THE LAST OUTLOOK ON LIFE
The view of life that man has on leaving it is the final test of his
philosophy of life. These are my thoughts: It is time to detach thyself
from this earth. The shadows are lengthening. Look around you and note
the strange changes that have taken place in the men and women of your
acquaintance. Those that you once knew in their prime are now old and
wrinkled,—and how many already dead! As you survey the procession of
life, how many vacant places are there in it! How many true and loyal
comrades have been swept away! Or go into the busy streets of the
city, and look at the multitude passing through them. You are still
one of this multitude. Presently you will drop out. There will perhaps
be a little ripple on the surface, and then the stream will flow on
as before. How curious is it to think that this frame of life which
sustains such high faculties should crumble into a little heap of dust
at the touch of the wand of death! Detach thyself, therefore, relax
thy hold by anticipation as thou shalt soon relax it actually. But
detachment does not mean cold inattention or unnatural shrinking from
the earthly scene, like that of the monk in his cell. Relax thy hold
on what is earthly in the earthly scene, and fix thy loving attention
all the more on what is _spiritually significant_ in it. Regard with
a friendly eye the beauty of the natural landscape around thee—yonder
lake and yonder noble mountain summit. They are earthly, yet are they
also hieroglyphs and symbols.
Still more is this true of thy social relations. Detach thyself means
relax thy hold on what is transient in those relations. Cling all the
more firmly to what is spiritual in them. The earth is thy foundation,
thou art Antæus as long as thou remainest in contact with the earth.
Until the very last thou must lean for strength upon the earthly bases
and substrata.
Consider the drive of the human race through the time and space world,
and its net result. Thou standest now on a high tower. Lean over
the parapet and peer as far out into the future as thou canst. Thou
standest as did Moses on Mount Pisgah. Strain thy eyes to catch sight
of the Promised Land. But remember that the Promised Land turned out
to be a land still of promise, not of fulfilment,—a land in which the
prophetic soul of Israel matured its visions of a fulfilment never on
earth to be attained.
Remember that as thou art linked to thy ancestry, so art thou linked
to posterity. The future centuries of the human race are like the
future years of an individual. Thou art keenly interested in what may
happen hereafter to the race with which thou art interlinked. But the
race, like the individual, will be cut off and become extinct before
ever the ideal is reached. Remember, therefore, that the purpose for
which humanity exists is achieved at every moment in everyone who
appropriates the fruits of partial success and frustration. Whosoever
standing on the earth as a foundation builds up for himself the
spiritual universe attains the purpose of human existence. There is
indeed progress in the explicitness with which the spiritual ideal is
conceived, and we are immeasurably interested in the greater light to
be attained by our posterity. But the essential fruition of the contact
of the infinite that is in us with the finite world is achievable at
every moment in every human being. And this gives an entirely new
meaning to the spiritual gains achieved in solitude, which seem vain
because there are no witnesses. But neither will there be witnesses
when the last human beings perish on earth. The spiritual bravery of
the shipwrecked man who sinks on the lonely ocean springs from the
conviction that though the sea can overwhelm him there is that in
him greater than ocean’s immensity; a conviction achieved through
the experience of living in the life of others. The same is the gain
achieved by the sick man who lies in solitude like a helpless log in
the darkened room. The altruistic philosophy fails in accounting for
the moral grandeur that attaches to the spiritual victories gained in
silence and solitude.
Face the terrors of life before you leave life. Be resolute to the
last not to cherish illusions. Face the terrors of life, the absence
of observable design, the cruelties, the ferocities. Think of William
Blake’s poem “The Tiger”: “Did he who made the lamb make thee?” In your
philosophy there is no question any longer of a Creator. Creation is an
attempt to explain the coexistence of the imperfect with the perfect,
to account for a lower stage in terms of a higher. The ultimate
inability of man to understand, to explain, is one of the principal
frustrations he meets with, is the crucifixion of man at the point of
his intellect.
