of
the rebellion as the head of the army, have declared that no more blood
should be uselessly shed, no more of war's desolation be visited upon
the people. But it does not seem ever to have entered the head of this
man that, perceiving the cause hopeless, and wielding the power which
temporarily sustained that cause, it was his duty to forbid its farther
prosecution at the price of blood. Had Lee possessed the courage,
decision, and positiveness of Grant, he would himself have been peace
commissioner instead of Stephens and his colleagues, and he alone the
contracting power. A truly great and honest soldier in Lee's position,
and with the convictions of the hopelessness of the rebel cause
expressed by him in 1865, would have made peace, even if he had been
compelled to put Jeff. Davis in irons to do so. As a man, compared with
Grant, Lee has none of the characteristics natural to greatness; and
when he joined the rebels for the sake of no great principle involving
honor, but simply, as he declared in a letter to his sister, because he
did not wish to raise his hand against relatives and children, although
he believed them engaged, if not in a bad cause, at least in one for
which there was no just occasion, he sank all individuality, and became
a traitor out of mere indecision of character. If Lee is never hung
as a traitor, he ought to be as a warning to all people who have not
minds and opinions of their own. For this, the weakest act of a weak
existence, there is no counterpart in Grant's life, but a thousand, or
rather, I should say, one constant and unvarying contrast.
The resemblance between Generals Grant and Thomas in personal
appearance and character is more marked than between the former and
Sherman. The comparison between Grant and Sherman must indeed be
confined to their military characteristics. The resemblance is most
noted in the fertility of invention which distinguishes both in a
higher degree than any two men hitherto developed by the war. Neither
ever lacks for resources. Grant, with an inventive faculty truly
wonderful, extricates himself from all difficulties with an originality
not less admirable on account of the boldness with which his designs
are accomplished. The originality of his designs, not less than the
boldness with which he acts, adds to the certainty of success. If
one resource fails he has another at hand. He creates opportunities,
and, though he is no Cadmus, at whose will armed men spring from the
ground, yet he may be said to originate the materials of action, and
to supply by his energy and his spirit, his invention and tactics,
many of the deficiencies existing in his physical force. He is not
easily disheartened, but seems greatest in disaster or when surrounded
by difficulties. He is not easily driven from the prosecution of a
plan. He carefully examines its merits before he decides upon it, and
fully tests its practicability before he abandons it for another. That
to which he is compelled to resort by reason of the failure of one
is not less matured than the first. It may be said with truth that
he has never been forced to abandon any general plan upon which he
had determined, though the campaign against Richmond was modified by
circumstances and facts developed at the Wilderness and Spottsylvania.
The purpose of the campaign overland was the destruction of an
important line of railroad, and the desolation of a rich country,
by and in which the enemy was enabled to exist at the very doors of
Washington, and by thus forcing him to abandon his threatening and
offensive attitude, enable Grant to place the army operating against
Richmond in its only true strategical position south of the James
River. It is now apparent to all that, had the attack of General W.
F. Smith on Petersburg in June, 1864, proved successful--as there was
every reason to suppose it would, and really no good reason why it did
not--the capture of Richmond would have followed immediately. There
exists a notable resemblance between this campaign of Grant's and that
of Sherman against Atlanta. Both were prosecuted against large armies
posted and fortified in a country naturally difficult to penetrate,
and in which the enemy had all the advantages arising from defensible
positions. Both were characterized by brilliant flank movements made
in the very teeth of the enemy. And though Sherman's campaign embraced
none of the desperate and lengthy battles in which Grant engaged, it is
marked by several combats of unusual desperation, generally occurring
on the march and fought for position.
Like Sherman, Grant is a fine mover and feeder of an army. The
marches of each are made with great precision, and their logistical
calculations are marked by great accuracy. If such were not the
case, the dangerous flank movements of the one at the Wilderness and
Spottsylvania Court-house, and of the other across the Allatoona
Mountains and around Atlanta, might have resulted in very grave and
serious disasters. Both generals have a full and genuine appreciation
of the importance of economy of time in the collection, and of
quantity in the distribution of supplies; and in view of the fact that
both have at all times operated at a great distance, and at times
entirely disconnected from their bases of supply, the regulation and
completeness with which their vast armies have been fed is surprising,
and calls forth the fullest admiration for the administrative ability
which each has displayed. The energy which Grant possesses, in a degree
fully equal to that of Sherman, differs materially, however, in
character from that of that erratic warrior. There is nothing nervous
about it, nor can it be said to be inspiring like that of Sherman, but
it is no less effective. Sherman's energy supplies all that may be
lacking in his subordinates, and retrieves their blunders and delays.
Grant's energetic manner of working soon teaches subordinates that
delinquencies are not allowable. The comparison might be extended
farther and to other features, while some minor traits of opposite
characteristics might be mentioned. Both are unselfish and unambitious,
or it would perhaps be a better expression to say both are unselfishly
ambitious, holding their own interests second to those of the country.
Sherman acknowledges Grant to have been the first to appreciate and
encourage him after his consignment to that tomb of military Capulets,
Jefferson Barracks. Grant attributes much of his uniform success to
the skill of his second in command. Neither ever wearies of sounding
the praises or of admiring the qualifications of the other. Among the
points of character in which they differ is temper, that of Grant being
exceedingly good in the sense of moderate and even, while Sherman's is
very bad in the sense of irritability and unevenness. There can be no
doubt that both are good, generous, and unselfish men at heart.
