CHAPTER I.

[Illustration: SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO THE FRONT.]

PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS

OF

DISTINGUISHED GENERALS.

BY

WILLIAM F. G. SHANKS.

NEW YORK:

HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,

FRANKLIN SQUARE.

1866.

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand

eight hundred and sixty-six, by

HARPER & BROTHERS,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District

of New York.

PREFACE.

The purpose of this volume is to make more familiar to the general

public the actual characters of some of our great military leaders

during the late war. I have attempted to portray them not as on

parade, but in undress uniform, and to illustrate not only their great

military qualities, but more particularly their mental peculiarities

and characteristics. These pages will be found to contain many facts

about some of the great battles which official reports have left

untold, with such recollections of our generals as history proper

will not perhaps condescend to record, and to embrace singular facts

about great campaigns and strange stories of great men. The portraits

are freely drawn. They are made from actual studies, if not special

sittings, and while taking care to give every beauty, I have omitted

none of the deformities or blemishes of my subjects, though I have

told in full detail their virtues, and have touched on their faults

and vices lightly. I have avoided alike extreme extravagance in

praise or censure. Still there is enough shadow to the pictures to

give the necessary, if not agreeable contrast to the lights. The

reader must not, however, mistake the stand-point from which I have

written. Distance, unfortunately for truth, lends enchantment not

only to objects, but to men. The atmosphere of Olympus produces many

phantasmagoria, and the great at a distance exist to our eyes in a sort

of mirage. The philosophy of perspective as applied to natural objects

is reversed when applied to mankind, and there are very few men who

do not grow smaller as one approaches them. Most men are pyramidal in

shape only, not proportions. "No man is a hero to his valet." Even

Jupiter was ridiculous at times to Homer. Very few generals have

appeared great to the war correspondents; and though very few of the

latter can claim to be descendants of Diogenes, they can assert, with

equal positiveness, that very few of the generals have been Alexanders,

and that "the very sun shines through them." I have written under the

disadvantage of being too near the objects drawn; and those who do not

know the subjects as well may imagine I have made them undeservedly

Liliputian in dimensions.

Writing contemporaneous history is the most thankless of tasks, and I

discover also one of the least independent of labors. Still I have not

written with a goose-quill, and there has been some gall in my ink, yet

I do not think I have any thing in the ensuing chapters to blot. I do

not think I have done any man injustice. I have written many sentences

and made many assertions which will doubtless be termed strong, but

in writing these I am only the amanuensis of truth; and I write with

the firm belief that "historical truth should be only less sacred than

religious truth."

I have no doubt, however, that others will think differently after

perusing the book. When publishing in Harper's Magazine I was told that

the language of some of these sketches offended the subjects, but I

have been unable to find any fact that ought to be stated otherwise. I

think it best to say, for the benefit of all who may choose to object

or condemn the volume as now published, that I have written nothing

that I do not believe to be true--I trust not one sentence that, dying,

I would wish to blot, and certainly not one word that, living, I intend

to retract.

NEW YORK, _Sept., 1866_.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

SHERMAN AS A STRATEGIST.

The most original Character developed by the War.--No Parallel for

Sherman.--His nervous Energy the secret of his great Success.

--Incidents illustrative of his great Energy.--Restlessness of Manner

and nervousness of Expression in Conversation.--His bad Temper.

--Appearance in Battle and under Excitement.--Vigorous Style as a

Writer.--He ought to have been a War Correspondent rather than a

General.--The Story of his Lunacy.--How it originated.--Method in

his Madness.--Habit of Decision.--How he came to leave the Law

and return to the Army.--His uncontrollable Temper nearly Ruins

him.--The Quarrel with Halleck and Stanton.--Failure as a Tactician

and Disciplinarian.--All his Battles Defeats.--Never won a

Battle.--His great strategic Marches.--The Campaign of Atlanta

his greatest Achievement.--Joe Johnston a Foeman worthy of his

Steel.--Sherman's Egotism.--His dislike for Correspondents and

independence of the Press mere Affectation.--Nicknames bestowed on

him by the Soldiers.--An inveterate Smoker.--His personal Appearance

Page 17

CHAPTER II.

THOMAS AS A TACTICIAN.

Sherman and Thomas match Horses.--A Contrast drawn between them.

--Methodical Habits of Thomas.--System necessary to his Existence.

--Fury of his Anger when aroused.--Great Self-control and Coolness

in Danger.--Illustrative Incidents of his Imperturbability.

--Cold-blooded upon Principle.--He Studies to avoid the display of

his Emotions.--Personal Description and Habits in Camp.--His tactical

Ability.--Affection of his Soldiers for Thomas.--The Bayard of the

Army.--His uniform Success as a Commander.--Thomas entitled to the

Credit of Sherman's March to the Sea.--The Battles of that Campaign

fought at Nashville by Thomas.--The Battle at Nashville his

greatest Action 58

CHAPTER III.

GRANT AS A GENERAL.

The proper Conception of his Character.--Grant a Combination of

Sherman and Thomas.--Contrasted with Lee.--Resemblance between Grant

and Sherman.--Energy of both.--Comparison between Grant and

Thomas.--The Persistence and Tenacity of each.--Grant's

Practicability and Magnanimity.--His Taciturnity.--His Idea of

Strategy.--His numerous Battles the most successful and important of

the War.--Campaign at Chattanooga and Knoxville.--The remarkable

Campaign to the Rear of Richmond the most brilliant of the War.--His

great Vice, a Habit of Smoking.--His great Weakness, a Love of

Horses.--Grant and Sherman as Damon and Pythias.--His Generosity

to his Subordinates.--Superiority to his principal Leaders.--What his

Character in the Future will be 91

CHAPTER IV.

SHERIDAN AS A CAVALRYMAN.

The Union Cause rich in its Leadership.--The Rebellion very weak.

--Sheridan one of the most able of our Leaders.--A Miracle of War.

--An Inspiration rather than a General.--A "Fighting" General.

--Reminiscences of his Youth.--His Career as a "belligerent Cadet" at

West Point.--His Class-mates and their Success.--Sheridan and Hood

compared.--Sheridan's early Career as a Lieutenant and Failure as a

Quarter-master.--A Favorite with both Grant and Halleck.--Sheridan a

Colonel of Cavalry.--His first Cavalry Victory.--Promoted Brigadier

General of Infantry.--Repeated Defeats as a Commander of Infantry.

--His Failures at Stone River and Chickamauga.--Success in Pursuit of

Bragg from Tullahoma and at Chattanooga.--Promoted to the Command of

all Grant's Cavalry.--His Success in this Capacity.--The Belligerent

in his Organization.--Personal Appearance and Habits.--A modern

Scipio 128

CHAPTER V.

FIGHTING JOE HOOKER.

General Hooker a Cosmopolitan.--Naturally "a Fighting General."

--Career in Mexico.--Difficulties in obtaining a Command.--His

inspiring Presence.--Critical Account of his "Battle above the

Clouds."--He manufactures the Clouds in order to fight above them.

--His Weakness consists in his Disposition to criticise every thing.

--His Candor.--Opinion of McClellan.--"The young Napoleon conducting

War in order to get into the best Society."--Hooker's Vanity and

Valor.--How he obtained a Command.--Sharp Criticisms in official

Reports.--Hooker's Criticism on Sherman.--His untiring Energy.--The

Title of Fighting Joe offensive to him.--How it was obtained.

--Personal Description and Habits 165

CHAPTER VI.

RECOLLECTIONS OF ROUSSEAU.

Strategic _versus_ fighting Generals.--Strategy always an Excuse for

military Failures.--Four fighting Generals compared.--Rousseau

naturally a Leader of Men.--His early Career.--He Acts as "the Member

from Louisville, Kentucky," in the Indiana Senate.--Always in the

Minority and always Popular.--Adventures in Kentucky as a criminal

Lawyer.--Success as a special Pleader.--Startling Adventure in

Defense of four Negroes charged with Murder.--Election to the

Kentucky State Senate.--The true Story of Kentucky Neutrality.--Simon

Bolivar Buckner and his Schemes.--How they were frustrated by

Rousseau.--Denunciation of Neutrality.--Forcing an Issue.--Division

of the State Guard into two rival Organizations.--Defection of the

"Lexington Chasseurs."--How Rousseau obtained Authority to raise

Troops for the United States Service.--Opposition of the neutral

Union Men to his Scheme.--How he overcame their Objections.--Himself

and Troops exiled.--Singular Scenes in the neutral State.--Recruiting

for both Armies in the same City.--Sad Divisions created in Families.

