time neither men nor means were wanting to the Spaniards in Andalusia,
nor prudence to direct their efforts in the wisest way. ♦CONDE DE
MAULE, T. XIII. P. 9.♦ The city of Cadiz alone supplied a donative of
more than a million dollars and 5000 men; and as the men were mostly
employed in filling up old regiments, the army was not weakened by
having great part of its ostensible force consisting in raw levies. The
general, Castaños, acted steadily upon the principles which the Junta
of Seville had laid down; he harassed the enemy by detachments on all
sides, cut them off from supplies, and allowed them no opportunity of
coming to a regular engagement; and thus, while the difficulties and
distresses of the French were continually increasing, the Spaniards
acquired habits of discipline, and obtained confidence in themselves
and in their officers. Castaños even attempted to reform the Spanish
army, and introduce among them that moral and religious discipline by
which Cromwell, and the great Gustavus before him, made their soldiers
invincible. He issued an order for banishing all strumpets from the
camp and sending them to a place of correction and penitence; he
called upon the officers to set their men an example, by putting away
the plague from themselves, and dismissing all suspicious persons;
he charged the chaplains to do their duty zealously, and threatened
condign punishment to any person, of what rank soever, who should act
in contempt of these orders. Such irregularities, he said, would draw
down the divine anger, and make the soldiers resemble in licentiousness
the French, who for their foul abominations were justly hated by God
and man; and it would be in vain to gather together armies, if at
the same time they gathered together sins, and thereby averted from
themselves the protection of the Almighty, which alone could ensure
them the victory over their enemies. Happy would it have been for Spain
if this principle had been steadily pursued; the foundations of that
moral reformation might then have been laid, without which neither the
strength nor the prosperity of any country can be stable.
♦DUPONT’S DISPATCHES INTERCEPTED.♦
Dupont might have secured his retreat across the Sierra Morena, if
he had not relied too confidently upon his actual strength and the
reputation of the French arms, and if he had not still hoped for
succours from Junot. His force, though reduced by sickness, and the
harassing service in which it was engaged, amounted to 16,000 effective
men, enough to have defeated the Spaniards if they had been rash enough
to engage in a general action, and more than he could well provide for.
A large convoy from Toledo, together with all his hospital stores, was
intercepted in the mountains. His men were fain to reap the standing
corn, and make it into bread for themselves; the peasantry, whom they
would otherwise have compelled to perform this work, having left the
harvest to take arms against them, and bear a part in the defence of
their country. He wrote pressingly for reinforcements; it was now, he
said, nearly a month that he had occupied the position at Andujar; the
country was exhausted, it was with extreme difficulty that he could
obtain the scantiest subsistence for his army; the enemy were acquiring
strength and courage to act upon the offensive: the anniversary of
their great victory at the Navas de Tolosa was at hand, and to this the
Spaniards, from religious, national, and local feelings, attached great
importance. Every moment which he was compelled to waste in inaction
increased the evil. Surely at such a crisis it would be prudent to
neglect all partial movements of the insurgents for the purpose of
enabling him to act in Andalusia with a sufficient force; if the enemy
were permitted to acquire strength so as to keep the field, their
example would be followed by all the provinces, and by all the Spanish
troops throughout the kingdom; whereas one victory obtained over them
here would go far towards the subjugation of Spain. These letters
fell into the hands of the Spaniards; but if they had reached their
destination, it was not in Savary’s power to have reinforced him.
♦PLAN FOR ATTACKING THE FRENCH.♦
On the 11th of July a council of war was held by Castaños, and it was
determined that a division of 9000 good troops, under General Reding,
should proceed by way of Menjibar to attack the enemy at Baylen, where
Gobert was stationed for the purpose of guarding the road to Carolina,
and maintaining a communication with Madrid. The Marqués de Coupigny,
with 5000, was to proceed by La Higuereta and Villanueva, toward the
same point, and co-operate with Reding; and Lieut.-Colonel D. Juan de
la Cruz Mourgeon, with a corps of 2000, was to go by Marmolejo, and act
against the enemy if they attempted to escape by the Sierra. Castaños
himself occupied the Visos de Andujar, a strong and advantageous
position, of which he thought it necessary to retain possession, though
the troops were without tents, there was a want of water, and the heat
excessive. But this position enabled him to keep Dupont upon the alarm,
and prevent him from acting against Reding and Coupigny, while they
interposed between him and the two other divisions of his army. ♦JULY
16.♦ Reding succeeded in driving the enemy from their _tête-du-pont_
at Menjibar, and from the positions which they took up one after
another between that place and Baylen, disputing their ground skilfully
and well. Gobert was killed, one cannon and the baggage in the
encampment taken. During these operations some of the Spaniards died
from excessive heat and exertion; and in the afternoon Reding retired
to Menjibar, and crossing the Guadalquiver again on the following day,
effected a junction, on the third morning, with Coupigny, who had
beaten the French from a strong post near Villanueva. Their intention
was to have attacked Baylen; but Dufour, who succeeded to the command
of Gobert’s division, had evacuated that place, finding himself unable
to maintain it, and fallen back to unite with Vedel, at Carolina.