The persistence with which Grant pursues an object or executes a plan,
the tenacity with which he fights, his practicability, reservedness,
and taciturnity, are the strongest points of resemblance between
himself and Thomas. It is difficult to say which excels in these
qualities. Grant's famous dispatch from Spottsylvania, "I propose to
fight it out on this line if it takes all summer," was written with
compressed lips--the reader naturally reads it with clenched teeth--and
fairly and graphically illustrates the perseverance and stubbornness
of the man. It is even more forcible than the memorable dispatch of
Thomas, "We will hold Chattanooga till we starve;" and in better taste
than that of Granger's, "I am in possession of Knoxville, and shall
hold it till hell freezes over." Grant's criticism on the Army of
the Potomac, which is doubtless as just an opinion of that army as
has ever been uttered, illustrates this trait of his character still
more forcibly and elegantly. A short time after he assumed personal
supervision of Meade's army, General Oglesby asked him what he thought
of its _personnel_.
"This is a very fine army," he replied, "and these men, I am told, have
fought with great courage and bravery. I think, however, that the Army
of the Potomac _has never fought its battles through_." It certainly
fought them through at the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, and on the
Appomattox, and fully confirmed Grant's faith in the superior endurance
of the men.
It is also related of Grant that, when young, he was very fond of
playing chess, and played with great skill, but found among his
opponents one who was his superior, and who used to win the first games
of a sitting with ease. But Grant was never content to remain beaten,
and would insist on his opponent playing until he got the better of him
in the end by "tiring him out," and winning at chess as at war by his
superior endurance.
The following story of Grant may be apocryphal. If true, however, it is
a fine commentary on that trait of his character under consideration.
If not true, it shows that the feature is such a prominent one that
anecdotes have been originated to illustrate it. The story runs
that immediately after the battle of Shiloh, General Buell began
criticising, in a friendly way, what he termed the bad policy displayed
by Grant in fighting with the Tennessee River in his rear.
"Where, if beaten, could you have retreated, general?" asked Buell.
"I didn't mean to be beaten," was Grant's reply.
"But suppose you had been defeated, despite all your exertions?"
"Well, there were all the transports to carry the remains of the
command across the river."
"But, general," urged Buell, "your whole number of transports could not
contain over ten thousand men, and you had fifty thousand engaged."
"Well, if I had been beaten," said Grant, "transportation for ten
thousand men would have been abundant for all that would have been left
of us."
It is not to be lightly concluded that the act of Grant in encamping
on the same side of the river and within thirty miles of the enemy
was bad policy. If he had encamped on the east side of the stream the
rebels would have made the river, instead of the railroad at Corinth,
their line of defense, and rendered its navigation very difficult for
gun-boats and impossible for transports. The stream could not have been
made the base of operations as was intended. It is doubtful if we lost
more men in the battle of Shiloh than we should have lost in attempting
to force the passage of the stream. Grant's position was faulty
because it was not fortified. His camp ought to have been intrenched.
In the absence of works, he depended for protection on the flooded
streams which in a measure surrounded his camp, but which failed to
retard the rebel advance.
Grant's disposition to persevere has had a natural effect in creating
in him a firm reliance upon himself. It is very seldom that he
calls councils of war or asks advice in any shape. He fears no
responsibility, and decides for himself. General Howard, himself a
man of very marked characteristics, has noticed and alluded to this
confidence, adding that it amounted almost to the superstitious
fatality in which Napoleon was so firm a believer. This self-reliance
is doubtless, however, merely the full confidence which has resulted
from the habit of independent thought and action of a man of unusually
strong, iron will, determination, and tenacity of purpose. Though
his language often indicates this confidence in himself, it never
degenerates into boasting.
During the battles of the Wilderness an aid brought the lieutenant
general news of a serious disaster to the Second Corps, which was
vigorously attacked by A. P. Hill. "I don't believe it," was the prompt
answer of Grant, inspired by faith in his success. The aid was sent
back for farther reports, and found that the reported disaster had been
exaggerated.
Among the most admirable qualities of Grant's mind and character, and
in which he is most like Thomas, is his practicability. Grant, like
Thomas, is not a learned scholar, but has grown wise from worldly
experience. His wisdom is that which results from a combination of
common sense trained to logical reflection with practical observation.
He deals with all questions in a plain, business-like manner, and with
all absence of ostentation or display, and in a systematic style, which
enables him to dispatch a great deal of business in a very short time.
His practicability renders him remorseless in the execution of his
plans. When he has decided it to be necessary, he pushes his massed
columns upon the enemy, and orders the desolation and depopulation of a
country with the same coolness, not to say indifference, with which he
would announce a common event of little importance. His administration
of the affairs of the Army of the Potomac, now universally
acknowledged to have been of the highest ability, fully displayed this
characteristic of practicability.