The radical incompetence of man to grasp with his intellect the
world as a “universe,” is to be faced by him and accepted without
qualification. It marks off this philosophy of life from those
philosophies and theologies which have attempted to explain the
universe, and which, while affecting humility, are the dupes of an
unwarranted self-confidence. Unqualified admission of the incompetence
of the human intellect to resolve the world riddle is the determining
factor in the more profound humility which characterizes the religion
of ethical experience. Agnosticism on the intellectual side is the very
condition of the transcending ethical conviction subsequently attained.
Without intellectual agnosticism there is no ethical certainty.
Consider now frustration and its supreme outcome, or the various
points at which man is crucified. I have mentioned the intellectual
crucifixion, due to the incompetence of the mind to understand. I must
now speak of still more poignant experiences due to the incompetence of
man adequately to fulfill the moral law, or to carry out the spiritual
relation in finite terms.
I have reached the bourne, or am very near it. The shadows lengthen,
the twilight deepens. I look back on my life and its net results. I
have seen spiritual ideals, and the more clearly I saw them, the wider
appeared the distance between them and the empirical conditions, and
the changes I could effect in those conditions. I have worked in
social reform, and the impression I have been able to make now seems to
me so utterly insignificant as to make my early sanguine aspirations
appear pathetic. I have seen the vision of democracy in the air, and on
the ground around me I have seen the sordid travesty of democracy—not
only in practice but in idea. I have caught the far outlook upon the
organization of mankind, the extension of the spiritual empire over the
earth by the addition to it of new provinces, and I do not find even
the faintest beginnings, or recognition of the task which the advanced
nations should set themselves. I scrutinize closely my relations
to those who have been closest to me,—and I find that I have been
groping in the dark with respect to their most real needs, and that my
faculty of divination has been feeble. I look lastly into my heart,
my own character, and the effort I have made to fuse the discordant
elements there, to achieve a genuine integrity there, and I find the
disappointment in that respect the deepest of all.
These are the various points of my life at which I have undergone the
crucifixion. I am like Arnold Winkelried, who gathered the sheaf of
spears into his breast, and even pressed them inward, to make a way for
liberty. So do I press the sharp-pointed spears of frustration into my
breast to make way for spiritual liberty. For these cruel spears turn
into shafts of light, radiating outward along which my spirit travels,
building its final nest—the spiritual universe.
Consider the new and profounder humility. In ethical experience is
revealed the plan of the spiritual relations, but the entities or
substances which are thus related are incognizable, unknowable. Did
I know them I should be able to solve the riddle of the universe. I
should know how it is that the finite exists side by side with the
infinite. But I cannot know. I cannot enter into the counsels of
the multiform godhead. There are the mighty powers that weave and
interweave behind the veil, but the veil between them and myself is
down, not to be lifted. Within the palace of light is the solemn and
serene assembly of the gods: I, man, stand at the gate.
The world as we know it is itself the veil, the screen, that shuts out
the interplay, the weavings and the interweavings of the spiritual
universe. But at least at one point, in the ethical experience of man,
is the screen translucent. The plan of the spiritual relation is there
traced in outline. It is this plan that conveys the certainty as to
what verily exists beyond, within, beneath.
As to my empirical self, I let go my hold on it. I see it perish with
the same indifference which the materialist asserts, for whom man is
but a compound of physical matter and physical force. It is the real
self, of which the empirical was the substratum, upon which I tighten
my hold. I do not assert immortality, since immortality, like creation,
is a bridge between the phenomenal and the spiritual levels. Creation
is the bridge at the beginning; immortality the bridge at the end. Were
I able to build the bridge, I should know. I do not affirm immortality.
I affirm the real and irreducible existence of the essential self. Or
rather, as my last act, I affirm that the ideal of perfection which
my mind inevitably conceives has its counterpart in the ultimate
reality of things, is the truest reading of that reality whereof man is
capable. I turn away from the thought of the self, even the essential
self, as if that could be my chief concern, toward the vaster infinite
whole in which the self is integrally preserved. I affirm that there
verily is an eternal divine life, a best beyond the best I can think
or imagine, in which all that is best in me, and best in those who are
dear to me, is contained and continued. In this sense _I bless the
universe. And to be able to bless the universe in one’s last moments
is the supreme prize which man can wrest from life’s struggles, life’s
experience._
I look back upon my life once more, and am grateful for the eternal
worth which it was permitted me in this frail vessel of my mortal
existence to hold, for the shimmer of the spiritual reality of things
which I was permitted to see; grateful especially to those who loved
me, and whom I was permitted to love, and who were to me in some
measure revealers of the eternal life.