--A Rebel and Union Praying-match.--The News of the Bull Run Disaster

in Louisville.--The Secessionists take Possession of the City.--A

Riot instantaneously quelled.--A Peace Meeting turned to a War

Gathering.--Rousseau's Parade through Louisville.--Buckner's

traitorous Scheme, and what was to have been effected by it.--Attempt

to seize the City.--Rousseau saves it from Capture.--A neutral

Editor's History of Neutrality.--Popularity of Rousseau with his

People.--His military Career.--Great Daring at Perryville.--Incidents

of that Battle.--Admiration of his Men for Rousseau.--New Mode of

taking Care of Prisoners.--Sherman's Idea of Rousseau's Raid to the

Rear of Hood's Army.--Return to political Life.--His Crusade against

Slavery.--Intimacy between Rousseau and Sherman.--Personal Appearance

of Rousseau 193

CHAPTER VII.

PECULIARITIES OF VARIOUS GENERALS.

General Don Carlos Buell.--One of the greatest Generals, also one of

the greatest Failures of the War.--Buell too methodical to be

practical.--Weakness of his Army Organization.--Three Corps

Commanders without Ability.--Perryville a Battle lost by Jealousy of

our Commanders.--Quarrel between Buell and Governor Johnson of

Tennessee.--The true Story of the proposed Evacuation of Nashville.

--Thomas and Buell compared.--William Starke Rosecrans a great

Failure.--His utter Incompetency.--His extreme Nervousness unfitting

him for a Command.--His Campaign of Chickamauga one Series of

Mistakes.--The Battle an unnecessary Slaughter.--The worst managed

Battle of the War.--Rosecrans not on the Field.--Gordon Granger's

Peculiarities.--His Predilection for artillery Fights.--His

Resemblance to Joe Hooker.--Retort upon Sherman.--"Living off the

Country."--His Opinion of Gideon Pillow and "painted Mules."--Grief

at the Death of Captain Russell.--"Old Steady" Steedman one of the

most positive Men of the War.--His Boldness and Impudence.--Daring

Charge at Chickamauga.--His March from Chattanooga to Nashville to

ask for Orders.--His Faith in Negro Troops.--Generals Wood and

Negley the Victims of Chickamauga.--Military Character of each.

--General Howard a Soldier on Principle.--His firm Faith in the Cause

and its Success.--Methodical Turn of Mind.--Religious Habits and

Training.--Mayor William H. Sidell as Sherman's Counterpart.--General

John A. Logan the representative General of the Western Army.--His

Readiness in Emergencies, and his great personal Daring.--General

John W. Geary's adventurous Career.--His famous midnight Battle with

Longstreet, and how he defeated him 242

CHAPTER VIII.

SOME PECULIARITIES OF OUR VETERANS.

Superiority of educated over uneducated Soldiers.--Contrast in the

_personnel_ of European and American, between Union and Rebel, and

between Eastern and Western Troops.--Superiority of the Union Armies.

--Anecdotes and Incidents illustrating the Peculiarities of our

Veterans 321

ILLUSTRATIONS.

PAGE

SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO THE FRONT _Frontispiece._

WILLIAM T. SHERMAN 16

GEORGE H. THOMAS 58

ULYSSES S. GRANT 90

ROBERT E. LEE 95

PHILIP H. SHERIDAN 131

JOSEPH HOOKER 164

LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU 194

DON CARLOS BUELL 245

WILLIAM S. ROSECRANS 261

GORDON GRANGER 268

JAMES B. STEEDMAN 276

OLIVER O. HOWARD 299

JOHN A. LOGAN 307

JOHN W. GEARY 317

PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS

OF

DISTINGUISHED GENERALS.

[Illustration: WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN.]

CHAPTER I.

SHERMAN AS A STRATEGIST.

Of the few really great men who have been developed by the late war

in this country, and who will leave a lasting impression on the

minds of the people, William Tecumseh Sherman may be regarded as the

most original. His name has been made more widely prominent, and his

character more universally popular, than that of any other of our

heroes; but it has been less in consequence of his brilliant success

as a leader than by reason of his strongly-marked characteristics of

person and mind. He is, without doubt, the most original and eccentric,

though not the most powerful--the most interesting, though not the

most impressive character developed by the rebellion. He is by far our

most brilliant general, but not by any means the most reliable; the

most fascinating, but not the most elegant; the quickest, but not the

safest; the first to resolve, but not the most resolute. As a man he is

always generous, but not uniformly just; affectionate by nature, but

not at all times kind in demonstration; confiding, and yet suspicious;

obstinate, yet vacillating; decided, but not tenacious--a mass of

contradictions so loosely and yet so happily thrown together as to

produce the most interesting combination imaginable. General Sherman's

character has many beauties and virtues, but also many glaring defects

and faults. His picture, as I have seen and studied it, possesses what

the artists call "great breadth of light and shade," and is full of

contrasts alternately pleasing and offensive, and which, in order to

properly analyze the character, should be portrayed and described with

equal force and impartiality. He is a character without a parallel

among his contemporaries, though not without a contrast; and it is for

the latter reason that I have chosen his character as the one upon

which to base, as it were, the following estimates of the characters of

his fellow-officers of the United States army, and not because I think,

as may be supposed, that he deserves the first place in the rank of our

great captains. The war lasted long enough to give the leaders, if not

their proper places in popular estimation, at least their true linear

rank in the army. General Sherman may be considered as first among

the strategists of the war; General George H. Thomas as first among

the tacticians; but Grant, combining the qualities of both tactician

and strategist, must always be ranked as greatly the superior of both

Thomas and Sherman.

General Sherman may be described as a bundle of nerves all strung to

their greatest tension. No woman was ever more painfully nervous; but

there is nothing of the woman's weakness in Sherman's restlessness.

It is not, as with others, a defect of the organization; it is really

Sherman's greatest strength, for from it results the brilliancy of

conception and design which has characterized his strategic movements,

the originality which has appeared in his views on political economy

and the policy of war, and the overwhelming energy which is "his all

in all," the secret and cause of his great success. From his extreme

nervousness results the most striking feature of his character--a

peculiar nervous energy which knows no cessation, and is resistless.

It is not merely that energy and quickness of movement which naturally

belongs to nervous organizations, but intensified a hundred fold. At

the same time, it is energy without system, and oftentimes without

judgment, but nevertheless always effective. General Sherman is the

engine, but he is not always the engineer. He furnishes the motive

power, but he frequently requires some person or thing to keep him

to the track; in fact, he requires to be controlled and directed.

He is untiring in his efforts; you can never dismay him with the

amount or frighten him with the dangers of a task; and he hesitates

at nothing, matters great and small receiving his attention. He is no

believer in that too common fallacy that labor is a wearisome waste

of the physical and vital powers; a punishment, not a privilege; and

degrading, not elevating. Work is necessary to his existence, and

hard, earnest work at that. Always a hard, earnest worker, he devoted,

during the continuance of the war, but little time to sleep, and that

little sleep was never sound. His active mind, I once heard him say

to a fellow-officer, delights in preposterous dreams and impossible

fancies, and, waking or sleeping, continues ever active in planning

and executing.

