43. No joining others in their wailing,
no violent emotion.
44. From Plato:[B] But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which
is this: Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good
for anything at all ought to compute the hazard of life or death, and
should not rather look to this only in all that he does, whether he is
doing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or bad man.
45. [C]For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man has
placed himself thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by
a commander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the
hazard, taking nothing into the reckoning, either death or anything
else, before the baseness [of deserting his post].
[A] See Aristophanes, Acharnenses, v. 661.
[B] From the Apologia, c. 16.
[C] From the Apologia, c. 16.
46. But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble and good is
not something different from saving and being saved; for+ as to a man
living such or such a time, at least one who is really a man, consider
if this is not---a thing to be dismissed from the thoughts:+ and there
must be no love of life: but as to these matters a man must intrust them
to the Deity and believe what the women say, that no man can escape his
destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best live the time that he
has to live.[A]
47. Look round at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going along
with them; and constantly consider the changes of the elements into one
another, for such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene life.
48. This is a fine saying of Plato:[B] That he who is discoursing about
men should look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some
higher place; should look at them in their assemblies, armies,
agricultural labors, marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the
courts of justice, desert places, various nations of barbarians, feasts,
lamentations, markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly
combination of contraries.
[A] Plato, Gorgias, c. 68 (512). In this passage the text of
Antoninus has [Greek: eateon], which is perhaps right; but
there is a difficulty in the words [Greek: mê gar touto men,
to zên hoposondê chronon tonge hôs alêthos andra eateon esti, kai
ou] &C. The conjecture [Greek: eukteon] for [Greek: eateon]
does not mend the matter.
[B] It is said that this is not in the extant writings of
Plato.
49. Consider the past,--such great changes of political supremacies;
thou mayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will
certainly be of like form, and it is not possible that they should
deviate from the order of the things which take place now; accordingly
to have contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have
contemplated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see?
50. That which has grown from the earth to the earth,
But that which has sprung from heavenly seed,
Back to the heavenly realms returns.[A]
This is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the atoms, or a
similar dispersion of the unsentient elements.
51. With food and drinks and cunning magic arts
Turning the channel's course to 'scape from death.[B]
The breeze which heaven has sent
We must endure, and toil without complaining.
[A] From the Chrysippus of Euripides.
[B] The first two lines are from the Supplices of Euripides, v.
1110.
52. Another may be more expert in casting his opponent; but he is not
more social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that
happens, nor more considerate with respect to the faults of his
neighbors.
53. Where any work can be done conformably to the reason which is common
to gods and men, there we have nothing to fear; for where we are able
to get profit by means of the activity which is successful and proceeds
according to our constitution, there no harm is to be suspected.
54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce
in thy present condition, and to behave, justly to those who are about
thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing
shall steal into them without being well examined.
55. Do not look around thee to discover other men's ruling principles,
but look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the universal
nature through the things which happen to thee, and thy own nature
through the acts which must be done by thee. But every being ought to do
that which is according to its constitution; and all other things have
been constituted for the sake of rational beings, just as among
irrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but the
rational for the sake of one another.
The prime principle then in man's constitution is the social. And the
second is not to yield to the persuasions of the body,--for it is the
peculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to circumscribe
itself, and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses
or of the appetites, for both are animal: but the intelligent motion
claims superiority, and does not permit itself to be overpowered by the
others. And with good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all of
them. The third thing in the rational constitution is freedom from error
and from deception. Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these
things go straight on, and it has what is its own.
56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to
the present time; and live according to nature the remainder which is
allowed thee.
57. Love that only which happens to thee and is spun with the thread of
thy destiny. For what is more suitable?
58. In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the
same things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as
strange things, and found fault with them: and now where are they?
Nowhere. Why then dost thou too choose to act in the same way? and why
dost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to nature to
those who cause them and those who are moved by them; and why art thou
not altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the things
which happen to thee? For then thou wilt use them well, and they will be
a material for thee [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and resolve to
be a good man in every act which thou doest: and remember ...[A]
[A] This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so corrupt
that it is impossible to give any probable meaning to it. It is
better to leave it as it is than to patch it up, as some
critics and translators have done.
59. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever bubble
up, if thou wilt ever dig.
60. The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in
motion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining
in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be
required also in the whole body. But all these things should be observed
without affectation.
61. The art of life is more like the wrestler's art than the dancer's,
in respect of this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets
which are sudden and unexpected.
62. Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to
have, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt
neither blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their
approbation, if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions and
appetites.
63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of
truth; consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and
temperance and benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most
necessary to bear this constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more
gentle towards all.
64. In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no dishonor
in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for it does
not damage the intelligence either so far as the intelligence is
rational[A] or so far as it is social. Indeed in the case of most pains
let this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable
nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if
thou addest nothing to it in imagination: and remember this too, that we
do not perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us are the
same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the being scorched by
heat, and the having no appetite. When then thou art discontented about
any of these things, say to thyself that thou art yielding to pain.
65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman as they feel towards
men.[B]
66. How do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to
Socrates? For it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death,
and disputed more skilfully with the sophists, and passed the night in
the cold with more endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon[C]
of Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked in
a swaggering way in the streets[D]--though as to this fact one may have
great doubts if it was true. But we ought to inquire what kind of a soul
it was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able to be content with
being just towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly vexed on
account of men's villainy, nor yet making himself a slave to any man's
ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his share out
of the universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor allowing his
understanding to sympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh.
[A] The text has [Greek: hylikê], which it has been proposed to
alter to [Greek: logikê], and this change is necessary. We
shall then have in this section [Greek: logikê] and [Greek:
koinônikê] associated, as we have in s. 68 [Greek: logikê] and
[Greek: politikê], and in s. 72.