Consider lastly the peace that passeth understanding. Now, if ever,
this peace should descend upon me. There is a kind of peace that is
accessible to the understanding, and there is the peace that passeth
understanding. The peace that can be understood is that which consists
in the relief of pain. It arises in various ways. After an acute attack
of physical pain how like balm is felt the succeeding absence of pain.
After a prolonged sickness, when the convalescent takes his first walk,
what a sweet tranquillity fills his mind! There is also the mental
relief that comes when some danger has been safely passed; the peace
of the sheltered fireside to one who has passed through a storm. Again,
there is the peace that follows pecuniary anxiety, or the removal of
some carking care, as when an erring son is reclaimed, or an estranged
wife or husband is found anew.
But the peace that passeth understanding is that which comes when the
pain is _not_ relieved, which subsists in the midst of the painful
situation, suffusing it, which springs out of the pain itself, which
shimmers on the crest of the wave of pain, which is the spear of
frustration transfigured into the shaft of light.
It is upon those we love that we must anchor ourselves spiritually in
the last moments. The sense of interconnectedness with them stands
out vividly by way of contrast at the very moment when our mortal
connection with them is about to be dissolved. And the intertwining of
our life with theirs, the living in the life that is in them, is but
a part of our living in the infinite manifold of the spiritual life.
The thought of this, as apprehended, not in terms of knowledge, but in
_immediate experience_, begets the peace that passeth understanding.
And it is upon the bosom of that peace that we can pass safely out of
the realm of time and space.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX I
SPIRITUAL SELF-DISCIPLINE
The preceding volume in its entirety and in every part is nothing else
than a book of spiritual self-discipline. Every religion presents to
its followers as real objects that the eye has not seen. The certainty
of the existence of these objects, religious certainty, religious
conviction, springs from one or other kind of need and distress. The
object that the eye has not seen is believed in because it corresponds
to that need, and relieves that distress. Furthermore, the conviction
is strengthened, the certainty intensified, by two methods: (1)
elaboration of the ideas presented; (2) performing acts in the doing
of which the existence of the objects is presupposed. Thus the idea of
the Heavenly Father corresponds to the childlike need of protection.
The elaboration of this idea in theological systems strengthens its
hold, every idea being powerful as an active force in proportion as it
is worked out in detail and linked up with other ideas. And ceremonies,
prayers, acts of worship in the doing of which the reality of the
Father-God is presupposed, strengthen the belief in him. Conduct is
one of the chief sources of belief. The more frequently a devout
Roman Catholic prays to the Virgin Mary, the more firmly will he be
convinced that she exists and hears him. These features are common to
all religion: unseen objects are presented as real; the belief in their
reality is augmented by elaboration of the ideas; and above all their
hold is reinforced by practice founded on and presuming the reality of
the ideas.
The unseen object which the religion of spiritual experience presents
is the unique personality. The lines along which the ideas are to be
elaborated have been sketched in the above. Conduct based on the
presumption that the divine nature exists in every human being is the
principal means of fortifying that conviction, and this presumption
itself rests on the fundamental fact of worth.
The difference in rank between the various religions depends on the
kind of need which they seek to satisfy. It may be physical, as when
the worshiper prays for large herds and fruitful crops. It may be the
urging of a passion, as when a man prays for revenge on his enemies.
And it may be ethical. And if ethical, it may be purely ethical, or
ethical with non-ethical elements admixed. A religion is neither
approved nor condemned because it satisfies a need. The judgment passed
on it depends on the kind of need it undertakes to satisfy.