A few anecdotes will perhaps better illustrate the nature of this

nervous energy. The most remarkable instance of this characteristic

which I can now recall occurred at Nashville, Tennessee. When Sherman

assumed command there in March, 1864, the great difficulty in the way

of an advance from Chattanooga upon the enemy, then covering Atlanta

and the Georgia railroads, was the lack of provisions at Chattanooga

and Knoxville. The military agent of the railroads from Nashville to

Chattanooga was running through to the army at the latter point about

ninety car-loads of rations per day. This merely served to feed the

army then gathered there; nothing was accumulating for the spring

campaign. General Sherman demanded the cause of this insufficient

supply of rations. The agent reported that he needed both cars and

locomotives, and added it was impossible to obtain them. General

Sherman answered that nothing was impossible, and immediately began to

devise means by which to remedy the evil. After a short deliberation,

he decided to seize a sufficiency of cars and locomotives in Indiana,

Ohio, and Illinois, and at once went to work to do so. In an incredibly

short space of time he extended the northern terminus of the Louisville

and Nashville Railroad through the former city, a distance of three

miles, to the Ohio River. On the levee, or wharf, he built an inclined

plane to the water's edge. One of the ferry-boats which plied between

Louisville and Jeffersonville was seized, and especially prepared

by the laying of rails across its bow and stern to carry cars and

locomotives. On the Indiana side of the river he extended the

Jeffersonville Railroad through that town to the Ohio River, and built

another inclined plane from the bluff on which the town is situated

down the steep wharf to the water's edge. At the same time he ordered

the impressment of the necessary cars and locomotives from the various

northwestern railroads, taking them off routes as far north as Chicago,

and rushed them off to Nashville, crossing the Ohio by the means he had

provided. The effect was soon visible. In a month after this movement

began the railroad agents reported that they were running two hundred

and seventy cars per day through to Chattanooga. By the 20th of April,

the day Sherman left Nashville to begin his Atlanta campaign, he had

accumulated at Knoxville eighteen, and at Chattanooga thirteen days'

rations for his whole army of 120,000 men. The energy which inspired

the railroad agents was communicated to the quarter-masters located at

Nashville, and the result was the increase of the laboring force of

this department from four or five thousand to nearly sixteen thousand

men. During the progress of this work General Sherman required the

railroad agents and quarter-masters to report progress daily. I

happened to be in his office one morning when assistant quarter-master

General James L. Donnalson reported a small increase in the number of

cars forwarded on that day over the supply of the day before. General

Sherman received the announcement with more evidences of gratification

than he would have shown on hearing of a heavy re-enforcement of his

numbers, for at this time he had more men than he well knew what to do

with. "That's good!" he exclaimed--"that's good, Donnalson; we'll be

ready for the start;" and then he hastily resumed his seat, and made

a rapid calculation of some sort, which he showed with much apparent

delight to Generals Donnalson and Webster, the latter his chief of

staff. He could not have been more delighted if he had heard the news

of a great victory. A moment afterward he turned to me to deny, in a

very gruff way--he was always gruff to newspaper correspondents--my

application for a pass over the military railroad to Chattanooga. "You

see," he said, "I have as much as I can do to feed my _soldiers_," with

a very ungracious emphasis on the word soldiers. As I had Lieutenant

General Grant's pass to any point and by any route in my pocket, and

had only submitted the question to General Sherman through deference

to him as the immediate commander of the department, I could afford to

smile at the slur conveyed in his emphasis, and turned away enriched

with a reminiscence, and with increased admiration of the man.

Some former experience with, or, rather, observation of the general,

had given me somewhat of the same opinion of his energy and

earnestness. When he first assumed command at Louisville, Kentucky,

in 1861, the agents of the New York Associated Press throughout the

country were employed by the government in transmitting its cipher

or secret messages, and correspondence between the various military

commanders, by telegraph. In consequence of this arrangement, General

Sherman frequented the office of the Louisville agency, in which I was

at the time employed. He was always at this office during the evening,

often remaining until three o'clock in the morning, when the closing

of the office would force him to retire to his rooms at the hotel.

During these hours he would pace the floor of the room apparently

absorbed in thought, and heedless of all that was going on around him.

He would occasionally sit at the table to jot down a memorandum or

compose a telegram. He would sometimes stop to listen to any remark

addressed to him by other occupants of the room, but would seldom

reply, even though the remark had been a direct question, and would

appear and act as if the interruption had but momentarily disturbed his

train of thought.

In July, 1864, while besieging the enemy's position at Kenesaw

Mountain, an incident occurred which may be given as illustrative

of Sherman's energy. When the campaign opened he had published an

order informing the army, in terms which were laughed at at the time

as rather bombastic and slightly egotistical, that "the commanding

general intended making the campaign without a tent," and during the

greater part of the march his head-quarters actually consisted of

nothing more than a tent-fly for the use of his adjutant general.

He generally slept under a tree during dry weather, and in very wet

weather in any convenient house. When the army was concentrated in

the gorge of Snake Creek Gap, in which there was not a house of any

character, General Logan "raised the laugh" on Sherman by sending him

a tent to protect him from the rain, and which, owing to the terrible

state of the weather, Sherman was compelled to use. But the greater

part of the campaign was actually passed by Sherman without any other

quarters than I have described as for the convenience of his adjutant

general. Early one morning a regiment of troops passed his bivouac

near Kenesaw Mountain, Georgia, and saw him lying under a tree near

the roadside. One of the men, not knowing the general, and supposing

him, from his jaded, weary, and generally dilapidated appearance, to be

drunk, remarked aloud, "That is the way we are commanded, officered by

drunken generals." Sherman heard the remark and instantly arose. "Not

drunk, my boy," he said good-humoredly, "but I was up all night looking

after your rations, and am very tired and sleepy." He soon after broke

up head-quarters, and, passing the same regiment on the march, was

received with loud and hearty cheers.

He makes his subordinates work, too, with the same zeal. When the

rebels, in evacuating Resaca, succeeded in burning the railroad bridge

over the Oostenaula River, he turned to Colonel Wright, his engineer

in charge of railroads, and asked him how long it would take him to

replace that bridge. Colonel Wright replied after a short calculation,

during which Sherman showed his impatience at the delay in the answer,

that he could rebuild it in four days.

"Sir," exclaimed the general, hastily, "I give you forty-eight hours,

or a position in the front ranks."

The bridge was forthcoming at the proper time.

This nervousness of Sherman's organization has naturally produced a

peculiar restlessness of manner and admirable vigor of expression. He

talks with great rapidity, often in his haste mingling his sentences in

a most surprising manner, and accompanying his conversation by strange,

quick, and ungraceful gestures, the most common of which is the

knocking of the ashes from his cigar with the little finger of his left

hand, frequently knocking at it until ashes and light too are gone.

In a conversation of importance, and particularly on a battle-field, he

seldom gives a person time to finish his remarks or reports. He replies

as soon as he has heard enough to convey the idea, never waiting its

elaboration. In giving his instructions and orders, he will take a

person by the shoulder and push him off as he talks, following him to

the door, all the time talking and urging him away. His quick, restless

manner almost invariably results in the confusion of the person whom he

is thus instructing, but Sherman himself never gets confused. At the

same time, he never gets composed. Under all circumstances, he is thus

restlessly, never timidly nervous. In danger the restlessness is not so

visible, and hence it is apparent that there is nothing of timidity in

it. On the battle-field where he commands Sherman's nervous manner is

toned down. He grates his teeth, and his lips are closed more firmly,

giving an expression of greater determination to his countenance. His

eyes are somewhat closed, as if endeavoring to see the furthermost

limits of the battle-field, and, as it were, peer into the future and

see the result. His cigar is always kept firmly between his lips, but

he suffers its fire occasionally to die out. He is less restless of

body; his arms are more confined to their proper limits; and he is

content to stay in one spot. He talks less at such moments than at

calmer ones. On light occasions, however, he is invariably ill at ease.

His fingers nervously twitch his red whiskers--his coat buttons--play

a tattoo on his table or chair, or run through his hair. One moment

his legs are crossed, and the next both are on the floor. He sits a

moment, and then rises and paces the floor. He _must_ talk, quick,

sharp, and yet not harshly, all the time making his odd gestures,

which, no less than the intonation of his voice, serve to emphasize his

language. He can not bear a clog upon his thoughts nor an interruption

to his language. He admits of no opposition. He overrides every thing.

He never hesitates at interrupting any one, but can not bear to be

interrupted himself. He is very well aware, and candidly admits that

his temper is uncommonly bad, and, what is worse, he makes no attempt

to control or correct it. In speaking of the late General McPherson,

of the Army of Tennessee, he once remarked, "He is as good an officer

as I am--is younger, and has a better temper." Grant, once speaking of

Sherman's peevishness, said, "Sherman is impetuous and faulty, but he

sees his faults as soon as any man." The fact is, if Sherman's faults

alone could be given to another, they would serve to distinguish him

from the common herd.