A fine illustration of his practicability is found in a story related
of him when operating before Fort Donelson. On the night before the
surrender, the preparations of a portion of the rebels to evacuate the
fort led General McClernand to believe they were meditating an attack,
and he communicated his suspicions to Grant, at the same time sending
him a prisoner who had been captured but a short time before. On
reading McClernand's dispatch, Grant ordered the prisoner's haversack
to be searched. It was found that it was filled with rations. "If the
rebels intend to hold the fort, they would not encumber their men with
rations. They are preparing to leave," was the very sage and practical
reasoning of the general; and he immediately ordered McClernand to
assume the offensive. The result was that a commanding ridge near
Dover, south of the fort, was carried, and only a portion of the
garrison escaped; the remainder capitulated.
During the battles of the Wilderness a rebel shell dropped within a few
feet of Grant and Meade, making a furrow in the ground and bursting
some distance beyond. Grant, without a word, drew from his pocket a
small compass with which he calculated the course of the shell. In
five minutes afterward he had a piece or two of artillery posted near
by, and opening upon, soon silenced the rebel battery, whose location
had been betrayed by the course of the projectile. As soon as this had
been done, he asked the elevation of the guns which had done such good
work. On being told, he soon established, by a calculation well known
to every artillerist, the important fact of the exact distance of the
enemy's line from his own.
Another illustration of his practicability is also an instance of his
magnanimity--a feature of his character equally prominent. The terms
of surrender granted to General Lee--the dismissal of the captured
army on parole, was a piece of strategy which was completely veiled by
the apparent magnanimity of the conqueror. It was a splendid stroke
of policy. The tender of such terms placed it at once out of the
power of General Lee to decline them. His army could not have been
kept together an hour after learning that they had been generously
offered and refused. Lee's reputation demanded his acceptance of them.
The rebel troops thus dismissed had to reach their homes by passing
through Joe Johnston's army. The tale of their utter discomfiture and
capture, and the generous treatment accorded them, Grant knew, would
be whispered in the ears of Johnston's men, to the utter demoralization
and disbandment of that army.
At Donelson and Vicksburg Grant's terms had been unconditional
surrender. Such a surrender was important for the moral effect to be
produced at the North. The surrender of Lee was demanded, and the most
generous of terms granted, in order to produce the desired moral effect
at the South. To my mind, this action illustrates the greatness of
Grant more forcibly than any one other act of his life.
General Grant fully appreciates, as does Thomas, the philosophy of
silence. His staff have learned to imitate his taciturnity; and
there is, consequently, an air of industry and business about his
head-quarters which no one who visits them can fail to observe. He
has, throughout his career, published no foolish proclamations and
made no visionary promises. His victories have been followed by
no high-sounding addresses to his armies; but he has confined his
compliments to a plain recital of the deeds of his men and the results
of their achievements. He has, moreover, gone through the war without
having made a single speech. At Lexington, Kentucky, in January,
1864, Grant met with a spontaneous reception from the citizens on his
arrival from East Tennessee. At the request of the populace he made his
appearance in front of his hotel, and, on being told that on account
of his short stature he could not be seen by those on the outskirts of
the crowd, he good-naturedly mounted a chair and bowed two or three
times to the people. A speech was called for, but he contented himself
with requesting Leslie Coombs, who was present, to state to the people
that he "had never made a speech in his life, knew nothing about the
business, and had no disposition to learn."
I have elsewhere, in endeavoring to show how Grant is a combination
of the strategist, Sherman, and the tactician, Thomas, used the
expression that he employed the strategy of one to reach his chosen
battle-field, and the tactics of the other to win the victory. Grant's
own definition of strategy will perhaps make this idea plainer. Shortly
after the battles of Chattanooga, he was sitting in his head-quarters
at Nashville, with his feet comfortably stretched before the fire,
while he enjoyed himself with purring and chewing his cigar with that
completeness of repose which strangers to his habits have called a
dullness of facial expression. Quarter-master General Meigs sat near
him, while General W. F. Smith, who had but a short time before made
himself quite a reputation with Grant by the skillful operations in
Lookout Valley in October, 1863, paced the floor apparently absorbed in
thought. Meigs, noticing this, broke the silence, which had lasted for
several minutes, by asking,
"What are you thinking about, 'Baldy?'"
On receiving no reply from the absorbed officer, he turned to Grant and
remarked, with a laugh,
"'Baldy' is studying strategy."
Grant removed his cigar from his lips and said, with a serious air, "I
don't believe in strategy in the popular understanding of the term.
I use it to get up just as close to the enemy as practicable with as
little loss as possible."
"And what then?" asked Meigs.
"Then? 'Up, guards, and at 'em!'" replied the general, with more than
usual spirit; then again lapsing into his accustomed taciturnity.
Grant has "crept" upon the enemy in this war on several occasions to
some purpose, and with an effect which proves that his strategy is
of a superior order. His strategic march to the rear of Vicksburg is
already accepted as an illustration of the art of war, and not many
years will elapse before it will be quoted as such in the military
academies of the country. The combinations against Richmond are full
of fine strategic marches and manœuvres. The flank movement around
Spottsylvania Court-house, and the march upon Petersburg, accomplished
in the face of the enemy, are not less brilliant than that of
Vicksburg; while the defeat, pursuit, and capture of Lee are by far
the most brilliant operations known to the history of modern warfare.