♦BATTLE OF BAYLEN.♦
One part of the Spanish commander’s plan had thus been accomplished,
and, in pursuance of his arrangements, Reding and Coupigny prepared to
march from Baylen upon Andujar, and there attack the main body of the
French on one side, while the reserve of the Spanish army was ready
to act against it from the Visos. Dupont meantime had formed the same
intention of placing a part of the enemy’s force between two fires; and
on the night of the 18th, as soon as darkness had closed, the French
marched from Andujar, after plundering the inhabitants of whatever
was portable, and took the road toward Baylen. ♦JULY 19.♦ Reding was
preparing to begin his march when the enemy arrived at three in the
morning, and fell upon him, thinking to take him by surprise. The
attack was made vigorously, and might probably have been successful,
had not the Spaniards, because of their intended movement, been in some
degree of readiness. The foremost companies both of horse and foot were
engaged hand to hand; but the Spaniards rapidly took their stations,
and repelled the assailants at all points. When day broke they were
in possession of the high ground, and the French were forming their
columns to renew the attack in a situation which was not exposed to
the Spanish artillery. In this renewed attack both parties conducted
themselves with the greatest intrepidity. Several times the assailants
broke the enemy’s lines, and fighting with the resolution of men who
had never known what it was to be defeated, they once made way to the
batteries. But the Spaniards stood firm, they knew that reinforcements
were at hand, and that if they kept their ground, the situation of the
French was desperate; they had confidence in their leaders and in their
own strength, and, above all, that thorough assurance of the justice
of their cause, which, when other points are equal, will inevitably
turn the scale. The action was long and bloody; it continued till
noon without any other interruption than what arose from occasional
recession and the formation of new columns. Dupont then, and the other
generals, putting themselves at the head of their men, made a last
charge with the most determined bravery; they were, however, once more
repulsed. By this time they had lost 2000 men, besides those who were
wounded. Dufour, who was with this part of the army, was killed, and
Dupont himself wounded. No hope of victory remained, and no possibility
of escape, the French therefore proposed to capitulate; and the arrival
of the Spanish reserve, under D. Manuel de la Peña, at this point of
time, enabled the victors to dictate their own terms.
♦SURRENDER OF THE FRENCH ARMY.♦
Dupont’s intention of marching from Andujar had been so well concealed
till the moment of its execution, that though that city contained some
14,000 inhabitants, no information was conveyed to the Spaniards on
the adjacent heights, nor were they apprized of his movements till
two in the ensuing morning, when he had been five hours on his march.
Castaños immediately ordered La Peña to pursue him with the reserve
and some corps of the third division. Upon his arrival he learnt that
a capitulation had been proposed, upon which he referred the French
negotiators to the commander-in-chief, and took such a position as
effectually to surround the defeated army. The answer which Castaños
returned was, that the French must surrender themselves prisoners of
war, and no other terms would be granted; that because of the manner in
which they had sacked the towns which they had entered, he would allow
the general and officers to retain nothing more than their swords,
and each a single portmanteau with apparel for his use; but that in
other respects they should be treated like their squadron at Cadiz,
in a manner conformable to Spanish generosity. And he required that
Dupont should capitulate not only for the troops who had been actually
engaged, but for the two other divisions also. The next day was spent
in adjusting the terms; and on the 21st Castaños and the Conde de
Tilly, as the representative of the Supreme Junta of Spain and the
Indies, a title which the Junta of Seville at this time arrogated,
advised the Junta that Dupont and his division were made prisoners of
war, and that all the other French between the summit of the Sierra
Morena and Baylen were to evacuate the peninsula by sea.
♦TERMS OF THE SURRENDER.♦
These, however, though thus officially announced to the Junta, and by
them made known to Lord Collingwood, were not the terms which had been
signed, and the cause of this misstatement has never been explained.
There could have been no motive for deceiving the French by promising
them better conditions than it was intended to observe, for the enemy
were absolutely at their mercy; so confessedly indeed, that when La
Peña made a threatening movement to accelerate the treaty, Dupont sent
him word that if he thought proper to attack them no defence would
be made. The most probable conjecture which can be offered seems to
be, that the French negotiators, Generals Chavert and Marescot, had
sufficient address not only to make the Spaniards relax the tone of
severe justice which was at first assumed, but also in the course of
drawing up the capitulation, to obtain modifications in the latter
articles, by which the intention of the former was set aside; that
Tilly and Castaños had been thus led to make greater concessions
than they were themselves aware of, and had no suspicion when they
communicated to the Junta the result of the treaty, that one part of
it, and that the most important, was actually annulled by the other.
The capitulation began by stating that their excellencies the Conde de
Tilly and Castaños had agreed with the French plenipotentiaries upon
these conditions, as desiring to give proofs of their high esteem for
his excellency General Dupont, and the army under his command, for the
brilliant and glorious defence which they had made when completely
surrounded by a very superior force. The troops under General Dupont
were to remain prisoners of war, except the division of Vedel; that
division, and all the other French troops in Andalusia who were not
included in the former article, should evacuate Andalusia, and take
with them the whole of their baggage; but to prevent all cause of
uneasiness while they were passing through the country, they should
leave their artillery and other arms in charge of the Spanish army, to
be delivered to them at the time of their embarkation; their horses,
in order to save the trouble of transporting them, should be purchased
by the Spaniards at a price agreed upon by two commissioners, one of
each nation. The other troops, who were made prisoners, were to march
out of the camp with the honours of war, with two guns at the head of
each battalion, and the soldiers with their muskets, which they were to
surrender to the Spaniards at the distance of four hundred toises from
the camp. All the French troops in Andalusia were to proceed by stated
journeys, not exceeding four leagues a day, and with proper intervals
of rest, to Sanlucar and Rota, there to be embarked in Spanish vessels
and transported to Rochefort; the Spanish army guaranteeing the safety
of their march. The generals and officers were to retain their arms,
and the soldiers their knapsacks. The generals should retain a coach
and a baggage cart each, the officers of the staff a coach only, free
from examination, but without breaking the regulations and laws of
the kingdom: all carriages which they had taken in Andalusia were
excepted, and the observance of this exception was left to the French
General Chavert. Whereas many of the soldiers in different places, and
especially at the taking of Cordoba, notwithstanding the orders of the
generals and the care of the officers, had committed excesses which
were usual and inevitable when cities resisted at the time that they
were taken (thus carefully was the article worded by the able French
negotiators), the generals and officers were to take proper measures
for delivering up any church vessels which might have been carried away
as booty, if any there were. Any thing omitted in this capitulation
which might add to the accommodation of the French during their
passage through the country and their tarriance in it, should be added
as supplementary to these articles.