Seek to raise the plus traits to the Nth degree. Seek through spiritual
sex interaction to release the spiritual life in the child. Bring
to birth in thyself the idea of the state, etc. Every chapter of
this volume contains some direction as to the lines of conduct to be
followed. The principal self-discipline consists in the effort to
follow these lines.
But experience tells us that the effort may be hindered or helped in
certain ways. I shall mention a few of the helps and hindrances:
Physical and Mental _Athleticism_ are helps to Moral Athleticism.
Ethics is a science of energetics. Bodily and mental energy is
favorable to ethical energizing. By mental energy I understand
especially the habit of vigorously attacking complex and difficult
mental problems.
Right _Asceticism_ is related to Ethical Development. I exclude
self-abnegation and self-repression practiced as drill apart from any
particular occasion requiring them, holding that self-repression should
always be incidental to self-expression. This applies especially to the
hygiene of the sex passion. A positive ideal of the sex relation, as in
marriage, is an invaluable help in ennobling and thereby restraining
the passion.
The Ethical Life is the supremely Planful Life. There is a hierarchy of
ends of which the ethical is the apex. The ethical end is the supreme
end to which all others are to be planfully subordinated. The habit of
conducting one’s life planfully is favorable to ethical behavior. I say
planfully, not pedantically, due regard being always had to spontaneity.
Among hindrances to Ethical development may be mentioned the tendency
to be satisfied with the _minor perfections_. The better is the
greatest enemy of the best. The disproportionate value set on the
embellishments of life is but one illustration of this point.
A great hindrance to the spiritual life is the necessity under which
we lie of restricting our actual ethical relations to a _few persons_.
We cannot extend our influence to the millions of China and India.
We cannot even deeply influence a considerable number of our fellow
citizens. On ethical grounds we do acknowledge the claims of each
individual, of all these myriads of human beings. Yet as far as any
actual good we can do them is concerned, we are powerless, and must
leave them to their fate. The tragic aspect of life comes home to us
sharply at this point. Intensity must take the place of extensity.
Intensive spiritual relations with a few will teach us at least to
conceive worthily of those personalities whom we cannot directly
affect, and to invest them in idea with the honor which is their due.
Intimate spiritual relations with a few will also counteract the
unethical habit of labeling those with whom we come into casual
contact according to the special functions they happen to exercise.
Thus a letter-carrier is apt to be thought of as an animated machine
to carry letters, a stenographer as a kind of animated machine to
take dictation, the servant in the house a machine to render physical
service. The more complete our appreciation of personality is in the
case of the few, the more we shall be impelled to transfer the concept
of personality, at least in its outlines, to all others. In this way
our friendships, our close relations, will not restrict our ethical
horizon. In the narrower circle we shall engender those ideas which
in thought at least we can carry out to the farthest limits of human
society.
But among the hindrances to ethical practice the two most conspicuous
must not be omitted. They are _pity_ and _terror_, pity for the pain
suffered by others, fear of pain for oneself. Aristotle regarded it
as the high function of the tragic drama to liberate men from these
disturbing factors. The two are combined and in consequence exacerbated
to an extreme degree in those situations where the pain suffered by
another person is at the same time poignantly felt as one’s own pain.
And the anguish felt in seeing the physical suffering of another is
even exceeded in witnessing the moral degradation of another, as of an
erring son or an apparently irreclaimable husband or wife. The doctrine
of frustration as explained in this volume is intended to show the way
of relief in such situations. But it is only by not shirking the pain,
by permitting it fully to penetrate, by uncovering the breast entirely
to the entrance of the pointed spear that we shall have the experience
of the transformation of it into the shaft of light.
APPENDIX II[103]
THE EXERCISE OF FORCE IN THE INTEREST OF FREEDOM
Force is a moral adiaphoron. The stigma attaching to the use of force
belongs rather to its abuse. The employment of force is good or bad
according as the ends for which it is used are good or bad.
The precept of non-resistance in the Sermon on the Mount is to be
understood as a piece of ethical irony.