[B] I have followed Gataker's conjecture [Greek: ohi
apanthrôpoi] instead of the MSS. reading [Greek: ohi anthrôpoi]
[C] Leon of Salamis. See Plato, Epist. 7; Apolog. c. 20;
Epictetus, iv. I, 160; iv. 7, 30.
[D] Aristophan. Nub. 362. [Greek: hoti brenthuei t' en taisis
hodois kai tô ophthalmô paraballei.]
67. Nature has not so mingled+ [the intelligence] with the composition
of the body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing
thyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy own;
for it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognized as such
by no one. Always bear this in mind; and another thing too, that very
little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And because thou
hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in the knowledge
of nature, do not for this reason renounce the hope of being both free
and modest, and social and obedient to God.
68. It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the greatest
tranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as
much as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members
of this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders the
mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquillity
and in a just judgment of all surrounding things and in a ready use of
the objects which are presented to it, so that the judgment may say to
the thing which falls under its observation: This thou art in substance
[reality], though in men's opinion thou mayest appear to be of a
different kind; and the use shall say to that which falls under the
hand: Thou art the thing that I was seeking; for to me that which
presents itself is always a material for virtue both rational and
political, and in a word, for the exercise of art, which belongs to man
or God. For everything which happens has a relationship either to God or
man, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but usual and apt
matter to work on.
69. The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every
day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor torpid nor
playing the hypocrite.
70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a
time they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of
them bad; and besides this, they also take care of them in all ways.
But thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring
the bad, and this too when thou art one of them?
71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness,
which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men's badness, which is
impossible.
72. Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds to be
neither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to
itself.
73. When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost
thou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to
have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return?
74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to act
according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful by
doing it to others.
75. The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either
everything that takes place comes by way of consequence or [continuity];
or even the chief things towards which the ruling power of the universe
directs its own movement are governed by no rational principle. If this
is remembered, it will make thee more tranquil in many things (vi. 44;
ix. 28).[A]
[A] It is not easy to understand this section. It has been
suggested that there is some error in [Greek: ê alogista] &c.
Some of the translators have made nothing of the passage, and
they have somewhat perverted the words. The first proposition
is, that the universe was made by some sufficient power. A
beginning of the universe is assumed, and a power which framed
an order. The next question is, How are things produced now?
Or, in other words, by what power do forms appear in continuous
succession? The answer, according to Antoninus, may be this: It
is by virtue of the original constitution of things that all
change and succession have been effected and are effected. And
this is intelligible in a sense, if we admit that the universe
is always one and the same, a continuity of identity; as much
one and the same as man is one and the same--which he believes
himself to be, though he also believes, and cannot help
believing, that both in his body and in his thoughts there is
change and succession. There is no real discontinuity then in
the universe; and if we say that there was an order framed in
the beginning, and that the things which are now produced are a
consequence of a previous arrangement, we speak of things as we
are compelled to view them, as forming a series of succession,
just as we speak of the changes in our own bodies and the
sequence of our own thoughts. But as there are no intervals,
not even intervals infinitely small, between any two supposed
states of any one thing, so there are no intervals, not even
infinitely small, between what we call one thing and any other
thing which we speak of as immediately preceding or following
it. What we call time is an idea derived from our notion of a
succession of things or events, an idea which is a part of our
constitution, but not an idea which we can suppose to belong to
an infinite intelligence and power. The conclusion then is
certain that the present and the past, the production of
present things and the supposed original order, out of which we
say that present things now come, are one, and the present
productive power and the so-called past arrangement are only
different names for one thing. I suppose then that Antoninus
wrote here as people sometimes talk now, and that his real
meaning is not exactly expressed by his words. There are
certainly other passages from which I think that we may collect
that he had notions of production something like what I have
expressed. We now come to the alternate: "or even the chief
things ... principle." I do not exactly know what he means by
[Greek: ta kureôtata] "the chief," or "the most excellent," or
whatever it is. But as he speaks elsewhere of inferior and
superior things, and of the inferior being for the use of the
superior, and of rational beings being the highest, he may here
mean rational beings. He also in this alternative assumes a
governing power of the universe, and that it acts by directing
its power towards these chief objects, or making its special,
proper motion towards them. And here he uses the noun ([Greek:
hormê]) "movement," which contains the same notion as the verb
([Greek: ôrmêse]) "moved," which he used at the beginning of
the paragraph, when he was speaking of the making of the
universe. If we do not accept the first hypothesis, he says, we
must take the conclusion of the second, that the "chief things
towards which the ruling power of the universe directs its own
movement are governed by no rational principle." The meaning
then is, if there is a meaning in it, that though there is a
governing power which strives to give effect to its efforts, we
must conclude that there is no rational direction of anything,
if the power which first made the universe does not in some way
govern it still. Besides, if we assume that anything is now
produced or now exists without the action of the supreme
intelligence, and yet that this intelligence makes an effort to
act, we obtain a conclusion which cannot be reconciled with the
nature of a supreme power, whose existence Antoninus always
assumes. The tranquillity that a man may gain from these
reflections must result from his rejecting the second
hypothesis and accepting the first--whatever may be the exact
sense in which the emperor understood the first. Or, as he says
elsewhere, if there is no Providence which governs the world,
man has at least the power of governing himself according to
the constitution of his nature; and so he may be tranquil if he
does the best that he can.
If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the labor to
discover the writer's exact meaning--for I think that he had a
meaning, though people may not agree what it was. (Compare ix.
28.) If I have rightly explained the emperor's meaning in this
and other passages, he has touched the solution of a great
question.