The idea generally prevails that commanding generals are very didactic

on the battle-field, and give their orders in precise language and

stentorian voice. A little familiarity with actual war will soon

dispel this false impression, particularly if you meet Sherman on the

battle-field, for there is less of dignity, display, and grandiloquence

in him than any other general whom I have met during the war. At the

battle of Chattanooga he gave his orders for the advance of his troops

against the enemy's strongly fortified position to his brother in law,

General Hugh Ewing, in the words uttered between two puffs at a bad

cigar: "I guess, Ewing, if you are ready, you may as well go ahead."

Ewing asked a few questions in regard to retaining the _échelon_

formation of his command as then marshaled for the advance. Sherman

replied, "I want you to keep the left well toward the river (the

Chickamauga), and keep up the formation four hundred yards distance,

until you get to the foot of the hill."

"And shall we keep it after that?" asked Ewing.

"Oh, you may go up the hill as you like," said Sherman; and then he

added, _sotto voce_, with a smile and a wink to his aid, and General

Ewing's brother, Charley Ewing, who stood near by, "if you can." As

General Ewing was mounting his horse and about to leave, Sherman called

out to him,

"I say, Ewing, don't call for help until you actually need it." General

Frank Blair, and others of the Army of the Tennessee who were standing

near Sherman, laughed at this in such a manner as left the impression

on the minds of others, as well as myself, that on some former occasion

General Ewing had called for help before General Sherman thought that

he really needed it.

It is recorded of Sherman that, on witnessing from the top of a

rice-mill on the Ogeechee River the capture of Fort McAllister by

General Hazen's forces, and the successful termination by that capture

of the "march to the sea," he exclaimed, imitating the voice of a

negro, "Dis chile don't sleep dis night," and hurried off to meet

General Foster and complete the junction of the two armies.

His nervousness is not less perceptible in his writings than in

his conversation and manners. His writings lack in elegance, but

not in force. Some of his letters, remarkable for absence of grace

and presence of vigor, are already accepted as among the model

documents of the war, not only as to style, but as to argument. His

speeches, letters, and orders are seldom more than skeletons, framed

of sharp, pointed, but disjointed sentences, from which the ideas

to be conveyed protrude so prominently as to be comprehensible when

the sentence is but half conveyed. His ideas are never elaborated in

his letters, though given more fully than in his conversations, but

you never have to finish the sentence to discover its meaning. There

are several specimens which every reader will naturally think of in

this connection. His letter to the rebel General Hood on the proposed

depopulation of Atlanta is a curious document, an impromptu reply,

thrown off-hand from his pen, and it reads as if it were Sherman

talking. He begins this letter by acknowledging the receipt of a

communication at the hands of "Messrs. Bull and _crew_." The bearers,

who were designated by this undignified title, were members of the

Common Council of Atlanta, for whom Sherman does not appear to have

entertained the most profound respect. The letter ends by advising

Hood to tell his tale of oppression "to the marines," as he (Sherman)

is not to be imposed upon. In the same correspondence he indicates

his action in depopulating Atlanta, and gives his peculiar "theory of

suppression." Sherman's whole theory, in which, by the way, he has been

consistent from the first, is embraced in the proposition to "fight

the devil with fire." He was for vigorous war all the time--hard blows

at the organized armies, frequent and oft repeated. He has none of

the elements of Fabian in him. He writes in defense of the action at

Atlanta alluded to: "We must have peace, not only in Atlanta, but in

all America. To secure this, we must stop the war that now desolates

our once happy and favored country. To stop war, we must _defeat the

rebel armies_ that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which

all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies, we must prepare

the way to reach them in their recesses provided with the arms and

instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose." His expression

in the same letter, "War is cruelty--you can not refine it," is a

sharp, terse rendition of an undisputed truth, to the illustration

of which whole chapters have been less successfully devoted by more

distinguished writers.

While endeavoring to fill up his dépôts at Chattanooga and Knoxville

preparatory to the campaign against Atlanta, Sherman was asked by

members of the United States Christian Commission for transportation

for their delegates, books, tracts, etc., for the army. His reply is

very characteristic of the man: "Certainly not," he wrote; "crackers

and oats are more necessary to my army than any moral or religious

agency." As this incident shows, Sherman is not a very firm believer

in the utility of Christian or Sanitary Commissions, or aid societies

generally. He thinks female nurses about a hospital or an army a

great nuisance. He once alluded contemptuously to the efforts of a

large number of ladies at Louisville, Kentucky, to send clothing,

lint, sweetmeats, etc., to his troops, but was induced, in lieu of

discouraging their efforts, to take steps to properly direct them. He

met the ladies by agreement in one of the public halls at Louisville,

now known as Wood's Theatre, and made an address to them. He went among

the lambs with all the boldness and dignity of a lion; but the rough,

uncouth manner of him who had frowned on thousands of men melted in

the presence of a few hundred ladies. They found that, though "he was

no orator as Brutus is," he could talk very tenderly of the soldier's

wants, very graphically of the soldier's life and sufferings, and very

gallantly of woman and her divine mission of soothing and comforting.

During the campaign of Atlanta communication with the rear was very

much obstructed, the news correspondents found many difficulties in

forwarding information, and telegrams to the press seldom reached

New York. During the movement around Atlanta Sherman was applied

to directly by the news agent at Louisville for the details of the

movement. In reply the general telegraphed, "Atlanta is ours, and

fairly won;" following up the expression, which has already passed

into song, with a brief and graphic report of the flank movement

around Atlanta and the battle of Jonesborough. This report is one of

the most admirable narratives I remember to have ever read, and at the

time of its publication I wrote for the Herald, of which I was then

a correspondent, a long criticism of it. The letter never appeared,

however, for the reason that I endeavored to show that, successful as

he had been, Sherman had mistaken his vocation as a general, and ought

to have been a war correspondent. I suppose Sherman would have been

mortally offended at such language, particularly as he affected to

hold correspondents and editors in contempt; but undoubtedly he would

have been invaluable to the New York Herald or London Times in such a

capacity, and could have made more money, if not more reputation, in

that capacity than as a major general. He has lately declared that he

does not believe he will ever have occasion to lead men again, and I

advise him by all means to go into the newspaper business. Any of the

principal papers of New York will be glad to give him double the pay of

a major general to act in the capacity of war correspondent.

Until Sherman had developed his practicability, this peculiarity of

expression and manner were accepted as evidences of a badly-balanced

mind. It will be remembered that in his early career a report was

widely circulated to the effect that he was a lunatic; but the origin

of this story, if properly stated, will redound to his credit, as

evincing admirable foresight and sagacity. The true origin of this

report is as follows: Sherman succeeded General Robert Anderson in

command of the Department of the Ohio on October 13, 1861. Up to that

time about ten thousand United States troops had been pushed into

Kentucky. The Western governors were under a promise to send as many

more, but were slow in doing so. General A. Sidney Johnston, the rebel

commander at Bowling Green, was endeavoring to create the impression

that he had about seventy-five thousand men, when he really had only

about twenty-eight thousand. In this he succeeded so far as to cause

it to be supposed that his force largely exceeded Sherman's. Sherman

urged upon the government the rapid re-enforcement of his army, but

with little effect. The troops did not come, for the reason that the

government did not credit the statements of the perilous condition

of Sherman's army. So repeated and urgent were Sherman's demands for

re-enforcements, that at last the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron,

visited Louisville in order to look into the situation of affairs. An

interview took place at the Galt House at Louisville, Sherman, Cameron,

and Adjutant General Thomas being present. Sherman briefly explained

the situation of affairs, stated his own force and that of the enemy,

and argued that re-enforcements were necessary to hold Kentucky, to say

nothing of an advance. "My forces are too small for an advance," he

said--"too small to hold the important positions in the state against

an advance of the enemy, and altogether too large to be sacrificed

in detail." On being asked how many men were required to drive the

enemy out of the state, he answered, without hesitation, "Two hundred

thousand." The answer was a surprise to the two officers, which they

did not attempt to conceal. They even ridiculed the idea, and laughed

at the calculation. It was declared impossible to furnish the number

of men named. Sherman then argued that the positions in Kentucky ought

to be abandoned, and the army no longer endangered by being scattered.

This was treated more seriously, and vigorously opposed by Cameron and

Thomas. They declared the abandonment of Kentucky was a step to which

they could not consent. Subsequently they broached a plan which had

been devised for dividing the Department and Army of the Ohio into

two; one column to operate under Mitchell from Cincinnati as a base

against Knoxville, and the other from Louisville against Nashville.

