All those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous road
thou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And this
means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust the future
to providence, and direct the present only conformably to piety and
justice. Conformably to piety that thou mayest be content with the lot
which is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for thee and thee for
it. Conformably to justice, that thou mayst always speak the truth
freely and without disguise, and do the things which are agreeable to
law and according to the worth of each. And let neither another man's
wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations of
the poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the passive part will
look to this. If, then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt be near
to thy departure, neglecting everything else thou shalt respect only thy
ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be afraid
not because thou must some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear
never to have begun to live according to nature--then thou wilt be a man
worthy of the universe which has produced thee, and thou wilt cease to
be a stranger in thy native land, and to wonder at things which happen
daily as if they were something unexpected, and to be dependent on this
or that.
2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of all men bared of the
material vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual part
alone he touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived
from himself into these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to do
this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who regards not
the poor flesh which envelops him, surely will not trouble himself by
looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and such like externals and
show.
3. The things are three of which thou art composed: a little body, a
little breath [life], intelligence. Of these the first two are thine, so
far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is
properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is,
from thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou
hast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee
because they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops thee or
in the breath [life], which is by nature associated with the body, is
attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external
circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt
from the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is
just and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt
separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached
to it by the impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and of
time that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles' sphere,
"All round and in its joyous rest reposing;"[A]
and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is,
the present,--then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which
remains for thee up to the time of thy death free from perturbations,
nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon [to the god that is within thee]
(ii. 13, 17; iii. 5, 6; xi. 12).
4. I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more
than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion of
himself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher
should present himself to a man and bid him to think of nothing and to
design nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived it, he
could not endure it even for a single day.[B] So much more respect have
we to what our neighbors shall think of us than to what we shall think
of ourselves.
[A] The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. It has
been restored by Peyron from a Turin manuscript, thus:--
[Greek: Sphairos kykloterês moniê perigêthei gaiôn.]
[B] iii. 4.
5. How can it be that the gods, after having arranged all things well
and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some men,
and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most communion
with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious observances have
been most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died should
never exist again, but should be completely extinguished?
But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise,
the gods would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be
possible; and if it were according to nature, nature would have had it
so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou convinced
that it ought not to have been so: for thou seest even of thyself that
in this inquiry thou art disputing with the Deity; and we should not
thus dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent and most
just; but if this is so, they would not have allowed anything in the
ordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly and irrationally.
6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of
accomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all
other things for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously than
the right hand; for it has been practised in this.
7. Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be when
he is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the
boundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter.
8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things bare of their
coverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what pleasure
is, and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his uneasiness;
how no man is hindered by another; that everything is opinion.
9. In the application of thy principles thou must be like the
pancratiast, not like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the
sword which he uses and is killed; but the other always has his hand,
and needs to do nothing else than use it.
10. See what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form,
and purpose.
11. What a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve, and
to accept all that God may give him.
12. With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought
to blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or
involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily.
Consequently we should blame nobody (ii. 11, 12, 13; vii. 62; 18 viii.
17).
13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at
anything which happens in life.
14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind
providence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director
(iv. 27). If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou
resist? But if there is a providence which allows itself to be
propitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if
there is a confusion without a governor, be content that in such a
tempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even if
the tempest carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor
breath, everything else; for the intelligence at least it will not carry
away.
15. Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splendor until
it is extinguished? and shall the truth which is in thee and justice and
temperance be extinguished [before thy death]?
16. When a man has presented the appearance of having done wrong [say],
How then do I know if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has done
wrong, how do I know that he has not condemned himself? And so this is
like tearing his own face. Consider that he who would not have the bad
man do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree to bear
juice in the figs, and infants to cry, and the horse to neigh, and
whatever else must of necessity be. For what must a man do who has such
a character? If then thou art irritable, + cure this man's
disposition.[A]
17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do not say it.