♦DIFFICULTY OF EXECUTING THEIR TERMS.♦
The French displayed more address in the management of this
capitulation than they had shown in the campaign. During the battle of
Baylen, Vedel was near enough with his division to hear the firing,
but he had received no intelligence of Dupont’s movements, and did not
move toward the scene of action till the firing had ceased. The French
soldiers endeavoured to account for their defeat by vague accusations
of treachery, by the want of a good understanding between the two
generals, and by the alleged misconduct of Dupont, in making his corps
attack one after another, instead of charging with his whole force,
and in leaving too strong a detachment to guard the spoils with which
he and the superior officers had enriched themselves. The more than
likely supposition, that his messengers had been intercepted, would
explain the want of co-operation, and the other charges may safely
be dismissed. That when they were at the enemy’s mercy they should
have obtained such favourable terms may indeed appear surprising,
even though the French have exceeded all other people in the art of
obtaining good terms under the most unfavourable circumstances. It
is more easy to perceive why the conditions were not observed; for
in fact it was impossible to observe them. Nothing could be done at
that time in opposition to the will of the people; and an universal
cry had gone forth against invaders who had set towns and villages on
fire, pillaging wherever they went, plundering churches and convents,
violating women, and putting to death the people whom they took in
arms. The Andalusians were exasperated against the French because of
these atrocities, as well as by that general feeling of indignation
which the cause of the quarrel, the murders at Madrid, and the whole
course of transactions at Bayonne, so justly excited. The Junta had
issued a regular declaration of war against France, but the people knew
and felt that this was not an ordinary war, and that no formalities
could make it so; that the invaders had entered their country not
in open hostility as fair and honourable enemies, but perfidiously
and basely in the character of allies; and that by the complicated
wickedness of their cause and their conduct they had forfeited all
claim to the courtesies and observances of civilized war. They regarded
Dupont’s army rather as criminals than as soldiers, ... men who had
laid down their arms, but who could not lay down their crimes; and in
that state of general feeling, if the Junta of Seville, or any other
persons in authority, had attempted to perform the conditions of the
capitulation, they would have been suspected of treachery, and might
probably have fallen victims, like Solano, to the fury of the populace.
Aware of this, and yet withheld from breaking the capitulation by that
national sense of honour which the revolution had not continued long
enough to destroy, the Junta hesitated how to act, like men who, under
the pretext of necessity, would willingly have done what, as an avowed
and voluntary act, they were ashamed to do. ♦THE JUNTA APPLY TO LORD
COLLINGWOOD AND SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.♦ They were deliberating whether to
observe the treaty when Castaños and Morla arrived at Seville. The
former felt that his country’s honour and his own would be wounded
by the breach of faith which was meditated, and he opposed it with
the frankness of an upright mind. Morla, on the contrary, supported
the popular opinion; and the Junta, deferring to it in fear, or in
inclination, circulated a paper, wherein it was affirmed that, both
Vedel and Dupont had broken the capitulation, that it was impossible
to fulfil it, and that even if possible, it ought not to be fulfilled.
This paper, composed by an officer of high rank, who was probably
envious of Castaños, was sent by the Junta to Lord Collingwood and to
Sir Hew Dalrymple, in the hope of obtaining their sanction for a mode
of conduct which they themselves secretly felt to be unworthy.
Lord Collingwood had not been satisfied with the terms granted to
Vedel: he was not sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances to
understand why an inferior[41] division should have been allowed
to capitulate after the principal force had been defeated; and he
perceived that these troops might again reach the frontiers of Spain
in a week after they were landed at Rochefort. But although these were
his feelings, nevertheless, when he was applied to from Cadiz for
assistance in transporting Vedel’s men to France, he replied, that
he would order seamen to fit out Spanish merchant vessels for that
purpose, as there were not more English transports in those parts
than were required for the conveyance of our own troops. It proved,
however, that Spanish vessels were not to be found; and the answer of
Lord Collingwood, when his opinion upon the fulfilment of the terms was
directly called for, was, that although he was sorry such a treaty,
or indeed any treaty, should have been made with the French General,
it was his opinion that all treaties, when once solemnly ratified,
should be held sacred, and the conditions observed as far as possible.
The present engagement was one which it was not possible to perform,
and therefore annulled itself. Sir Hew Dalrymple’s answer was still
less satisfactory to those persons who sought a British sanction for
breaking the terms. His opinion, he said, exactly coincided with
what must have been that of the Spanish and French Generals by whom
the capitulation was sanctioned, namely, that it was binding on the
contracting parties, as far as the means of carrying it into execution
were in the power of each. He hoped that the laws of honour, and not
the rules of political expediency, continued still to govern the
conduct of soldiers in solemn stipulations of this kind; and certainly
the surrender of General Vedel’s corps could only be justified by the
confidence he placed in that honour which characterized the Spanish
nation. The reputation of a government, particularly one newly-formed,
is, said he, a valuable part of its property, and ought not to be
lightly squandered. And perhaps the question might be argued even on
grounds of expediency.
♦CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DUPONT AND MORLA.♦
Disappointed in these applications, but yielding to the real difficulty
of the case, the Junta made no preparations for transporting the
French troops; and Dupont at length addressed a letter to Morla, as
Captain-general of the Province, complaining of this, and of orders
which had been given to examine the baggage of the general and other
officers at Lebrixa. Morla beginning, as he usually did, with a
declaration of his own honour and veracity, replied, that neither
the capitulation, nor the approbation of the Junta, nor an express
order from their beloved King himself, could make that possible which
was not so. There were neither transports for his army, nor means of
procuring them; and what greater proof of this could there be than
that the prisoners taken in the squadron were detained at a great
expense, because the Spaniards were unable to remove them? ♦1808.
AUGUST.♦ General Castaños, when he promised to obtain a passport from
the English for this army, could promise no more than that he would
earnestly ask for it; and this he had done: but how could the French
commander believe that the English would let an army pass which would
certainly carry on the war in some other point, or perhaps in the very
same? I am persuaded, he pursued, that neither the general nor your
excellency supposed such a capitulation would be executed; his object
was to relieve himself from embarrassment, yours to obtain conditions
which, impossible as they were, would render your inevitable surrender
honourable. Each effected his desire, and now the imperious law of
necessity must be obeyed. The national character permits no other law
than this with the French; it will not allow us to use the law of
retaliation. Your excellency compels me to speak bitter truths....