To this Sherman was strongly opposed. Satisfied by the persistence of

Cameron on this point that the government was not disposed to second

his views of conducting the affairs of the Department, Sherman asked to

be relieved and ordered to duty in the field. Cameron gladly acquiesced

in his wishes, and he was relieved by Buell, November 30, 1861.

On the same evening of the famous interview between Cameron and

Sherman, the latter paid his customary visit to the Associated

Press-rooms at Louisville. Here, while still in a bad humor over the

result of the interview, he was approached by a man who introduced

himself as an attache of a New York paper, and asked permission to pass

through the lines to the South in the capacity of a correspondent.

Sherman replied that he could not pass. The correspondent, with

unwarrantable impertinence, replied that Secretary Cameron was in

the city, and he would get a pass from him. Sherman at once ordered

him out of his department, telling him that he would give him two

hours to make his escape; if found in his lines after that hour he

"would hang him as a spy." The fellow left the city immediately, and

on reaching Cincinnati very freely expressed his opinion that the

general was crazy. A paper published in that city, on learning the

story of the interview between Cameron and Sherman, which soon became

public, employed the fellow to write up the report which was thus first

circulated of Sherman's lunacy. His opinion that two hundred thousand

men were required to clear Kentucky of rebels was quoted as proof of

it by this man, and thus the story came into existence.

Subsequent events revealed the fact that Sherman did not much

exaggerate the force necessary to carry on the war in the central zone

of the field of military operations. Although we have never had a

single army numbering two hundred thousand men in the West, much larger

armies have been necessary to the accomplishment of the campaign of the

Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers than any person other than Sherman

thus early in the war imagined. The army of Grant at Fort Donelson and

Shiloh, combined with that of Buell, was not over eighty thousand men.

That of Halleck before Corinth numbered exactly one hundred and two

thousand. Sherman left Chattanooga in May, 1864, with one hundred and

twenty thousand men, the largest army ever gathered in one body in the

West. At the same time, he had under his command at different points

on the Mississippi River and in Kentucky an additional force of about

fifty thousand, while the forces operating under other commanders in

the West would, if added to his, make a grand total of two hundred and

fifty thousand men operating on the Mississippi River, every one of

whom was necessary to the conquest and retention of the Mississippi

Valley.

Sherman may have been at one time crazy, but his madness, like

Hamlet's, certainly had marvelous method in it. Such lunatics as he

have existed in all ages, and have, when as successful as himself, been

designated by the distinctive title of "genius," in contradistinction

to men of medium abilities. Not only Shakspeare, but Dryden, seems to

have encountered such madness as Sherman's, and to have appreciated the

truth that

"Great wits are sure to madness near allied,

And thin partitions do their bounds divide."

Doubtless the same author had such a genius or madman as Sherman in his

mind when he described one of his characters as

"A fiery soul, which, working out its way,

Fretted the pigmy body to decay."

The peculiar formation of Sherman's head shows his great development

of brain. His forehead is broad, high, and full, while the lower half

of his face and head are of very diminutive proportions. In a person

of less physical strength and vitality, this great preponderance of

the mental over the physical powers would have produced perhaps actual

lunacy. The head of Sherman is of the shape peculiar to lunatics

predisposed to fanciful conceptions. There is too much brain, and

in Sherman it is balanced and regulated only by his great physical

development. Sherman's brain, combined with bad health, would have

produced lunacy; his brain and sinewy strength combined produced his

peculiar mental and physical nervousness. Had he been a sedentary

student instead of an active soldier, the last line of Dryden's poem

might also have applied to him, and we should know of him only as an

"o'er informed tenement of clay."[1]

When this report of his lunacy was first circulated, Sherman was

much chagrined at it, and often referred to it in bitter terms.

Time and success have enabled him to frown it down, and justified

him in laughing at it. He once laughingly referred to this report

about himself, and the rumor which simultaneously prevailed regarding

Grant's drunkenness during the battle of Shiloh as illustrative of the

friendship existing between them. "You see," he said to a gentleman,

"Grant stood by me when I was crazy, and I stood by him when he was

drunk."

During the siege of Corinth he commanded the right wing of Thomas's

corps, while T. W. Sherman, of Port Royal memory, commanded the

left. The latter was very unpopular with his division on account of

a painfully nervous manner and fretful disposition, and the officers

of the command discussed him critically with great freedom, many

condemning his manner as offensive. One day General W. T. Sherman was

visiting General Steedman--then a brigade commander in T. W. Sherman's

division--and the latter's name was brought up, Steedman giving a very

ludicrous account of Sherman's conduct.

"Oh!" said William Tecumseh, "this is the crazy Sherman, is it?"

Great difficulty was found during the operations before Corinth in

distinguishing the two Shermans. The soldiers solved the problem

by giving each Sherman a nickname. T. W. Sherman was called "Port

Royal Sherman," in allusion to his services in South Carolina, while

W. T. Sherman was known by the somewhat inappropriate title of

"Steady-old-nerves," in contradistinction to the other, who, as before

stated, was more timidly nervous. Mr. Lincoln, with some recollection

of this coincidence of names on his mind, asked General Grant, on

being introduced to General Sherman, if he was W. T. or T. W., and

laughed with boyish glee at the "joke on Sherman."

As another natural result of Sherman's nervous energy, he has acquired

the habit of decision in the most perfect degree, and his peculiar

organization has tended to make him practical as well as petulant. He

never seems to reason, but decides by intuition, and, in this respect,

has something of the mental as well as bodily peculiarities of the

gentler sex, who are said to decide intuitively. But Sherman is by no

means a woman--he would have been a shrew had he been--and possesses

not one particle of the sex's beauty or gentleness. Sherman jumps at

conclusions with tremendous logical springs; and, though his decisions

are not always final, they are in effect so, for, if he is forced

to retire an inch, his next jump will probably carry him forward an

ell. Facts are the only argument which prevail with him, and the best

arguments of wise men are wasted in endeavoring to convince him without

undeniable facts at hand. Obstinate, and vain, and opinionated as he

is, and indisposed as he may be to listen to or heed the arguments of

equals or inferiors, he never hesitates to sink all opposition before

the orders of his superiors, and pay the strictest deference to their

views when expressed authoritatively.

I have before said this nervousness of mental and bodily organization

was the main-spring of Sherman's character. From it result not only

his virtues, but his faults, and as man and commander he has many. He

is as petulant as a dyspeptic; excessively gruff, and unreasonably

passionate. His petulance does not, however, prevent his being

pleasant when he is disposed; his gruffness does not destroy all his

generosity, and his passionate moods are usually followed by penitence.

His fits of passion are frequent but not persistent, and, though

violent, are soon appeased.

His gruffness often amounts to positive rudeness. While in command

at Louisville in 1861, the wife of the rebel commander Ingraham

passed through the city _en route_ to the South. The lady, who was

rebelliously inclined, pleaded consumption as her excuse for wishing

to inhale the Southern air. Sherman gruffly advised her to "shut

herself up in a room and keep up a good fire--it would do her just

as much good." He often replies in this petulant tone to both sexes,

particularly if the person addressed has no business of importance.

He once took great offense at having his manners, and particularly this

habit of gruffness, compared to the manners of a Pawnee Indian, and

expressed his contempt for the author of the slur in a public manner.

He was much chagrined shortly after to find that the correspondent

who had been guilty of the offensive comparison had heard of his

contemptuous criticism, and had amended it by publicly apologizing to

the whole race of Pawnees!

During the battle of Bull Run, where General Sherman commanded a

brigade, he was approached by a civilian, who, seeing him make some

observations without the aid of a field-glass, proffered him the use of

his own. Sherman turned to the gentleman and gruffly demanded,

"Who are you, sir?"

"My name is Owen Lovejoy, and I am a member of Congress."

"What are you doing here? Get out of my lines, sir--get out of my

lines."

Nothing satisfied Sherman but the immediate retreat of the member of

Congress to the rear.

I have heard that Sherman's bad temper was the cause of his leaving his

chosen profession of the law. After resigning his commission in the

army in 1853, he became, after several changes, a consulting lawyer in

the firm of his brothers-in-law, the Ewings, at Leavenworth, Kansas.