The right, or to be more explicit, the duty, of society to coerce
individual members of it rests on the same ground and holds within
the same limits as the duty of the individual to coerce himself.
Self-coercion depends on the difference in the quality of one’s
impulses, on the choice one is bound to make between competitive ends.
Self-coercion is of two kinds: stimulative and repressive; stimulative
to overcome inertia, repressive to subject wrong to right impulses.
He who denies the duty of self-coercion, to be consistent, must
fall back on the position of the Cynics. For the Cynics were indeed
consistent. They asserted not only the right of the individual to be
free from outside compulsion, but also the right of each individual
moment of the individual’s life to be lived without regard or
subjection to future moments. Hence they rejected civilization and
its tasks, inasmuch as the prosecution of any task involves the
subordination of the present to the content of some future moment.
But if the coercion of a man by himself be admitted, it follows that
the exercise of force upon a man by society must in principle be
likewise admitted. For we are social by nature; we take an interest in
the achievement by each one of his ends, and we regard such achievement
as a social-benefit.
As to the limits within which outside interference is to be permitted
and welcomed, these can best be ascertained by fastening attention
upon the end to be attained. And here the positive conception of
freedom seems to be the most helpful,—freedom defined as the release
in each one of his essential self, that is, of his distinctive gift
and capability, or of that in him which is unique or most nearly so. A
society in which such valuable contributions were elicited from each
would be the ideal society. Stimulative and repressive social coercion
are justified in so far as they provoke energy and check disturbing
impulses,—always of course without discouraging spontaneity, which is
the very good to be secured.
The antithesis of reason and force common in discussions of this
subject seems misleading and inadequate; since reason is a faculty of
inference and not of preference, has to do with the adapting of means
to ends, and does not of itself afford guidance in the choice of ends.
The concept of freedom as defined is more illuminating. Let freedom and
force be contrasted, not reason and force.
The idea of law that would follow from what has been said may be
illustrated by comparing the action of law with that of automatism
in the human body. The system of co-ordinations by which we learn to
walk, or acquire any kind of skill, such as that of performing on a
musical instrument, is at first painfully and consciously acquired.
Consciousness superintends every step in the process. But after a
time the sequences reel off automatically. Consciousness retires from
the field, ascends to a higher plane, and devotes itself to more
interesting and significant business. Law, taking it in its broadest
sense, may be regarded as the automatic machinery of freedom. It is
the system of stimulations and repressions which the experience of
mankind at any given time has found conducive to the attainment of the
superior ends of life. In the minds of the more advanced members of
the community repressive laws like the prohibitions of murder, theft,
etc., have already become automatic. Such a thing as questioning or
transgressing these laws never once in a lifetime occurs to them. (Of
the stimulative laws, such as the requirement to pay taxes in support
of the progressive interests of society, the same is not yet true.) As
regards the backward members of society, however, the repressive laws
are educative. Just as in certain diseases the convalescent needs to
acquire anew the art of walking, which his neighbors exercise without
thinking, so the backward members of society have to learn painfully
those habits of repression which for others have sunk below the
threshold of consciousness.
Social compulsion therefore may be defined as discipline in the
interest of positive freedom. We may expect that in future this
salutary kind of compulsion will go to even much greater lengths than
it has yet gone. Society as organized in the state has undoubtedly
the right to interfere in the choice of the sexes by prohibiting the
marriage of persons afflicted with infectious disease. If the study of
human character could ever be so far developed as to determine what
kind of temperaments are radically incompatible with one another (a
bare throw in the air of course), it would be within the province of
the state to prohibit the conjugal union of such temperaments, and
thus to prevent the disastrous effects on real freedom which such
incompatibilities are apt to cause.
I am well aware of the perils of this point of view. There is a
brutal factor in the action of society, as in that of individuals. A
given community is apt to mistake its prejudices for principles, its
torpor for conservatism, its superstitions for spirituality. Such
apprehensions as those that weighed on the mind of John Stuart Mill as
set forth in his _Essay on Liberty_ are not to be lightly dismissed.
And yet the main trend of his argument was plainly determined by an
individualistic conception of liberty which many of us no longer share.