What right has such an army to require the impossible fulfilment of a
capitulation? ... an army which has entered Spain professing friendship
and alliance, imprisoned our King and his Royal Family, sacked his
palaces, murdered and robbed his subjects, ravaged his country, and
despoiled him of his crown! If you do not wish to draw upon yourself
more and more the just indignation of the people, which I am exerting
myself to restrain; you will cease to advance such intolerable
pretensions, and endeavour by your conduct to abate the strong sense
of the horrors so recently committed at Cordoba. He added, that the
orders for examining the baggage came from the Supreme Junta, and were
indispensable.
A large sum of money had been found in possession of a private
soldier, and Morla reminded the French general how greatly such a
fact would provoke the rage of the populace. The discovery of some
church plate, which was brought to light by the fall of a package at
Santa Maria, roused the popular feeling beyond all farther endurance,
and they immediately seized upon the whole baggage. Dupont upon this
wrote angrily to Morla, demanding the restoration of the equipage,
money, and effects of every kind belonging to himself and the other
superior officers; invoking the principle of honour and probity, and
saying, that jealous as he was for the glory of the Spaniards, the
horrible excesses of the Spanish mob had made him groan. ♦AUGUST 14.♦
Undoubtedly, replied Morla, the conduct of the people has grieved me
greatly; not that the act itself was wrong, but because it manifested
a distrust of their government; because they took the administration
of justice into their own hands; because it might have happened that
in their fury they might have performed the vile and horrid office of
the executioner, and have stained themselves and their compatriots by
shedding that blood which had been spared on the field of battle.
This is the cause of my concern, and on this account I proposed, as
a thing expedient for the safety of your excellency and of those
who accompanied you, that your equipages should undergo a prudent
examination before they left Lebrixa, and advised you that nothing but
submission and a discreet demeanour could save you from the indignation
of the people. But it never was my intention, and still less the
Supreme Junta’s, that your excellency and your army should carry out of
Spain the fruit of your rapacity, cruelty, and impiety. How could you
conceive this possible? How could you suppose us to be so stupid and
insensible? Could a capitulation which speaks only of your equipage,
give you the property of the treasures which your army has accumulated
by means of murders, profanation of all sacred things, cruelties and
violence of every kind, in Cordoba and in other cities? Is there any
reason, law, or principle which enjoins that faith, or even humanity
should be observed towards an army which entered an allied and friendly
kingdom under false pretences, seized its innocent and beloved King
with all his family by fraud and treachery; extorted from him a
renunciation in favour of their own sovereign, ... a renunciation
impossible in itself, ... and because the nation would not submit to
this forced and invalid transfer, proceeded to plunder palaces and
towns, to profane and sack the churches, murdering the ministers of the
altar, violating nuns, carrying rape every where, seizing every thing
of value which they could transport, and destroying what they were not
able to bring away! Is it possible that such persons as these, when
deprived of a booty, the very sight of which ought to fill them with
compunction and horror, should have the effrontery to appeal to the
principles of honour and probity! My natural moderation has made me
hitherto write to your excellency with a certain degree of respect; but
I could not refrain from tracing a slight sketch of your conduct, in
reply to your extraordinary demands, ... demands which amount to this,
... do you plunder the temples and houses of Cadiz to reimburse me for
what the people of the Puerto have taken from me, and what I took from
Cordoba, with every circumstance of atrocity, violence, and brutality.
Let your excellency lay aside such expectations, and be contented that
the noble character of the Spanish nation withholds it from performing
the vile office of the executioner. He concluded by saying, that every
attention should be paid to the personal safety and convenience of the
French general; and that he would use all endeavours in his power to
have him sent to France with the least possible delay.
♦TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS.♦
Dupont, when the first danger from the populace was over, had reason
for his own sake to rejoice that the capitulation was not carried
into effect. Enraged as Buonaparte was at the first signal defeat
which his armies had sustained, he well knew that no opportunity of
vindicating himself would be allowed him, and Admiral Villeneuve’s
example was before his eyes. Most of the Swiss in his army, the
officers excepted, entered the Spanish service; the more willingly,
because General Reding, who had borne so conspicuous a part in the
victory, was their countryman. But, in truth, it was to them a matter
of indifference on which side they were engaged, and in whatever action
they were present the victor was sure to find recruits. Many, however,
as well as many of the Germans who were taken at the same time, were
allowed to engage as agricultural labourers. But toward the French the
vindictive feeling of the people was never mitigated. The troops who
escorted them with difficulty saved them from being torn to pieces
by the peasantry; the murder of a Frenchman, so strong a hatred had
their atrocities excited, was regarded as a meritorious act; untold
numbers disappeared in consequence of this persuasion; and at Lebrixa
a whole detachment, eighty in number, were massacred at one time, upon
a cry of danger, absurd indeed, but sufficient to give the cowardly
rabble a plea for gratifying that cruelty which is every where the
characteristic of depraved and brutalized man. Letters were addressed
to Morla from Madrid and various parts of Spain, some requiring that
Dupont and the other French generals should be put to death, others
that the whole of the prisoners should suffer, as an example which the
public good demanded, and which justice called for. Some of these
letters, by their ill writing and incorrect language, indicated from
what base hands they came; others were the elaborate composition of men
whom the very hatred of cruelty had made cruel, and who pleaded for a
massacre in the same spirit of perverted zeal which had produced the
Inquisition and the horrors of St. Bartholomew’s day. These letters
were so numerous that Morla thought proper publicly to reply to them,
representing that such an act would not only bring on reprisals, but
would fix a lasting stain upon the Spaniards. He took that opportunity
of excusing himself from any concern in the breach of the capitulation,
desiring it might be understood that he neither executed, nor desired
to execute the supreme power; but that it was the Junta of Seville
which, for weighty reasons, not fit to be made public, had delayed the
transportation of Dupont and the other French generals. “I,” said he,
“had only to obey; for it is not in my character or manner of thinking
ever to resist a constituted authority; such resistance can only
occasion civil dissensions, which are the greatest evil a nation can
suffer, and which I shall never spare any sacrifice to avoid.”