He had entered into the copartnership with the distinct understanding

that he was not to be called upon to plead in the courts; for, though

possessing a thorough knowledge of legal principles, a clear, logical

perception of the equity involved in all cases, and though perfectly

_au fait_ in the authorities, he had no confidence in his oratorical

powers. He was not then the orator he has latterly become, and utterly

refused to take any part in legal debate or pleadings. One day a case

came up in the Probate Court of Kansas requiring immediate attention.

Tom and Hugh Ewing were busy; McCook was absent, and Sherman was

forced, _nolens volens_, to go into court. He carefully mapped out

his course until it looked like plain sailing; laid down his plan of

procedure, as he used subsequently to do his plans of marches; but he

was destined to be driven from his chosen route, not by a Joe Johnston

or "foeman worthy of his steel," but by a contemptible, pettifogging

lawyer, with more shrewdness than honesty, and more respect for the end

to be attained than the means to be used. In the debate which the trial

involved, Sherman lost his temper, and, consequently, his case. He

returned to his office in a towering rage, dissolved the partnership

with his brothers-in-law, and, without farther hesitation, accepted the

presidency of the Louisiana Military Academy, the proffer of which he

had received a day or two before.

General Sherman's violent temper greatly endangered his reputation

toward the close of the war, and he came near sacrificing, in an evil

hour of passion, all that he had won before. His passion was to him

as the unarmored heel was to Achilles, and the vulnerable point of

his character came near costing him even more dearly than did the

vulnerable part of the Grecian warrior's body. His diplomatic feat with

Joe Johnston was generally denounced as a blunder, but it was not the

blunder which came near costing him so dearly. That piece of diplomacy

took the shape of a blunder in consequence of the unfortunate and

unforeseen circumstances and disasters which occurred simultaneously

with it. Had Mr. Lincoln lived, General Sherman would to-day have

borne a brilliant reputation as a diplomatist, and his agreement with

Johnston would have been at once, as it was eventually, accepted as the

basis for the political reconstruction of the country. That agreement

was repudiated by the people and President Johnson in an hour of

frenzied passion, though the latter has since modeled his plan upon

it; and Sherman lost his chance for becoming a great diplomatist. But

he, and he only, was to blame for the grave blunder which immediately

afterward nearly cost him his fame and position as a soldier. Sullen

at the repudiation of his agreement with Johnston, angry at the

interference of General Halleck with the co-operative movements of

himself and Sheridan, and furious at the countermanding of his orders

to his subordinates by the Secretary of War, Sherman forgot himself,

and marched to Washington with his army, breathing vengeance upon

Halleck, and hate and contempt for Stanton. Fortunately for Sherman,

history will not record the scene. History never yet recorded--no

nation ever before safely witnessed such a spectacle as that of a

victorious general, at the head of eighty thousand men devoted to him

and jealous of his fame as a part of their own, marching to the capital

of the country with threats against his military superiors breathing

from his lips and flowing from his pen. For days Sherman raved around

Washington, expressing his contempt for Halleck and Stanton in his

strongest terms, and denouncing them as "mere non-combatants" whom he

despised. More than this, he wrote to his friends, and through them

to the public, comparing Stanton and Halleck to "cowardly Falstaffs,"

seeking to win applause and honor for the deeds he had done; accusing

the Secretary of War of suppressing his reports, and endeavoring to

slander him before the American public in official bulletins. For days

his army roamed the streets of the capital with the same freedom with

which they had roamed through the fields of Georgia and the swamps of

the Carolinas, and no man dared to raise his voice in condemnation

of their leader, or approval of the superiors who had opposed him.

No republic ever before survived such a condition of affairs; this

republic never was in such danger before, and yet the danger was

hardly suspected. The spectacle is one which Sherman will ever regret,

but every true American, and every lover of republican liberty, can

point to it with pride as a remarkable illustration of the stability

of republican institutions. Powerful as Sherman was against Stanton

and Halleck (and a word from him would have destroyed them), he was

powerless against the nation, and not one man of his mighty host would

have followed him in an attempt upon its existence. It is, perhaps,

a still greater proof of the power of republican principles that, in

the midst of his furious rage, such a thought as the injury of the

government never for a passing second entered the brain of the leader

of these men. He has reason to be thankful that the nation was as

generous as he was honest; and that the people made no record against

him for the offense against discipline which in any other country would

have cost him not merely his position, but his reputation, and in any

other army his head. At the same time, the nation must and will cherish

the honest man who, thus tried and tempted, never for a single second

forgot his allegiance to the principles for which he had fought and the

country which he had served.

General Sherman's reputation as a soldier must rest entirely on his

strategic abilities. His successes were those of strategy only--not

of tactics. His faults as a commander are glaring as his faults of

character. As an organizer of armies for the field, and as a tactician

in battle, he was an utter failure. He never commanded a well-organized

army whose discipline did not become relax under his administration,

and he was never commander-in-chief in any battle which was not a

failure. Instead of being an organizer, Sherman was a disorganizer;

he was always chief among the "Bummers" which he made his soldiers,

and by which name they were eventually designated. His whole career

shows him to have been solely a strategist, absolutely incapacitated

by mental organization for disciplining and fighting an army. His

attempt to organize the army in Kentucky in 1861 was a most egregious

failure. He gave it up in despair to General Buell, who, on assuming

command, found it a mob without head or front, or appropriate parts.

Buell, in contradistinction to Sherman, was great as an organizer

and disciplinarian, and he soon made a fine army out of Sherman's

unorganized mob. General Sherman shortly afterward went into the battle

of Shiloh with a division of troops who were also unorganized, and only

escaped annihilation by the timely appearance of Buell and the now

thoroughly disciplined troops which Sherman had originally commanded.

When Buell's troops on this occasion made their appearance on the

small plateau which is called Pittsburg Landing, the great numbers of

Sherman's demoralized new recruits who were there huddled together

welcomed them as veterans. "Buell! Buell!" was their cry; "here come

Buell's veterans." One can not but smile when he remembers that the

men thus hailed as veterans had never been engaged in even so much as

a skirmish. Their conduct in the desperate battle which followed on

the day after their arrival proved them to be worthy of the name. One

year's thorough discipline had made them veterans without having fought

a battle.

Throughout Sherman's career his troops were noted for their lack of

discipline. When he assumed command of the Army of Tennessee on the

promotion of General Grant in 1863, he found it one of the best

disciplined armies in the country, though not the best provided.

I doubt if there was ever a division, brigade, or even regimental

drill in that army after Sherman took command. He subsequently became

indirectly in command of the Army of the Cumberland, which, though

directly commanded by that strict disciplinarian, General George H.

Thomas, soon felt the effect of Sherman's presence and control, and

became very relaxed in discipline. Subsequently, on the march to the

sea and through the Carolinas under Sherman, the discipline of the

formerly model armies became still more relaxed, and gradually the

whole army became regular "Bummers," a term which is not generally

understood in its proper sense of reproach. The people to this day

only half know what a "bummer" is, from having a general idea of the

character of Sherman as the chief of bummers. The veil of romance

which surrounded Sherman's army has never been entirely torn away.

Its pilgrimages are still romances. It has always been viewed in

that dim and distant perspective which adds a charm to beauty, and

hides internal troubles and blemishes, and the evils it did and the

outrages it committed have never been made public. But the friends of

Sherman might reasonably claim even the want of this special tact for

organizing and disciplining troops as a virtue. It can not really be

said to have detracted from Sherman's ability as a soldier. What was

lost thereby to the army in discipline was made up in mobility. If its

morale was bad, the marching was good, and that satisfied Sherman. If

he did not teach his soldiers how to fight, he gave them the mobility

which the execution of his strategic designs required of them, and

thus the end aimed at was gained, and the country was satisfied. He

merely changed his men from heavy to light infantry. Success justifies

all means, and thus Sherman became--and justly became--a great general

without ever having won a battle.