It is safe to say that on the whole the benefits of coercion outweigh
the detriments. We have only to picture to ourselves a state of society
in which these coercions should not exist to realize that this is so.
The dangers are real, but are due to the abuse of force and not to the
exercise of it under the controlling idea of positive freedom which is
here proposed.
FOOTNOTES:
[103] A paper read before the Fourth Conference on Legal and Social
Philosophy at Columbia University, November, 1915. (Reprinted from the
_International Journal of Ethics_, April, 1916, pp. 420-423.)
INDEX
Achilles, 210
Africa, exploitation of, 187f, 335
Altruism, 79, 218, 220, 256
Antæus, 355
ἄπαξ λεγόμενον, 228
A priori knowledge, 105f, 111
Architecture, 286n
Aristotle, 105, 127, 168n, 190, 281, 305, 319, 365
Ark of the Covenant, 77
Arnold, Matthew, 10, 298
Arnold von Winkelried, 358
Art, relation to Ethics, 277f;
limitations, 287n;
students of, 296
Asceticism, 363
Bacon, _On Studies_, 10
Baptism, 353
Beatrice, 170
Beauty, 281f
Bereavement, 64, 162f
Bergson, 108, 131n
Blackstone, 185
Blake, William, 356
Bloch, 242
Bluntschli, 327f
Buddha, 16, 32, 199, 347
Cæsar Borgia, 172
Cana, feast at, 206
Categorical Imperative, 75f;
and hypothetical, 80
Causality, “prejudice of,” 110f, 136, 141, 171
Christianity, an estimate of, 30-42;
other-worldliness of, 140, 268;
national, 321;
forced on the East, 331
Church, 347
Citizenship, 322
Confucius, 16, 31, 299
Congo, atrocities in, 330, 335, 338
Conscience, origin of, 78
Copernicus, 141
Creation, doctrine of, 139, 356
Cromer, Lord, 331n
Crucifixion, of man, 357f
Cynics, 366
Dante, 198n, 283
Darwinism, 59, 78f, 120
“Death in Life,” 225
Decalogue, 198
Democracy, ethical aspect of, 125, 143;
political, 319n;
evils in, 321, 330n;
new conception of, 340n
Dependence, 226
Dilke, Sir Charles, 335n
Discipline, 244f
Duality, of character traits, 208f
Duty, in Kant, 75f;
conflicts of, 317f
Education, state, 252;
as vocation, 291f;
for adults, 301f;
moral, 302n
Edwards, Jonathan, 163
Egoism, 220
Elisha, the prophet, 61
Emerson, estimate of, 27-29;
_Essay on Love_, 164n
Ends, proximate and ultimate, 50-51;
in Kant, 74, 89;
instrumental, 138, 166, 229f, 268;
unattainable in finite world, 149f, 158;
hierarchy of, 363
Enemies, 205;
intellectual, 207n
Erastianism, 342
Ethical Culture, Society for, 58, 346n;
School, 58n, 276
Ethics, as non-violation of personality, 7, 35, 54;
individuality of, 24;
as science of ends, 40, 50f;
and social reform, 48;
relation to other subjects, 66;
Kantian, 73f;
an independent discipline, 84f, 132f;
energizing quality of, 93, 101, 135n, 221, 228, 274, 363;
contrast with physical science, 93, 99;
its peculiar manifold, 109f, 114f, 126, 132, 141;
verification in, 112;
and social structure, 191;
and empirical traits, 212f, 223f, 242f;
the law of levitation, 222;
as science of relations, 233;
and industry, 272f;
and art, 277f;
and nationality, 325f;
historical systems of, 346;
and worship, 349, 352
Evil, problem of, 32-34;
immediate reform, 49;
contrasted with sin, 172f
Family, as empirical group, 133, 249f;
spiritual view of, 251f
Festivals, religious, 353
Feudalism, 142