General Grant's marches closely resemble in their general outlines
those of Sherman. They are executed with all the energy and certainly
as much of the skill as those of Sherman, but on a larger scale, with
larger forces, and in the face of greater natural obstacles. In none
of Sherman's operations has he made the passage of such streams as the
Mississippi or James Rivers. The mountains of Georgia furnish no more
difficult passes than those of Virginia. The marches of Sherman in
Georgia and South Carolina are wonderful and brilliant, but they were
made in the face of an enemy totally inadequate to cope with him. Those
of Grant in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia, are not the less
wonderful because made in the face of a strong, watchful enemy, who,
in Virginia at least, had an admirably mobilized army, and because
accompanied by weeks of hard contested encounters.
The numerous battles of Grant are the most important and the most
successful of the war. From his first victory at Fort Donelson,
through Shiloh, Corinth, and Iuka, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, to the
battles before Richmond, and the surrender of Lee, he has been almost
uniformly successful, and his victories have been more complete,
and productive of more substantial fruits than those of any other
commander. As his strategy is that of Sherman on a larger scale, so
his grand tactics are those of Thomas on more extensive fields. The
movements and the manœuvres of the two men are the same. The movements
are always deliberate and heavy; the manœuvres are always executed
by massed columns formed in deep lines. Grant, like Thomas, appears
to decide in his own mind the key-point of the enemy's position, and
to direct his assaults to the ultimate possession of that point. He
devotes every energy, and, when it is necessary, every life, to the
attainment of this success, knowing that this ends the conflict. When
it is gained, as at Chattanooga and during the engagements of April 2d
before Petersburg, the battle is won. If he fails to reach this key of
the field, as in the first assault at Vicksburg and at the Wilderness,
he is beaten. If he wins the point and the victory, he immediately
pursues the retreating foe, as at Chattanooga and Petersburg. But if he
fails, he does not abandon the field. His mind is too rich in resources
for retreat. Ceasing to be Thomas, he becomes Sherman again, and has
recourse to strategy, whereby he forces the enemy to a field where
his grand tactics will stand a better chance of success. A critical
examination of Grant's campaigns will reveal these features fully
developed. He fully comprehends the specialty of Sherman, strategy, as
well as that of Thomas, grand tactics, and is master of both. He has
displayed in his campaigns, all of which have been of mixed operations,
all the persistence and pertinacity of Thomas combined with the
originality of design and resources of mind of Sherman. But in none of
his campaigns have these peculiarities been better or more brilliantly
illustrated than in the campaign and battles of Chattanooga, and the
not less wonderful campaign around Richmond. The first is an example of
his tactics, the latter of his strategy.
The operations of Hooker and W.F. Smith in Lookout Valley, which were
a part of the Chattanooga campaign, and which resulted in raising the
siege of that strong-hold by opening river communication with the base
of supplies, was not less original in conception or bold and brilliant
in execution than the famous march around Vicksburg. Bragg was
compelled to abandon all hope of starving out the garrison or capturing
Chattanooga, and he determined to attempt the seizure of Knoxville
with a portion of his army under Longstreet while he kept up a show of
besieging Chattanooga with the remainder. It was this movement which
gave Grant the opportunity for the display of his tactical abilities.
Burnside, in advising Grant of Longstreet's approach to attack him,
reported that he (Burnside) held a line on the Tennessee River,
from London to Kingston, possessing unusual natural advantages, and
expressed the opinion that he could easily defeat Longstreet in any
attempt he might make to cross the stream. Grant immediately ordered
Burnside to make no defense of the line which he held, but to fall
back to Knoxville and stand a siege, promising to relieve him in a few
days. The result of this was that Longstreet was deluded into crossing
the Tennessee, and thus placed himself far beyond supporting distance
of Bragg. Grant's strategy had thus far resulted in dividing the rebel
army into two. He immediately went to work to defeat the parts in
detail.
Bragg, learning of the approach of Sherman to Grant's aid, attempted,
on November 23, 1863, to evacuate his strong position before
Chattanooga, and retire for safety beyond the mountains. Grant,
unwilling to let him off so cheaply, made a movement to detain him,
and by commencing his proposed operations a day sooner than originally
intended, he forced the rebel leader to remain in his rifle-pits and
accept battle. Grant in nowise changed his plan as determined upon
six days before the operations began, except that he commenced them
eighteen hours sooner than intended. On the afternoon of November 23d
he did that which he had previously intended to do on the morning of
the 24th. It was the movement of Granger's _corps_ into a position from
whence, at the proper time, it was to assault the rebel centre. In this
position the _corps_ was compelled to lie idle, and in waiting for the
auspicious moment, for eighteen hours longer than it was originally
intended it should. This assault, which was made on the 25th, and was
the closing scene of the battles, has been erroneously called one of
those "blind, uncertain strikings which won the Alma and Magenta,"
when in reality Grant had determined upon it six days before it was
executed, and spent two entire days in watching from the very front of
the line for the moment at which to attempt it. The entire three days'
engagement is remarkable for the consistency with which the plan was
followed out. General Halleck pronounced the battle to be the "most
remarkable in history," and Meigs called it the "best directed battle
of the war." Never have operations in war better illustrated the vast
advantages of the offensive.