It is very strong language, I admit, to say that Sherman never won a

battle, but considerately so, for if the purely tactical operations of

General Sherman be critically examined, it will be found that they were

almost invariably failures. He was the chief in command, the central

and controlling power, in the battles of Chickasaw Bayou, Resaca,

Kenesaw Mountain, and Jonesboro, all of which, with the bare exception

of the latter, where his overpowering force and strategic march of

the night before insured victory, were tactically great failures. The

failure of the co-operative movements of Grant at Chickasaw Bayou

doubtless caused Sherman's defeat at that point--at least it has

served to explain it away, and stands as the excuse for it; but all

will remember how signal a failure it was. The battle of Resaca was

a still greater failure. Doubt, delay, and inaction lost Sherman the

great advantage which his strategic march through Snake Creek Gap had

given him in placing him in the rear of the enemy's position, and he

ought to have captured every gun and wagon of the enemy, and dispersed

the army which subsequently retarded his advance in Atlanta; but the

battle was begun too late and pushed too feebly. Sherman's strategy

had at one time rendered a battle unnecessary, and it was forced on

him through another's indecision (I believe that General McPherson

admitted before his death that that fault was his), but certainly it

was the fault of Sherman that the battle, when fought, was indecisive.

Every body will remember the Kenesaw Mountain battle and its useless

sacrifices, and every body will remember, too, the candor with which

Sherman wrote that it was a failure, and that the fault was his. All

the minor engagements of his great campaign against Atlanta were

either positive defeats or negative advantages, and yet that wonderful

campaign was won, and all the advantages which could have under any

circumstances accrued from it were gained to us without the losses

which a great battle would have caused. The strategic marches executed

during that campaign are now chapters in the theory and history of

war, and the close student of the art will see more to admire in the

passage of the Chattahoochee River, the march through the gorge of

Snake Creek Gap, and across the Allatoona Mountains, and the flank

movements around Kenesaw and Atlanta, than in the more dashing but

less skillful marches through Georgia and the Carolinas. The campaign

of Atlanta was made in the face of the enemy commanded by their most

skillful general, while during the other and more famous marches no

enemy was met. The campaign through Georgia was merely extensive;

that against Atlanta was both grand in conception and difficult in

execution. One was accomplished at a stride, the other step by step.

The campaign of Atlanta gave rise not only to a new system of warfare,

but even to a new system of tactics. Never before in the history of

war had an army been known to be constantly under fire for one hundred

consecutive days. Men whom three years of service had made veterans

learned during that campaign a system of fighting they had never heard

of before. The whole army became at once from necessity pioneers and

sharp-shooters. The opposing armies lay so close to each other that not

only pickets, but whole corps were within musket range of each other,

and every camp had to be intrenched. As a singular fact, showing the

impression made on the minds of the men by the changed tactics which

this campaign rendered necessary, I may mention that the soldiers

called each other "gophers" and "beavers;" and "gopher holes" were

more common in the armies' track than were camp-fires. It used to be

laughingly said of the men that, instead of "souring onto," i.e. taking

without leave each other's rations, they were in the habit, during the

Atlanta campaign, of purloining each other's pick-axes and spades with

which to dig their "gopher holes" or trenches for their protection from

the enemy's sharp-shooters. I imagine it is on this campaign and its

results, rather than on that from Atlanta to the sea, and from thence

to Goldsboro', that General Sherman would prefer to rest his reputation

in the future.[2] We of to-day study the holiday marches from a very

different stand-point from that which the generations which follow us

will view them. When all things come to be critically examined and

carefully summed up, it will be decided and adjudged that the battles

which made the campaign to the sea and through the Carolinas successes

were fought on the hills around Nashville by General Thomas, not by

General Sherman. Yet they are not without their great merit. Undertaken

with deliberation and after elaborate preparation, they were not

wanting in boldness and originality of design, but they do not serve to

illustrate strategy: it is only the logistics which are so admirable.

A great deal has been said and written about General Sherman's dislike

for the newspapers and for that class of necessary nuisances which were

with every army, the war correspondents; but it was a dislike that was

in a great measure affected. All men are egotists, Grant and Sherman

among the rest, and both like to be well spoken of and written about;

they would hardly be human if they did not. In fact, if Sherman can

not find somebody to write about him, he does it himself. One of the

instances in which he has complimented himself is destined to give

every student of the art of war a knowledge of this weak point of his

character. Shortly after the successful passage of the Chattahoochee

River in the face of the enemy, an operation which was among the

finest accomplishments of the campaign of Atlanta, Sherman published

an address to his troops, in which he said, with pardonable egotism,

"The crossing of the Chattahoochee and breaking of the Augusta Road was

most handsomely executed by us, and will be studied as an example in

the art of war." A still greater piece of egotism from his pen is not

less amusing. It is that letter in which he refers to his having been

a scourge to the South, and in which he adds, "Think how much better

that it was I than Ben Butler or some other of that school." This, to

say the least, must have been pleasant to "Ben" and "others of that

school," if not modest in General Sherman.

This egotism led to an affectation of simplicity in style and

carelessness in habits which produced a very pleasant incident at

Nashville in 1864. Sherman was very fond of the theatre, and would

go as often as he found time. When he first arrived in the "City of

Rocks," the manager of the "New Nashville Theatre" waited on him with

the tender of a private box. The general declined it, and instead of

appearing in a private box, would be found very frequently sitting in

the pit of the theatre surrounded by his "boys in blue," and laughing

at the comicalities or applauding the "points" with as much gusto as

any of the audience. This affectation of the republican in manners

gained him more notice than if he had sat in a private box, and every

body enjoyed seeing him there except the manager, who complained that

it was injuring his business. No officer dared to sit in a private

box with Sherman present in the pit, and these places became, during

Sherman's stay, "a beggarly account of empty boxes" indeed.

I once had a long conversation with General Sherman on the subject of

the press and war correspondents, from which I learned very little more

than that he was very much disposed to underrate the advantages of the

one and the abilities of the other, but very willing to accept, though

with an affected ill grace, the praises of either. He declared in that

conversation that the government could well afford to purchase all the

printing-presses in the country at the price of diamonds, and then

destroy them, and that all the war correspondents should be hung as

spies. Sherman, with all his affected contempt for the press, is more

indebted to it than any other officer in the army.

From time immemorial--at least from the days of Suwarrow and of "Old

Fritz"--Frederick the Great--troops have always given nicknames to

the commanders they adored. The veteran soldier is an affectionate

creature, and he evinces his lovable disposition pretty much as the

women do, by the use of pet names and expressive adjectives. The

veterans had a slang of their own, as expressive to the initiated and

as incomprehensible to the ignorant as the more systematically arranged

jargon of the showman, gambler, or peddler. Increasing affection for

a popular leader was evinced by an increase in the intensity of the

adjective or pronoun applied to the person. A popular leader may have

at one time been only "Colonel," but as his popularity increased and

he won the affection of his men, he was called "_The_ Colonel,"

"Our Colonel," and "Our Bully Colonel." At the height of McClellan's

popularity his soldiers invariably called him "Little Mac." Sheridan

was always "Little Phil," John A. Logan always "Black Jack," and Thomas

has successively been known as "Old Slow Trot," "Uncle George," and

"Old Pap," the latter being the superlative form of expression.

Sherman has not entirely escaped "nicknames," though he has been more

fortunate in this respect than some other commanders. In 1861 the Home

Guards of Louisville gave him a name which has never been used by any

other body of troops. It was under the following circumstances: The

Home Guard marched under Sherman's leadership from Louisville to meet

the invasion of Buckner. While moving to Lebanon Junction the general

spoke to the men, telling them of the necessity which had arisen for

their services, and proposed to muster them into the United States

service for thirty days. Few of them had blankets, none had haversacks,

and no tents were at the time on hand. The men were really not prepared

to remain long in the field, and some demurred at the length of time

mentioned. Sherman grew very angry at this, and spoke very harshly,

intimating that he considered the Home Guards a "paltry set of

fellows." The men were chagrined at this, and much embittered against

him, and on the spot voted him "a gruff old cock." They soon found,

however, that they had to accept him as a commander, when one of them

remarked, "It was a bitter pill." Out of this grew the title of "Old

Pills," which was at once fastened upon the general. The men consented

to be mustered for fifteen days. This put Sherman in an excellent humor

again, and he promised them tents, blankets, etc., immediately. This,

in turn, put the Guards in a high glee, and one of them suggesting that

"Old Pills" was sugar-coated, the nickname was modified, and he was

known ever after as "Old Sugar-coated Pill."