[For let thy efforts be--][B]
[A] The interpreters translate [Greek: gorgos] by the words
"acer, validusque," and "skilful." But in Epictetus (ii. 16,
20; iii. 12, 10) [Greek: gorgos] means "vehement," "prone to
anger," "irritable."
[B] There is something wrong here, or incomplete.
18. In everything always observe what the thing is which produces for
thee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the
material, the purpose, and the time within which it must end.
19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and more
divine than the things which cause the various affects, and as it were
pull thee by the strings. What is there now in my mind,--is it fear, or
suspicion, or desire, or anything of the kind (v. 11)?
20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose. Second,
make thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social end.
21. Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, nor will
any of the things exist which thou now seest, nor any of those who are
now living. For all things are formed by nature to change and be turned
and to perish, in order that other things in continuous succession may
exist (ix. 28).
22. Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power.
Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner who
has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and
a waveless bay.
23. Any one activity, whatever it may be, when it has ceased at its
proper time, suffers no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has done
this act, does he suffer any evil for this reason, that the act has
ceased. In like manner then the whole, which consists of all the acts,
which is our life, if it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for
this reason, that it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this series
at the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper time and
the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar nature of
man, but always the universal nature, by the change of whose parts the
whole universe continues ever young and perfect.[A] And everything which
is useful to the universal is always good and in season. Therefore the
termination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it
shameful, since it is both independent of the will and not opposed to
the general interest, but it is good, since it is seasonable, and
profitable to and congruent with the universal. For thus too he is moved
by the Deity who is moved in the same manner with the Deity, and moved
towards the same thing in his mind.
[A] vii. 25.
24. These three principles thou must have in readiness: In the things
which thou doest, do nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than as
justice herself would act; but with respect to what may happen to thee
from without, consider that it happens either by chance or according to
providence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse providence.
Second, consider what every being is from the seed to the time of its
receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul to the giving back of
the same, and of what things every being is compounded, and into what
things it is resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly be raised up
above the earth, and shouldst look down on human things, and observe the
variety of them how great it is, and at the same time also shouldst see
at a glance how great is the number of beings who dwell all around in
the air and the ether, consider that as often as thou shouldst be raised
up, thou wouldst see the same things, sameness of form and shortness of
duration. Are these things to be proud of?
25. Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders thee from
casting it away?
26. When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast forgotten this,
that all things happen according to the universal nature; and forgotten
this, that a man's wrongful act is nothing to thee; and further thou
hast forgotten this, that everything which happens, always happened so
and will happen so, and now happens so everywhere; forgotten this too,
how close is the kinship between a man and the whole human race, for it
is a community, not of a little blood or seed, but of intelligence. And
thou hast forgotten this too, that every man's intelligence is a god and
is an efflux of the Deity;[A] and forgotten this, that nothing is a
man's own, but that his child and his body and his very soul came from
the Deity; forgotten this, that everything is opinion; and lastly thou
hast forgotten that every man lives the present time only, and loses
only this.
[A] See Epictetus, ii. 8, 9, etc.
27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have complained
greatly about anything, those who have been most conspicuous by the
greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any kind: then
think where are they all now? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a
tale. And let there be present to thy mind also everything of this sort,
how Fabius Catellinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in his
gardens, and Stertinius at Briae, and Tiberius at Capreae, and Velius
Rufus [or Rufus at Velia]; and in fine think of the eager pursuit of
anything conjoined with pride;[A] and how worthless everything is after
which men violently strain; and how much more philosophical it is for a
man in the opportunities presented to him to show himself just,
temperate, obedient to the gods, and to do this with all simplicity: for
the pride which is proud of its want of pride is the most intolerable of
all.
[A] [Greek: met' oiêseôs. Oiêsis kai typhos], Epict. i. 8, 6.
28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou
comprehend that they exist and so worshippest them, I answer, in the
first place, they may be seen even with the eyes;[A] in the second
place, neither have I seen even my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus
then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of
their power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate
them.