Force, as ethical discipline, 356f;
and freedom, 366f
Forgiveness, 202f
Fouillée, Alfred, 209, 324
Freedom, 148f, 300, 306, 366f
Freud, 79
Friendship, 234f
Froebel, 295
Frustration, in marriage, 62f, 235;
in bereavement, 64;
in intellectual ambition, 65f, 227;
cosmic, 67;
in social betterment, 69;
in achieving ethical uniqueness, 118;
and ethical plan, 137, 140, 147, 150f;
mission of, 152f, 165, 195, 365;
in science, 265;
in vocation, 269;
final realization of, 356f
“Functional Finalities,” 106, 111f
Galileo, 97n
Gang Loyalty, 77
George, Henry, 44
Goethe, 67n, 176n, 198n, 220, 243, 285
God, idea of, 136, 139, 362;
submission to will of, 156;
worship, 350
Greek, art, 16n;
philosophy, 105;
treatment of suffering, 155, 166;
idea of evil, 172;
social system, 190f;
epic, 283;
education, 299
Grotius, 332
Hague Conference, 326
Happiness, 227f
Harnack, Adolf, 39
Hebrews, sex purity, 7;
religion, 14-26;
as elect people, 19;
their mission, 21f;
and problem of evil, 33
Hegel, 139, 343
Helmholtz, 196, 267
History, value of, 247n;
ethical aim of, 275f
Humboldt, William von, 126
Hume, 111
Ilion, 283
Imagination, 267
Immortality, 139, 166f, 359
Individual, the, 246, 250, 295, 319f
Industry, organization of, 271, 274;
representation of, 312
Insanity, 161n
Intellect, 227
Internationalism, 325f;
obstacles to, 332f;
organized, 338n
Isaiah, 22
Jerusalem, siege of, 33
Jesus, as exemplar, 25;
his teaching, 30-42;
and the problem of evil, 33f;
and socialism, 37;
attitude toward sin, 204n, 205
Jews, 347
Justice, social, 194f;
commercial, 215f;
ethical, 217;
legal, 289
Kant, individualistic ethics, 9;
and holiness idea, 59;
Critique of Ethical Ideal, 73f, 137f;
his pre-occupation with physical science, 84f, 88, 100, 133;
doctrine of ends, 74, 80, 87, 100;
_Critique of Pure Reason_, 84, 95, 102;
not a pure rationalist, 95f;
_a priori_ doctrine, 111;
doctrine of worth, 119;
and God idea, 126f;
and ontological argument, 129;
on marriage, 257
Keats, 282
Labor, remuneration of, 193
Lange, Albert, _Die Arbeiterfrage_, 10;
_History of Materialism_, 11
Law, 290, 307;
international, 332f;
divine, 345;
and freedom, 367
Lawyer, vocation of, 289
Lear, King, 282
Leibnitz, 196, 247n, 332
Lessing, 150
Life, right to, 179f
Louis XIV, 316
“Lycidas,” 282
Manifold, of time and space, 96;
in physical science, 107f;
ethical, 109f, 132, 134, 141
Marcus Aurelius, 120
Marriage, and happiness, 61f;
_tabu_ notion of, 77;
spiritual relation in, 163, 258f;
monogamic, 251, 254;
infelicitous, 257;
state control of, 307
Marx, Karl, _Das Kapital_, 44;
type of socialism, 45f
Materialism, of middle class, 52
Mayer, Robert, 196
Mill, J. S., 368
Mommsen, 276n
Monasticism, 40
Monotheism, 20f
Moral Law, as worshipful, 10, 12;
obligation to obey, 75;
universality of, 177;
and worship, 350
More, Sir Thomas, 205n
Moses, 26, 355
National Character, 324;
sins of, 330, 336f
Nature, exploitation of, 186f
Necessity, applied to ethics, 85f;
Kantian, 88
Newton, 84, 94, 196
Nietzsche, 47, 152, 214
Non-resistance, doctrine of, 182
_Noumena_, Kantian, 127n
_Numen_, spiritual, 220, 224, 228, 231
_Œdipus Rex_, 173, 281n
Ontological Argument, 129f
Ostwald, 94
Pantheism, 8n
Paul, St., 38