Later in the war his troops fixed upon one title of endearment for

Sherman which will doubtless stick to him to the last. It expressed no

peculiarity, was not properly a nickname, but simply an expression of

affection. He will always be known to his veterans as "Old Billy." His

veterans of 1861 and 1862 called him "Old Sherman," and few will forget

it who heard General Rousseau's brigade hail him by that title during

the battle of Shiloh. On the day of that battle, while hotly engaged

near the log church which gave its name to the field, Sherman met a

brigade of Buell's fresh troops moving forward to his support, and

hastily asked whose troops they were. General Rousseau, who commanded

the brigade, rode hastily through the line to meet Sherman, who had

been dismounted for the third time by the fire of the enemy, and had

one wounded arm in a sling, while his face was blackened by the fire of

his own artillery.

"Rousseau's brigade," said that officer--"your old troops, General

Sherman."

At the mention of Sherman's name, Rousseau's men, who had made their

first campaign under Sherman, recognized him. "There's old Sherman,"

ran along their lines, and in an instant more there broke above the din

of the battle three loud ringing cheers for "Old Sherman." Sherman

took no notice of the cheers at the time, but his subsequent report of

the battle showed that he was not oblivious to the compliment. At the

moment he simply ordered the brigade forward. It was about the time the

rebels began falling back, and soon the advance thus ordered became a

pursuit of the foe.

Sherman is an inveterate smoker. He smokes, as he does every thing

else, with an energy which it would be supposed would deprive him of

all the pleasure of smoking. He is fully as great a smoker as Grant,

whose propensity in that line is well known, but he is very unlike

him in his style of smoking. Grant smokes as if he enjoyed his cigar.

Sherman smokes as if it were a duty to be finished in the shortest

imaginable time. Grant will smoke lying back in his chair, his body and

mind evidently in repose, his countenance calm and settled. He blows

the smoke slowly from his mouth, and builds his plans and thoughts in

the clouds which are formed by it about his head. He smokes his tobacco

as the Chinese do their opium, and with that certain sort of oblivious

disregard for every thing else which it is said characterizes the opium

smoker. He enjoys his mild Havana in quiet dignity, half-smoking,

half-chewing it. Sherman puffs furiously, as if his cigar was of the

worst character of "penny grabs" and would not "draw." He snatches it

frequently, and, one might say, furiously, from his mouth, brushing the

ashes off with his little finger. He continually paces the floor while

smoking, generally deep in thought of important matters, doubtless;

but a looker-on would imagine that he was endeavoring to solve the

question of how to draw smoke through his cigar. He seldom or never

finishes it, leaving at least one half of it a stump. When he used to

frequent the Associated Press-rooms at Louisville in 1861, he would

often accumulate and leave upon the agent's table as many as eight

or ten of these stumps, which the porter of the rooms used to call

"Sherman's old soldiers." Even until long after Anderson's assumption

of command at Louisville the agent of the New Orleans papers continued

sending his telegrams for the rebel papers to New Orleans. This man was

a rabid secessionist, and disliked Sherman exceedingly. He used to say

of him that he smoked as some men whistled--"for want of thought." This

is undoubtedly a mistake; for close observers say that, while smoking,

Sherman is deepest absorbed in thought.

He is certainly, when smoking, almost totally oblivious to what is

going on around him. This peculiar absence of mind had an excellent

illustration in a circumstance which occurred at Lebanon Junction,

Kentucky, when first occupied by Sherman and the Home Guards. While

walking up and down the railroad platform at that place, awaiting

the repair of the telegraph line to Louisville, Sherman's cigar gave

out. He immediately took another from his pocket, and, approaching

the orderly-sergeant of the "Marion Zouaves"--one of the Home Guard

companies--asked for a light. The sergeant had only a moment before

lighted his cigar, and, taking a puff or two to improve the fire, he

handed it, with a bow, to the general. Sherman carefully lighted his

weed, took a puff or two to assure himself, and, having again lapsed

into his train of thought, abstractedly threw away the sergeant's

cigar. General Rousseau and several other officers were standing by at

the time, and laughed heartily at the incident; but Sherman was too

deeply buried in thought to notice the laughter or mishap. Three years

subsequently, at his head-quarters in Nashville, Rousseau endeavored

to recall this occurrence to Sherman's mind. He could not recollect

it, and replied, "I was thinking of something else. It won't do to let

to-morrow take care of itself. Your good merchant don't think of the

ships that are in, but those that are to come in. The evil of to-day is

irreparable. Look ahead to avoid breakers. You can't when your ship is

on them. All you can then do is to save yourself and retrieve disaster.

I was thinking of something else when I threw the sergeant's cigar

away." And then he added, laughing, "Did I do that, really?"

With the personal appearance of General Sherman the public are but

little acquainted. Very few full-length pictures of him have been made.

Of the numerous engravings and photographs which have been published

since he became famous very few are good likenesses, and none convey a

proper idea of his general appearance. The best picture which I have

seen is the one from which the accompanying engraving is made. The

outlines of the features are given with great accuracy, and any one

familiar with the general's physiognomy will pronounce it a faithful

likeness, though the position in which the subject sat serves to

conceal the extreme Romanism of his nose. There is a scowl on the face,

and yet the expression is that of Sherman in a good humor. He seldom

has such a self-satisfied air. A critical observer of the picture in

question would remark that Sherman has done in this case what he seldom

takes time or has inclination to do, and has given the artist a special

sitting. He has "made himself up" for the occasion. If the critic were

one of Sherman's soldiers, he would notice the absence from his lips

of the inevitable cigar. The coat, it will be observed, is buttoned

across the breast, and is the chief fault of the engraving, for Sherman

seldom or never buttons his coat either across his breast or around

his waist. His vest is always buttoned by the lower button only, and,

fitting close around his waist, adds to his appearance of leanness. It

is doubtful if at this time any one can be found, except the general's

tailor, who can tell when his coat was new. He appears to have an

aversion to new clothes, and has never been seen in a complete new suit

or heard in creaking boots. It may be said that he never conforms to

the regulations in respect to the color of his suit; for the uniform he

generally wears has lost its original color, and is of that dusty and

rusty tinge, and with that lack of gloss which follows constant use.

One would readily imagine, judging by its appearance, that he purchased

his uniform second-hand. The hat which he generally wears is of the

same order of faded "regulation," with the crown invariably puffed out

instead of being pushed in, in the "Burnside style." The regulation

cord and tassel he does not recognize at all.

With the exception of his eyes, none of the features of Sherman's

countenance are indicative of his character. Altogether he is

commonplace in appearance, neither excessively handsome nor painfully

repulsive. At the same time, divest him of his regulations, and in a

crowd his face would attract attention and afford a study. His eyes,

conforming to his general character, are as restless as his body or

mind. They are rather of a dull though light color, their restlessness

giving them whatever they possess of brilliancy and animation. His

lips close firmly and closely, and with the deep lines running from

his nostrils to either corner of his mouth, give to the lower half of

his face an air of decision indicative of his character. His hands

are long, slender, and tapering, like those of a woman, and are in

admirable keeping with his figure. His short, crisp whiskers, which

grow unshaven, and which appear to be stunted in growth, are of a dingy

red, or what is commonly called "sandy" color. He takes very little

care of his whiskers and hair, each having to be content, with one

careless brushing a day. He has, perhaps, as great a disregard for his

personal appearance as he pretends to have for what others may say or

think of him.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] "A fiery soul, which, working out its way,

Fretted the pigmy body to decay,

And o'er informed the tenement of clay."

[2] A more laborious campaign than that of Atlanta was never

undertaken, and it is difficult to say which soldier deserves the most

credit for the movements, Sherman or Joe Johnston. The retreats of the

latter were not less admirable than the flank marches of the former,

and Johnston showed as clean heels as Sherman did a fully guarded

front. His camps were left barren; Sherman found only Johnston's

smoking camp-fires, but no spoils left behind him. It was looked upon

by the officers of Sherman's army as the "cleanest retreat of the war,"

and it is very evident now that, had Johnston remained in command,

and been allowed to continue his Fabian policy, Sherman could never

have made his march to the sea, and the capture of Atlanta would have

been a Cadmean victory to him. Johnston proved himself a very superior

soldier--in fact, the superior general of the Southern armies. If it

could be said of any of the rebels, it could be said of Johnston that,

in fact, he was

"The noblest Roman of them all:

All the conspirators, save only he,

Did that they did in envy of great Cæsar.

He only, in a generous, honest thought,

And common good to all, made one of them."