The several battles of Chattanooga were fought on purely offensive
principles, and I have often thought since that the secret of Grant's
success may be discovered in the fact that he has always taken the
offensive. I have heard men call him "the lucky Grant," and the
newspapers speak of his good fortune; but it is not luck--it is not
good fortune. It is "_Le genie de la guerre_." He does not depend upon
circumstances or good fortune, but controls both. One such illustration
from Grant, as witnessed at Chattanooga, shows more forcibly and
graphically the vast advantages of offensive warfare than can all the
maxims of Napoleon or Jomini. From the moment that Bragg at Chattanooga
was compelled to abandon his attempts at an orderly retreat and
evacuation of his position, his movements were forced upon him, and
his army was really controlled and commanded by Grant. Every movement
made by the enemy may be said to have been ordered by Grant. Bragg,
in command of the rebel army, was merely his mouth-piece. The plan of
the battle contemplated the breaking of the enemy's centre; but this
was so strongly posted on a mountain ridge almost inaccessible, that,
in order to render success possible, it was necessary to force him
to weaken his forces holding the centre. This was accomplished after
two days' labor by the attacks upon either flank of the rebel line by
Hooker and Sherman, and was no sooner made than perceived by Grant,
who instantly ordered the assault of the centre, which resulted in the
victory, and the capture of several thousand prisoners and sixty pieces
of artillery. To complete the success of the operations, Burnside about
the same time defeated Longstreet at Knoxville (Fort Saunders), and
Sherman approaching to the relief of the besieged, the rebels abandoned
the siege and retreated to Virginia, rejoining Lee soon after at
Fredericksburg.
In conception, execution, and result, the closing operations of the
war--the campaign to the rear of Richmond--must be considered as by far
the most remarkable and brilliant movements of the rebellion. There is
every evidence necessary to show that the campaign, as deliberately
planned, was energetically carried out. The battles of April 1st and
2d, south of Petersburg, were absolutely necessary to the solution of
the strategic problem. The object was to gain a position on the right
flank of Lee, in order to force him not only to evacuate Petersburg,
but to compel him to evacuate it in such a way that he would have to
retreat by roads on the north side of the Appomattox River. By the
success of this battle Lee was thus forced north of the river, and
Grant gained a route to Burkesville Junction--the only point to which
Lee could retreat--which was parallel with that of the rebels, and
which, while separated from them a great part of the distance by a
river, was also much shorter and without any natural obstructions such
as lay in Lee's way. Lee had to retreat by the longer route, which
was practically made still longer by the necessity of recrossing the
Appomattox River. The consequence was that Grant reached Burkesville
Junction by the time Lee reached Amelia Court-house, and not only
interposed himself as an impassable barrier to the junction of Johnston
and Lee, but also continually presented a force between Lee and
Lynchburg. By keeping this force thus "heading Lee off," while at the
same time he continually attacked him in flank and rear, Grant forced
him, on the seventh day of the pursuit, to surrender his whole force.
From the moment of occupying Burkesville, Grant held Lee in a position
from which, if defeated in battle, he had no line of retreat. He was
forced to make a stand in a position in which, had he given battle,
he would have been forced to an unconditional surrender or equally
disastrous dispersion.
An idea of the character of General Grant must, of course, be
formed from the developments of the war. His life at West Point,
and his subsequent career in Mexico and in civil life, displayed no
particularly prominent trait of character other than an adaptation
to the practical in life. At West Point he is remembered as a quiet,
studious, and taciturn youth, only remarkable for the decision which
has since been so prominent a characteristic of the man. He was neither
a book-worm nor an idler, and graduated neither first nor last, but in
that medium rank in his class which has given to the country several
of its most thoroughly practical and successful men. In Mexico he was
distinguished only for the bravery which he displayed at Chapultepec.
In his manners, dress, and style of living, Grant displays more
republican simplicity than any other general officer of the army. In
manner he is very unassuming and approachable, and his conversation is
noticeable from its unpretending, plain, and straightforward style.
There is nothing declamatory nor pedantic in his tone or language. His
rhetoric is more remarkable for the compact structure than the elegance
and the finish of his sentences. He talks practically, and writes as
he talks; and his language, written and oral, is distinguished by
strong common sense. He seldom indulges in figurative language; but
when he does, his comparisons betray his habits of close observation.
He dresses in a careless but by no means slovenly manner. Though his
uniform conforms to army regulations in cut and trimmings, it is often,
like that of Sherman, worn threadbare. He never wears any article which
attracts attention by its oddity, except, indeed, the three stars which
indicate his rank. His wardrobe, when campaigning, is generally very
scant, while his head-quarter train is often the smallest in the army.
For several months of the war he lived in a log hut of unpretending
dimensions on the James River, sleeping on a common camp-cot, and
eating at a table common to all his staff, plainly furnished with good
roast beef, pork and beans, "hard-tack," and coffee. It is related of
the general that when the march to the rear of Vicksburg began, he
announced to his army the necessity of "moving light"--_i.e._, without
extra baggage. He set an example by sending to the rear all his baggage
except a green brier-root pipe, a tooth-brush, and a horn pocket-comb.
The story of his appearance in the Senate Chamber in February, 1865,
is still fresh in the minds of the public. He had no sooner left the
hall, after paying his respects to the senators, than one of the
Democratic members rose and asked the consideration of the Senate
upon what he termed the evident and gross mistake which had been made
in appointing Grant a lieutenant general, and declared it to be his
opinion that "there was not a second lieutenant of the Home Guard of
his state who did not 'cut a bigger swell' than this man who had just
left their presence!"