♦REJOICINGS FOR THE VICTORY AT BAYLEN.♦
By the battle of Baylen Andalusia was left in peace. Castaños had made
a vow to dedicate the victory to King St. Ferdinand, who won Seville
from the Moors, and lying inshrined in the magnificent mosque of that
city, which he converted to a Christian church, is venerated there
with especial devotion. The ceremony was performed with great pomp,
and the French eagles were offered at the shrine of the canonized King
and conqueror, as trophies of the most signal victory which had been
achieved in Andalusia since his time.
♦MOVEMENTS OF BESSIERES AFTER THE BATTLE OF RIO SECO.♦
Among the papers which fell into the hands of the Spaniards were
dispatches from Madrid, recalling Dupont to protect the capital against
the army of Galicia and Castille and Leon, then advancing against it.
These dispatches were written before the battle of Rio Seco, where
Cuesta’s fatal rashness exposed that army to destruction. The Spanish
generals separated after their defeat, and Cuesta complained that
he was abandoned by the Galician force. He retired with his part of
the army to Leon, and knowing that that city could not be defended,
instructed the Leonese Junta to remove to Astorga; but Astorga itself
was not more secure, and they withdrew across the mountains to
Ponferrada. Cuesta then dispersed his infantry on the frontiers of
Asturias, and retreated with the cavalry into Castille, cutting his way
through the enemy’s rear-guard. Marshal Bessieres meantime reaped the
fruits of his victory by seizing arms and stores which, in consequence
of this rash action, were only brought from England to fall into the
enemy’s hands. He found large depôts at Villalpando and Benevente; then
turning southward to Zamora, was informed there that Cuesta had ordered
his troops to rendezvous at Mayorga. Deceived by this information,
to Mayorga he went, and there a deputation from Leon waited upon him
to solicit his clemency. At Leon also he found arms and ammunition
to a great amount, which, if not imprudently accumulated there, were
carelessly abandoned.
♦CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN BESSIERES AND BLAKE.♦
Blake was thought to have given proof of great military talents both
in the action and in the retreat; and Marshal Bessieres, hoping that
so severe a defeat would convince him all farther resistance must be
ineffectual, endeavoured to win him over to the Intruder’s service. For
this purpose he wrote to him, under the pretext of assuring him that
the prisoners should be well treated; and he took that opportunity for
urging him to obey the act of abdication, and acknowledge King Joseph
Napoleon. ♦JULY 24.♦ The Spanish general made answer, he acknowledged
no other sovereign than Ferdinand of Bourbon, or his legitimate heirs;
and if that unfortunate family should be altogether extinguished,
his allegiance would then be due to the people of Spain, lawfully
represented in a general Cortes. These, he said, were the sentiments
of the whole army and of the whole nation; and he warned Bessieres
against the error of mistaking the forced submission of towns which
were occupied by French troops, for a real change of opinion in the
inhabitants. “Undeceive therefore,” said he, “your Emperor; and if it
be true that he has a philanthropic mind, he will renounce the project
of subduing Spain. Whatever partial successes he may obtain, it is
evident that his brother never can reign in this country; unless he
reign over a desert, covered with the blood of the Spaniards, and of
the troops employed on this unjust enterprise.”
♦1808. JULY.♦
This answer did not satisfy the Frenchman, who, in a second letter,
told Blake it was his duty to avoid the effusion of blood; for while
France, and the greatest part of Europe, continued in their present
state, it was impossible that the Bourbons could reign. He accompanied
this reasoning by proposing a conference with him upon the subject,
... a proposal which, Blake replied, it was not fitting that he should
address to a man of honour. Bessieres had set at liberty four or
five hundred prisoners, under the title of peasants; this title the
Spanish general disclaimed for them, maintaining that they were regular
soldiers, incorporated with the troops of the line, though not wearing
the uniform. In explaining this, he said, “his intention was not to
release himself from acknowledging the generous conduct of the Marshal
towards them, ... but to prevent the possibility of their receiving,
upon any occasion, in consequence of any misconception, a treatment
which they did not deserve; and which, he was sure, from the sentiments
that his excellency had manifested, could not but be painful to his own
feelings.” This answer was in a lower tone than the occasion required;
it admitted a distinction between the peasant and the soldier: but it
became him to have proclaimed, that Spain was in circumstances when,
by the first principles of law in all countries, every man is called
upon to defend his country, and, becoming a soldier by necessity and
duty, is to be accounted such in virtue of the cause for which he is in
arms.
♦THE FRENCH LEAVE MADRID AND RETIRE TO VITORIA.♦
Bessieres might now have sent a reinforcement to Junot, who had to
contend against a spreading insurrection, while he was threatened with
the more serious danger of an English expedition; but as that danger
had prevented Junot from succouring Dupont, so the destruction of
Dupont’s army cut off his hopes of assistance from Bessieres, who was
then summoned in all haste to protect the flight of the Intruder from
Madrid. There is some reason to believe that the news of the battle of
Baylen reached the capital some days before it was known to Joseph and
his ministers, that this knowledge emboldened the Council of Castille
to make their resolute stand against taking the oath of fidelity, and
that it was concealed as long as possible in the hope of preventing
or intercepting the Intruder’s retreat. He was not apprised of it
till eight or nine days after the event; and no time was then lost in
providing for his safety by retiring to Vitoria, with the intention
of concentrating the French force in that part of the country, and
remaining there under their protection till reinforcements from France
should arrive, numerous enough to effect the subjugation of Spain.