Peace, spiritual, 360
Pekin, 330
Personal Factor in Ethics, 3-6
Personality, 197, 222, 247, 321
Pestalozzi, 295
Peters, Karl, 335
Philistinism, 52
Philosophy, monism and pluralism, 110
Plagiarism, 197
Plato, transcendent vision of, 16;
his idea of justice, 31;
ethics of, 74, 120, 132;
influence of, 198n;
and eugenics, 214;
and art, 286;
and the State, 305, 313, 319
Poverty, evils of, 44f;
relief of, 51
Pragmatism, 106n, 136n
Prayer, 351f
Property, its rights, 185f;
as a social concept, 189
Ptolemy, 105n
Public Good, 314
Punishment, its object, 176, 203;
capital, 204
Race Prejudice, 236n
Ranke, 247n
“Reality-producing functions,” 114f, 124n, 126, 130, 132, 265
Religion, Types of, 363
Religious Society, 341f;
its teaching, 343f;
organization, 347f;
worship, 349f
Repentance, 203f
Representation, in State, 310n, 322;
proportional, 322
Reputation, right to, 196f
Responsibility, definition, 173f;
for others’ life, 180;
for poverty and suffering, 183f
Reverence, three-fold, 241f, 250;
in family, 253;
in artist, 284f;
in education, 292;
among nations, 324
Reymond, Dubois, 128
Rousseau, _Confessions_, 6;
idea of State, 305
Schiller, 285n
School, 292;
and home, 294;
objects of, 295f;
prevocational, 298;
moral education in, 303;
self-government in, 304
Schopenhauer, 120, 131n
Science, as vocation, 263f;
and internationalism, 334
Self-discipline, 362f
Self-sacrifice, 212f
Sermon on the Mount, 4, 198, 366
Service, 226f
Shelley, 282
Sin, 171f, 202f
Social reform, 48f;
fallacies of, 53f, 268;
spiritual view of, 56;
its object, 261;
various schemes of, 273;
ethical program of, 275n
Socialism, 11, 37, 43f, 56n, 196, 271f, 274
Socrates, 122
Sophocles, 173
Spencer, Herbert, 94
Spinoza, 8
Spiritual Nature, 148, 224, 231
State, ethical conception of, 305f;
sovereignty of, 308f;
organization of, 310f;
as lawmaker, 313;
duty towards, 319;
and individual, 319n;
international relations, 326f;
and religion, 342f
Stephen, the Martyr, 38
Stevenson, R. L., 208n, 211n
Stoicism, 154, 159
Suffering, various attitudes toward, 154f;
ethical attitude, 159f
Sympathy, as ethical motive, 49f, 99n, 156
_Tabus_, 77, 179
Tariff, 314, 315n
Tasks of Life, 268
Thomas à Kempis, 258
Tolstoy, 184
Trade, international, 334f;
slave, 335
Tyndall, 268
Tyrrel, Father, 39, 150n
Universe, spiritual, 125f, 134;
last blessing of, 360
University, ideal of, 298f;
American, 300f
Value, _vs._ Worth, 117n
Vattel, 332
Verification in ethics, 112, 118, 135n
Virtue, 211
Vocation, influence on development, 58f;
_vs._ occupation, 260f;
an ethical classification, 262f;
practical, 270f;
educational, 289f;
represented in State, 310f, 322
Wages and wage-earners, 194, 215n, 216
Waitz, _Anthropologie_, 209
War, when justified, 182f
Wealth, 51;
stewardship of, 192
Whole, ideal of, in ethics, 100f, 114f, 121
Women, in State, 311;
in religious societies, 348
Wordsworth, 282
Worship, religious, 349
Worth, in human personality, 57, 68, 70, 224n, 247;
Kant’s doctrine of, 82f, 89f, 101;
ethical justification of, 91f, 98n;
attributed to man, 101n, 102f;
as member of ethical manifold, 117, 119, 121;
_vs._ value, 117n;
homage to, 349, 360
Zeno, 108
Zionism, 24
Zoroaster, 15