The general is not lacking in self-esteem. He very naturally desires
to be popular, likes to be well spoken of, but succeeds better than
Sherman in concealing what vanity he possesses. He often excites
admiration by the modesty of actions which in others would be
considered exceedingly immodest; as, witness the quiet manner in which
he accepted a present of a hundred thousand dollars from the citizens
of New York.
Those who are disposed, like himself, to be fatalists, may imagine
in the significance of Grant's surname, and the manner in which he
obtained his baptismal name, encouraging omens of his success and
that of the cause in which he is engaged. The surname Grant (derived
from the French word _grande_, great, or valorous) is that of a
Scottish clan, whose motto, as given in Burke's "Encyclopædia of
Heraldry," appears to have been adopted by General Grant. It is as
follows: "_Stand fast, stand firm, stand sure_." The slogan of the
clan was "Stand fast, Craigellachie." I believe there is no doubt that
General Grant is of Scotch descent, and from the Grants and Duffs of
Aberdeenshire. One of his aids, and a distant relation, Colonel Duff,
was born at Duff House, "in the shadow," of which Mr. James Gordon
Bennett, who was the first to appreciate and proclaim Grant's ability,
records that he also was born. The general's proper Christian name
received at baptism was Hiram Ulysses; but on entering West Point he
received, by the mistake of the person who nominated him, the name
of Ulysses Simpson, which, abbreviated, gives the same initials as
those used to indicate the government of which he is the servant.
"United States Grant" is an appellation much more common than Ulysses
S. Grant; while the patriotic friends of the general have given this
title several facetious variations, such as "Uncle Sam," "Unconditional
Surrender," and "United we Stand Grant."
The confidence of the fatalist is not necessary to courage. There
is a courage superior to the mere indifference to danger, and this
quality Grant possesses to the fullest degree. Sherman calls him one
of the bravest men he ever saw. His coolness and his clear-headedness
under danger and amid excitement is remarkable, and is superior to
that of Thomas, who, next to Grant, is the coolest and most clearly
administrative man under fire now in the army. During the battles
of Chattanooga Grant and Thomas established their head-quarters on
"Orchard Knoll," immediately in the rear of the centre of the field,
and from which they could have a full and close view of the column
which was to make the assault on the rebel centre. From the moment the
signal for the attack was sounded, the scene was of the most exciting
character; but during that important half hour in which the victory
trembled in the balance, Grant and Thomas remained passive, cool, and
observant. They were standing together when the assaulting column had
reached half way to the summit of Missionary Ridge, when a portion of
it was momentarily brought to a halt, and when the stream of wounded
retiring down the hill made the line look ragged and weak. At this
moment Thomas turned to Grant and said, with a slight hesitation, which
betrayed the emotions which raged within him,
"General, I--I'm afraid they won't get up."
Grant, continuing to look steadily at the column, hesitated half a
minute before answering; then taking the cigar he was smoking between
his fingers, he said, as he brushed away the ashes,
"Oh, give 'em time, general," and then as coolly returned his cigar to
his mouth.
Fifteen minutes later I met him on the summit of the hill, riding along
with head uncovered, receiving the plaudits of the men who had won,
but who had not yet secured the victory. The rebel centre had been
broken, but the right wing, which had just repulsed Sherman, was yet
intact, and, turning about face, attacked the troops which had carried
the centre of their line. Our line was much broken, and the troops
excited to such a degree at the victory they had gained that they had
become almost uncontrollable, and on the appearance of General Grant,
who, following in the wake of the advancing columns, had appeared in
their midst on the summit as the white-plumed helmet of Henry IV. had
appeared at Ivry, the men gathered around him shouting and hurraing,
grasping his hand and embracing his legs. But, while coolly receiving
these demonstrations of affection and delight, Grant was not blind
to the danger, and was using the necessary efforts to get his troops
in readiness for the expected attack, which, but for his precaution,
I am satisfied would have badly damaged us. He conveyed his fears
intuitively, as it were, to his staff, and each one exerted himself
to get General Turchin's brigade into position as ordered by Grant.
Mingling in the very thickest of what now became the hottest fire of
the day, they urged forward the troops, and personally gave directions
for their disposal. Turchin, finding some men moving a piece of
artillery to the rear in his way, raved and swore in broken English
until he had got his men up to the works, and Lieutenant Turner as
heartily cursed the fellows who were retiring the gun, and while doing
so got seriously wounded. General Meigs, quarter-master general, busied
himself in preparing friction primers for the captured guns which
General Grant was ordering into position, but got so excited over the
great victory gained that he gave the task up in despair to Captain
Ross, of General Grant's staff. General Turchin pushed forward his
troops, and no sooner had they appeared in line of battle in the fort,
than suddenly the battle ceased and was over. As if with one accord,
the rebels ceased to struggle. They broke in utter and total confusion,
and rushed down the hill. Volley after volley followed them as they
fled, but they did not halt. On they rushed, struggling and striving,
reckless of all now save safety.
During the siege of Vicksburg Grant personally superintended the
mounting of a number of Columbiads on a part of his line. While the men
were cutting the embrasures in the works he stood upon the epaulement,
and, though the rebels made a mark of him for their bullets, very
composedly whittled a rail until the guns were placed to suit him.