Till this time, hope had been entertained by his adherents, that the
opposition of the Spaniards, unexpected and violent as it was, would
soon be quelled: but now it was apparent that what had hitherto been
regarded as an insurrection, had assumed the serious form of war; and
it is said that Joseph, considering that this extremity had not been
contemplated by the Spaniards who had entered ♦AZANZA Y O’FARRILL,
P. 101.♦ ♦DE PRADT, 192.♦ into his service, left them now at liberty
to choose their part, for or against him, in the ensuing contest. In
so doing he may have acted from a generous feeling, of which he was
not incapable when master of his own actions; but in reality it was
not in his power to withhold the liberty which he offered. The Duke
del Infantado had already escaped from Madrid, and travelling in the
dress of a peasant, had joined one of the Spanish armies. The Duke del
Parque also had taken the first opportunity to withdraw. Two of the
Intruder’s ministers, Cevallos and Pinuela, availed themselves of the
liberty which was now within their choice, and remained at Madrid.
Jovellanos, always true to himself and his country, had refused to obey
his summons. The other five, Urquijo, Azanza, Mazarredo, O’Farrill, and
Cabarrus, adhered to what they still believed to be the stronger part,
and accompanied Joseph in his retreat.
END OF VOL. I.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.
FOOTNOTES
[1] A few years after the peace of Utrecht, the Abbé de Vayrac
published a work in three volumes, entitled _Etat Present de L’Espagne,
où l’on voit une Geographie Historique du Pays, l’Etablissement de la
Monarchie, ses Revolutions, sa Decadence, son Rétablissement, et ses
Accroissemens: les Prerogatives de la Couronne; le Rang des Princes
et des Grands: l’Institution et les Fonctions des Officiers de la
Maison du Roy, avec un Ceremonial du Palais: le Forme du Gouvernement
Ecclesiastique, Militaire, Civil et Politique; les Mœurs, les Coûtumes,
et les Usages des Espagnols: le tout extrait des Loix Fundamentales du
Royaume, des Reglemens, des Pragmatiques les plus authentiques, et des
meilleurs Auteurs_. There is no mention whatever of the Cortes in this
work.
[2] The _Beatas_ of Cuenca, Madrid, and Evora, may be cited as
examples. Notices of the two former impostors may be seen in Llorente’s
_Histoire Critique de l’Inquisition_: a manuscript account of the
latter is in my possession.
[3] What is most extraordinary is, that some German critics have
discovered sublimity in these monstrous exhibitions, which are as
offensive to common sense as they are to the moral feeling.
[4] The Vermin and Four-in-hand clubs are sufficiently analogous
to this Spanish fashion of the _majos_, to render this at once
intelligible and credible to the English reader.
[5] In this respect, more had been done in France nearly a century ago
than has yet been attempted in England. It was not the fault of the
government if any one of its subjects was ignorant of what it most
concerns all men to know. The declaration of the king, of May 14, 1724,
contains the following article: “_Voulons qu’il soit etabli, autant
qu’il sera possible, des maîtres et maîtresses d’école dans toutes
les paroisses ou il n’y en a point, pour instruire tous les enfans
de l’un et de l’autre sexe, des principaux mysteres et devoirs de la
religion catholique, apostolique et Romaine; les conduire à la messe
tous les jours ouvriers, autant qu’il sera possible; leur donner les
instructions dont ils out besoin sur ce sujet, et avoir soin qu’ils
assistent au service divin les dimanches et fêtes; comme aussi pour y
apprendre à lire, et même écrire à ceux qui pourront en avoir besoin,
le tout ainsi qu’il sera ordonné par les archevêques et evêques en
conformité de l’art. 25 de l’edit de 1695, concernant la jurisdiction
ecclesiastique. Voulons a cet effet que, dans les lieux ou il ny aura
pas d’autres fonds, il puisse être imposé sur tous les habitans la
somme qui manquera pour l’etablissement des dits maîtres et maîtresses,
jusqu’à celle de 150 fr. par an. pour les maîtresses._”
[6] Except, indeed, that there were to be seminaries for the new
national clergy, where they were to be taught ... surveying,
mensuration, the knowlege of simples, a little medicine, and a little
law!
[7] “_L’ouvrage que l’on demande_,” said Gregoire, speaking in the
name of the Committee of Public Instruction, “_doit donc tracer
des regles de conduite pour le temps de la grossesse, des couches,
de l’allaitement_,” &c. Petit went farther back: according to him,
“_l’education en general doit aller chercher l’homme dans l’embryon
de l’espece; les peres, les meres surtout, doivent d’abord fixer son
attention_.”--
An able writer has performed the useful task of bringing together in
one work the various schemes of education which were attempted in
France during the democratic tyranny, and the military tyranny which
succeeded it. The title of his book is, _Le Genie de la Revolution
consideré dans l’Education; ou Memoires pour servir a l’Histoire
de l’Instruction Publique, depuis 1789 jusqu’ à nos Jours; ou l’on
voit les Efforts reunis de la Legislation et de la Philosophie du
Dix-huitieme Siecle pour aneantir le Christianisme_. Paris, 3 T.