[A] "Seen even with the eyes." It is supposed that this may be
explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a god or
living being (iv. 40), and that the celestial bodies are gods
(viii. 19). But the emperor may mean that we know that the gods
exist, as he afterwards states it, because we see what they do;
as we know that man has intellectual powers, because we see
what he does, and in no other way do we know it. This passage
then will agree with the passage in the Epistle to the Romans
(i. _v_. 20), and with the Epistle to the Colossians (i. _v_.
15), in which Jesus Christ is named "the image of the invisible
god;" and with the passage in the Gospel of St. John (xiv. _v_.
9).
Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of learning,
and all of it sound and good, quotes a passage of Calvin which
is founded on St. Paul's language (Rom. i. _v_. 20): "God by
creating the universe [or world, mundum], being himself
invisible, has presented himself to our eyes conspicuously in a
certain visible form." He also quotes Seneca (De Benef. iv. c.
8): "Quocunque te flexeris, ibi illum videbis occurrentem tibi:
nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse implet." Compare also
Cicero, De Senectute (c. 22), Xenophon's Cyropaedia (viii. 7),
and Mem. iv. 3; also Epictetus, i. 6, de Providentia. I think
that my interpretation of Antoninus is right.
29. The safety of life is this, to examine everything all through, what
it is itself, that is its material, what the formal part; with all thy
soul to do justice and to say the truth. What remains, except to enjoy
life by joining one good thing to another so as not to leave even the
smallest intervals between?
30. There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted by walls,
mountains, and other things infinite. There is one common substance,[A]
though it is distributed among countless bodies which have their several
qualities. There is one soul, though it is distributed among infinite
natures and individual circumscriptions [or individuals]. There is one
intelligent soul, though it seems to be divided. Now in the things which
have been mentioned, all the other parts, such as those which are air
and matter, are without sensation and have no fellowship: and yet even
these parts the intelligent principle holds together and the gravitation
towards the same. But intellect in a peculiar manner tends to that which
is of the same kin, and combines with it, and the feeling for communion
is not interrupted.
[A] iv. 40.
31. What dost thou wish--to continue to exist? Well, dost thou wish to
have sensation, movement, growth, and then again to cease to grow, to
use thy speech, to think? What is there of all these things which seems
to thee worth desiring? But if it is easy to set little value on all
these things, turn to that which remains, which is to follow reason and
God. But it is inconsistent with honoring reason and God to be troubled
because by death a man will be deprived of the other things.
32. How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable time is assigned
to every man, for it is very soon swallowed up in the eternal! And how
small a part of the whole substance; and how small a part of the
universal soul; and on what a small clod of the whole earth thou
creepest! Reflecting on all this, consider nothing to be great, except
to act as thy nature leads thee, and to endure that which the common
nature brings.
33. How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all lies in
this. But everything else, whether it is in the power of thy will or
not, is only lifeless ashes and smoke.
34. This reflection is most adapted to move us to contempt of death,
that even those who think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still
have despised it.
35. The man to whom that only is good which comes in due season, and to
whom it is the same thing whether he has done more or fewer acts
conformable to right reason, and to whom it makes no difference whether
he contemplates the world for a longer or a shorter time--for this man
neither is death a terrible thing (iii. 7; vi. 23; x. 20; xii. 23).
36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the world];[A]
what difference does it make to thee whether for five years [or three]?
for that which is conformable to the laws is just for all. Where is the
hardship then, if no tyrant nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away
from the state, but nature, who brought thee into it? the same as if a
praetor who has employed an actor dismisses him from the stage.[B]--"But
I have not finished the five acts, but only three of them."--Thou sayest
well, but in life the three acts are the whole drama; for what shall be
a complete drama is determined by him who was once the cause of its
composition, and now of its dissolution: but thou art the cause of
neither. Depart then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is
satisfied.
[A] ii. 16; iii. 11; iv. 29.
[B] iii. 8; xi. 1.