Whittling and smoking are among Grant's favorite occupations. He is
a true Yankee in these respects. It is recorded of him that, during
the battles of the Wilderness, he was engaged in whittling the bark
of a tree under which his head-quarters were established; and on all
occasions, great and small, he smokes. He is a more inveterate smoker
than either Sherman or Rosecrans, but he smokes in a different style
and for a different effect. Both Sherman and Rosecrans take to tobacco
as a stimulant to their nervous organizations. Grant smokes with the
listless, absorbed, and satisfied air of an opium-smoker, his mind and
body being soothed into repose rather than excited by the effect of
the weed. Neither Sherman nor Rosecrans are neat smokers, the velvet
breast-facing of their coats and their shirt-bosoms being generally
soiled. Grant, on the contrary, is very neat, and smokes only the best
of cigars. He smokes almost without cessation, and is never at ease
when employed at any thing which forbids smoking as an accompaniment.
During the famous interview with Pemberton before Vicksburg he smoked
with his usual composure. "We pardon General Grant for smoking a cigar
as he entered the smouldering ruins of the town of Vicksburg," said a
rebel paper after the surrender. "A little stage effect," it added,
"is admirable in great captains." But Grant never smokes dramatically.
His cigar is a necessary part of himself, and is neither assumed nor
abandoned for state occasions. He has been known to forgetfully smoke
at reviews, and has frequently been brought to a halt and notified by
sentinels or guards over commissary stores, "No smoking allowed here,
sir." On entering the Senate Chamber to be presented to the Senate, he
had to be requested to leave his cigar outside.
Sherman's erratic disposition caused him to be suspected of lunacy.
Grant's imperturbation and his dullness of expression, added to
exaggerated tales of his excessive use of strong tobacco as an opiate,
was the origin of the story which prevailed at one time to the effect
that he drank to excess. In early life he may have indulged in
occasional sprees, but he does not drink now at all. Swearing is not a
habit with him, and his phlegmatic temperament is seldom so ruffled as
to cause him to indulge in an oath. He seldom jokes, and rarely laughs.
His great "weakness" is Alexandrian, and consists in his love for fine
horses. When quite a boy he was remarkable for tact in managing horses,
"breaking" them with astonishing ease. When he was only fifteen years
old persons came to him from a great distance to have him teach their
horses to pace. This is not a great and exclusive quality of the man,
however, as it is well known that thousands of negroes on Southern
plantations were noted for the same knack or tact. It was doubtless the
result of the innate love of the boy for horses, a love now as strong
in the man and the general. He is said to be the best rider in the army.
Grant's undemonstrative manner has nothing of the repulsive about it.
He has won and retained many warm friends. The friendship between him
and Sherman has become historical, and is often quoted as in agreeable
contrast to the numerous bitter and disgraceful jealousies which have
too often been made public, but which exist in the army to an extent
not suspected by those who have no intimate acquaintance with its
secret history. There is much of romance in the story of Grant and
Sherman's friendship. It began in 1862, and has ever since continued
to grow in strength. When the armies of Halleck were lying--literally
so, indeed--before Corinth, Grant was, to all appearance, shelved
in disgrace. He was second in command, but to be second in command
then was to be the "fifth wheel to the coach." Grant was much
chagrined at his position, and felt in ten-fold degree each petty
indignity which Halleck heaped upon him. One day General Sherman,
who commanded one of the divisions of the wing under the command of
General George H. Thomas, went to General Grant's quarters, bolted
with his usual abruptness into his tent--they didn't stand on ceremony
in the field--and found the general actually weeping with vexation.
Sherman asked the cause, and, for the first time, Grant recounted the
indignities which he had endured, the troubles he had encountered, and
the false position in which he had been placed before the country.
"The truth is, Sherman," he said, "I am not wanted. The country has no
use for me, and I am about to resign and go home."
"No you are not," returned Sherman, impatiently; "you are going to do
nothing of the sort. The country does need you, and you must stay here,
bear these petty insults, and do your duty."
He gave Grant no time for argument, compelled him, in a measure, to
stay, cheered him up and kept him in the field until the appointment of
Halleck, as commander-in-chief, left the command in the West vacant,
and Grant again came into power.
Years afterward, at the close of the war, Sherman, returning from
his march through the Carolinas, having just received the surrender
of Joe Johnston, found himself placed in a false light before the
country by this same man Halleck. When he reached Washington City he
was boiling over with rage at the indignity which Halleck had placed
upon him by telegraphing that he had directed his troops to move
without reference to Sherman's truce or orders, and his naturally bad
temper became threateningly violent and uncontrollable. He denounced
Halleck in unmeasured terms, and, had the latter been in Washington, a
personal collision might have occurred. But, before the two could meet,
Grant saw Sherman, and the scene enacted in the tent before Corinth
three years before was re-enacted, save that the parts were changed.
Grant appeared as the peacemaker, and as positively, though in a very
different manner, advised Sherman to ignore Halleck and frown him down.
Sherman was wise enough to take the advice, and the "great marplot"
will make his chief appearance in history as one whom these men could
afford to ignore.