1817–1818. One legislator maintained that a nation which had recovered
its freedom wanted none but stirring, vigorous, and robust men; it
was such men that they should endeavour to form: and the revolution
had already provided inexhaustible sources of instruction for them;
for the best schools in which youth could receive a republican
education were the public assemblies of the departments, districts, and
municipalities, the tribunals, and, above all, the popular societies,
... meaning the jacobine clubs! Lequinio would have had a daily journal
edited by a committee of philosophers, for the purpose of enlightening
the simple country people, ... the people of Paris and the large towns
being sufficiently enlightened. Lakanal required that there should be
at least one theatre in every canton, where the women were to learn
dancing, and the men to practise it. And Rabaut de St. Etienne, who had
been a Protestant minister, proposed that the mayors of every canton
should deliver moral lectures on Sundays in the national temple. These
legislators confined their views to France: but Dupont, the atheist,
hoped to see a school established at Paris for propagating atheism and
anarchy throughout Europe. These are his words: “_Avec quel plaisir
je me represente nos philosophes dont les noms sont connus dans
toute l’Europe Petion, Sieyes, Condorcet, et autres, entourés dans
le Pantheon, comme les philosophes Grecs à Athènes, d’une foule de
disciples venus des differentes parties de l’Europe, se promenant à la
mode des Peripateticiens, et enseignant, celui-la le systeme du monde,
celui-ci perfectionnant le système social, montrant dans l’arrêté du 17
Juin le germe de l’insurrection du 14 Juillet, du 10 Août, et de toutes
les insurrections qui vont se faire avec rapidité dans toute l’Europe,
de telle manière que ces jeunes etrangers de retour dans leur pay s
puissent y repandre les mêmes lumières, et opérer, pour le bonheur de
l’humanité, les mêmes revolutions._”
[8] Every thing was to be done by ... analysis:--“_Cette_ analyse,
_qui compte tous les pas qu’elle fait, mais qui n’en fait jamais un
ni en arrière, ni à côté, ... elle peut porter la même simplicité de
langage, la même clarté dans tous les genres d’idées.... Les sciences
morales, si necessaires aux peuples qui se gouvernent par leurs propres
vertus, vont être soumises à des demonstrations aussi rigoureuses que
les sciences exactes et physiques.... Tandis que la liberté politique,
et la liberté illimitée de l’industrie et du commerce détruiront les
inegalités monstreuses des richesses_, l’analyse, _appliquée à tous
les genres d’idées dans toutes les écoles, detruira l’inégalité des
lumieres, plus fatale encore et plus humiliante_.... L’analyse _est
donc essentiellement un instrument indispensable dans une grande
démocratie; la lumiere qu’elle repandra a tant de facilité à pénétrer
partout, que comme tous les fluides, elle tend sans cesse à se mettre
au niveau_.”--Rapport de Lakanal sur les Ecoles Normales, du 3
Brumaire, an. III. (24 Oct. 1794).
[9] He is reported to have said, _Les prêtres ne considèrent ce
monde que comme une diligence pour conduire à l’autre. Je veux qu’on
remplisse la diligence de bons soldats pour mes armées._ The speech
seems to authenticate itself; but whether it be authentic or not, this
was the spirit and the declared object of his institutions.
[10] Of the persons who died in Paris in the year 1800, more than
two-fifths expired in the hospitals: ... from this single fact some
estimate may be formed of the numbers who were ruined by the revolution.
[11] “The most serious and thinking people among all denominations
begin to see something more than ordinary providence in the recent
overthrow of state after state, and kingdom after kingdom, upon the
continent of Europe. People without any pretensions to religion see
a fatality attending almost every state that has hitherto exerted
itself against the French empire.” The Gospel Magazine then compares
Buonaparte to Cyrus, because having destroyed the persecuting spirit
of Romish Babylon, and restored the liberty of religious worship, he
had so far laid the foundations of the New Jerusalem. “It is of no
avail,” says the writer, “to object to any such character that he is a
man of blood, for such was David; and yet as his wars were necessary
to bring in the peaceable reign of Solomon, so the present wars, and
the manifest destruction of the enemies of truth, may introduce the
reign of a greater than Solomon, who shall have dominion also from sea
to sea, and from the river to the ends of the earth.” This sample may
suffice, one of many which might be adduced in proof of the text.
[12] Transactions of the Parisian Sanhedrim, p. xiv. 11, 104, 168, 226.
There are two Hebrew Odes upon the birth-day of Buonaparte in this
volume. Macpherson imitated the Scripture-poetry when he manufactured
Ossian; and it is curious to observe, how much more these French Hebrew
Odes resemble Macpherson, than either he or they resemble the Biblical
poets.
[13] _Principe del Paz_, not Prince of Peace, as usually translated.
The title of Prince of Peace used formerly to be given by the Emperors
to the Abbots of Mount Cassino, or assumed by them.--Helyot, 5, 53.
[14] See Burke’s remarks upon this cession in his Letters on a Regicide
Peace.--Vol. 8. 281, 8vo. edition.
[15] In the year 1796 Godoy was denounced to the Inquisition by three
friars, as being suspected of atheism, he not having confessed or
communicated in his proper church for eight years, as having two wives
living, and leading a scandalous life with many other women. This
was a court intrigue, planned by D. Antonio Despuig, Archbishop of
Seville, and afterwards cardinal, and by D. Rafael de Murquez, queen’s
confessor, and titular archbishop of Seleucia. The inquisitor-general,
Lorenzana (archbishop of Toledo), was afraid to interfere; they assured
him that the king would consent to the proceedings when it was shown
him that Godoy was an atheist; and Despuig applied to the pope through
the nuncio, that Lorenzana might be reproved for his timidity, and
enjoined to act. The pope accordingly wrote to the inquisitor-general;
his courier was intercepted at Genoa by the French, and Buonaparte sent
the letters to Godoy, as a means of consolidating the recent friendship
between the Directory and the court of Spain. The two archbishops in
consequence were sent out of the kingdom under a pretext of paying a
visit of condolence to the pope. These facts are stated by Llorente in
his History of the Inquisition (chap. 39.) Llorente had been secretary
to that abominable tribunal, and in writing its history, had none
of those motives for perverting the truth which influenced him when
writing under the name of M. Nellerto.
[16] No additional infamy can possibly be heaped upon Don Manuel Godoy;
it ought, however, to be mentioned, that the minion who thus planned
the destruction of the kingdom of Portugal, in order to obtain a new
principality for himself, was, at this very time, a noble of that
kingdom, by the title of Conde de Evora-Monte, and enjoyed a pension
from the crown. This was conferred upon him by an _Alvara_ of Feb. 5th,
1797, in which the Queen calls him “My Cousin.”
[17] Azanza and O’Farrill declare that when they came into office
as Ferdinand’s ministers, they found no papers concerning it in
their office. Cevallos says, that he was entirely ignorant of the
transaction: Izquierdo indeed charges him with having approved the
treaty in conversation with him, as the most advantageous which had
ever been made by Spain; and with having complimented him for obtaining
what France had constantly refused, while the Bourbons occupied both
thrones. (Nellerto (Llorente), T. iii. p. 80.) But this does not
necessarily imply that Cevallos was acquainted with the business while
it was in progress. M. de Pradt affirms that Talleyrand only learnt
it from Marshal Bessieres, of whom he inquired why the guards were
marching towards Spain, and that Bessieres had been informed by one of
the persons who signed the treaty. But M. de Pradt adds that Talleyrand
immediately apprized the Conde de Lima, then charge d’affaires for
Portugal, and that the Count set off instantly to give his government
the alarm; this is wholly incredible. M. de Pradt is always a lively,
and often a sagacious writer, but not always correct in his assertions.