Grant has always been generous to his subordinates. His careful
consideration of the interests of his staff and general officers is
proverbial, while his generous treatment of inefficient officers, whom
he has been compelled to relieve, is well known. In the first action in
which he commanded, the battle of Belmont, his troops at first gained
an advantage over the rebels. They began to plunder the rebel camp in
spite of all that the general could do to stop them. At last Grant, who
knew that Confederate re-enforcements were coming up, got some of his
friends to set fire to the camp, so as to stop the plundering. Then
he got his troops together as well as he could, and retreated; but,
in the mean time, the Confederate re-enforcements came up, attacked,
and defeated him. There were five colonels under Grant who had not
by any means supported him efficiently in his attempts to stop the
plundering and collect his troops. Grant expected to be deprived of
his command on account of the defeat, and one of the colonels, fearful
of the same fate, called to see him about the prospect. He gave him no
satisfaction, but, on the colonel's departure, turned to a friend and
said, "Colonel ---- is afraid I will report his bad conduct."
"Why do you not?" asked his friend; "he and others are to blame for not
carrying out your orders."
"Why," said the generous Grant, "these officers had never been under
fire before; they did not know how serious an affair it was; they have
had a lesson which they will not forget. I will answer for it they
will never make the same mistake again. I can see by the way they
behaved in the subsequent action that they are of the right stuff, and
it is better that I should lose my command, if that must be, than the
country should lose the services of five such officers when good men
are scarce." Grant did not lose his command, and three out of the five
officers afterward greatly distinguished themselves.
The impression prevails to some extent among persons unacquainted with
Grant in the field, the only place where he shows to great advantage,
that he owes all his success to Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan, and his
other chief subordinates. The fact is, the indebtedness is on the part
of the subordinates. Grant owes his reputation to them just as every
schoolmaster owes his to the ability displayed by his scholars; but
the indebtedness of the pupil to the tutor who educates his mind and
directs his talent is not by any means repaid by this reflected credit.
Sherman was a complete failure; he was looked upon, indeed, as a
lunatic, until Grant saw what he was capable of, and directed his great
abilities into the proper channel. Sheridan met with an uninterrupted
series of defeats until Grant singled him out for his cavalry
commander, and then the "belligerent cadet" met with an uninterrupted
series of victories. Wilson stands similarly indebted; and Meade's
greatest successes were obtained under Grant's direction.
It is not only with such men as Sherman, Sheridan, Logan, Howard, and
others, with whom he bears the most intimate relations, but with his
whole army, that Grant is a well-beloved leader. He has gained the
universal admiration of his men by no clap-trap display or familiarity
at the expense of discipline, but by a constant and watchful care for
their interest. It is a boast in the Army of the Tennessee, which Grant
commanded in person for nearly three years, that the men never wanted
for food; Grant's commissary stores were always well filled. He was
always careful to protect his men from the imposition of sutlers and
army speculators, generally by fixing the prices of all articles sold
in his department; and he cut red tape for the benefit of the private
soldier with a remorseless hand.
When sitting for their photographs Grant and Sherman have dispensed
with their cigars, and the consequence is an imperfect picture.
None of the many artists who have painted them in oil have had the
independence to supply the deficiency of the photographs, and add the
cigar, which is a necessary accompaniment of the men, and which must be
an important feature of every pen-picture which will be made of them.
The addition of the cigar would doubtless detract from the dignity of
the picture, but it should be remembered that artists paint as well
for posterity as for the present generation. History will preserve in
its picture of Grant his peculiarities, and, among others, the fact
that he was an inveterate smoker. Why should not the artists preserve
such a peculiarity as this, as well as the outlines of his figure and
expression of his face? Is it any more important for posterity to know
that his eyes were blue than that he smoked incessantly?
Grant is not so tall as Sherman nor so heavy as Thomas. His short
stature would have made it difficult for him to enlist in the British
army. He is but an inch above the minimum standard of officers of our
army, but, being straight and somewhat spare, he has the appearance
of being above medium height. Sheridan and Logan are the only major
generals in our army who are shorter in figure than Grant. His
forehead is high and square. His hair was originally a dark brown,
but at forty-three, his present age, it is fast becoming sprinkled
with iron-gray. His eyes are sharp and expressive, though small,
peering out from under his overarching brow with great brilliancy. His
nose is aquiline. His mouth is small, and he has a habit of closely
compressing his lips. His chin and cheeks are covered with a heavy
beard, which he never shaves, but keeps closely cropped or trimmed.
Though the war in which he has won his reputation is now ended,
the future has still much to do in establishing the position which
Grant has to hold in history. Today he enjoys the confidence of his
countrymen to a degree unknown to military leaders during the war. If
ultimately successful in the end--if he directs his course through
the mazes of the political campaign which has followed hard upon the
close of the war as well as he has his military career, posterity
will delight, and will find little difficulty, in tracing out a
comparison between his character and that of the country's first great
leader. This it is hardly proper for the present age to do; and such
a comparison, if made in detail, would doubtless shock the modesty of
General Grant more than it would the nation's sense of propriety; but
if consistent in character and success to the end, the historian of the
future will not be content to draw simply the comparison which I have
imperfectly outlined, but will liken him to one who in every respect
was greater than the Sherman or Thomas to whom, combined as in one man,
I have compared him. But, whether successful to the end or not, if he
remains, as at present, aloof from politics and far above partisanism,
General Grant, like Washington, will live forever in the memories of
his countrymen as a good and honest man.