He makes the unaccountable mistake of supposing that the French had
already occupied the North of Portugal two years before the treaty was
made! (p. 26, 33.)
[18] A Portugueze, who saw their entrance, compares them to the
hospital patients between Caldas and Lisbon in a wet day, and in the
worst part of the road;--_huma enfiada de semimortos pobretoens,
verdadeira imagem da conducta das Caldas em hum dia de chuva
pelo enfadonho caminho de Espinhaço de Caō_. He himself picked
up one who, fainting with exhaustion, had fallen upon one of the
street-dunghills,--an act of compassion which he afterwards repented of
as a crime.--Os Sebastianistas, P. I. p. 1, 2.
[19] The circumstance was noted in the Paris papers, and it was added,
that no sooner had the French flag been hoisted, than the elements were
calm, and the sun broke forth in all its splendour. This augury could
not be current at Lisbon, because the French flag was not hoisted there
till ten days after the storm.
[20] The letter which the Nuncio left for the French General may
be seen in Neves, t. ii. c. 40. “Who would have thought,” says the
historian, “that England was to give an asylum to the delegate of
the Holy Father? But this ought not to be wondered at, when we
know that the successor of Henry VIII. has offered one to the Pope
himself against the persecution of him who occupies the throne of St.
Louis.”--P. 223.
[21] One of their officers, a man of the old school, who had not
forgotten the manners and the feelings of better days, did not scruple
to declare in the house where he was quartered that the army was
ruined. He had seen robbery enough in his time, he said, but never to
an excess like the present; and, where this was suffered, an army must
inevitably be destroyed: and he ran through the names of the generals,
calling each a robber as he named him, and venting the bitterness of
his heart in thus giving each the appellation which was so richly
merited by all.
[22]
_Pōe dois ós hum sobre outro,
E pōe lhe outro á direita,
Pōe outro como o primeiro,
Ahi tens a conta feita._
A Sebastianist was explaining this to P. Jose Agostinho de Macedo, who
asked him, now he had made out the 808, where the thousand was? The
believer pointed to the flag-staff from which the Portugueze colours
were flying on the Mint.... There it is, straight and upright, behind
the five wounds, which the voice of the Prophet has converted into
ciphers.... _Oh loucos e duros de coraçam em vos render a evidencia!
Abri os olhos, miseraveis, que eu vos desengano, quereis esse sinal
numerico, esse hum, que designe os mil? Nam vedes alli o páo da
bandeira, tam direito, tam posto a pino, tam empertigado por detras das
cinco chagas convertidas em cifras pela voz dos profetas; ahi estam,
incredulos, ahi estam 1808_.--Os Sebastianistas, p. 1, 98.
Another prophecy gave the date by thirty pair of scissars, the bows
standing for ciphers; and the scissars, when opened, each represented a
Roman X. I am not sufficiently versed in the arithmetic of the prophets
to discover how this is summed up into 1808.
[23] O mez de Maio foi sempre de muito respeito em toda a peninsula.
He o mez da fome, e basta esta circumstancia para se lhe abaixar a
cabeça.--_Neves, ii. 231._
[24] The authors of the official Spanish history excuse the King from
the charge of putting forth a false declaration, upon the plea that
no promise of remaining was expressed in it. But certainly this was
implied, and it is less discreditable to Charles, and more consistent
with his character, to suppose that he was sincere when he issued it,
and changed his mind when the next tidings brought on a fresh access of
fear.
[25] The Marquis de Caballero says, there was no intention of removal
that night; that the Prince of the Peace was amusing himself, according
to his custom, _tête-à-tête_ with one of his numerous mistresses; that
the lady left his apartment under an escort of his guards of honour;
that the patrole chose to see who she was, she resisted, her escort
fired in the air, the trumpet on guard took this for the signal of
departure, he put his troop in motion, and then the populace assembled.
Godoy must have possessed much more courage in critical circumstances
than he has obtained credit for, if he could amuse himself with a
mistress at such a moment as this!
Caballero says, that he proposed to the commanders of the body guards
to disperse the rabble with twenty horsemen, if they could answer for
their fidelity; and if they could not, that they should recall six
hundred men from Ocaña, who certainly had not been corrupted, with whom
and with the artillery he would undertake for the safety of the royal
family, but he was told that no person except the Prince could appease
the agitation. He affirms that the people would have suffered the King
and Queen to depart, and even Godoy also, but that they would have
stopped the Prince. The Conde de Montijo claims the merit of having
directed the popular feeling on the occasion. Except a generous feeling
on the part of the people, who knew not what they were doing, there is
nothing in these whole transactions creditable to any of the parties
concerned.
[26] _No se pudo evitar que le dieran algunas bofetadas y algunos
palos, que algo le desfiguraron aquel rostro bello con que hizo
su fortuna y la ruina de la nacion._ This is the sort of feeling
with which the Spaniards relate the manner of Godoy’s fall. In the
same tract, “Manifiesto Imparcial y Exacto,” it is said, that when
he secreted himself he took with him some jewels, _de que su alma
codiciosa pudo ocuparse en momento tan critico_; and that he was
discovered at last, because he could no longer endure hunger and thirst.
[27] The authors of the official history, published at Madrid, insist
that the abdication was a pure voluntary act; that Charles, who was
altogether incapable of deceit, displayed the greatest affection
towards his son after that event; and that none of the innumerable
Spaniards, who with the heroism of martyrs performed their duty
through all the horrors of the subsequent struggle, ever entertained
the slightest scruple upon that point. They maintain that the letters
of the royal parents, which Buonaparte published, are so interpolated
by him that they cannot be trusted; and they endeavour to show, that
even in those letters proofs may be discovered that no violence was
complained of by the writers. Perhaps this is the only point upon which
these Spanish authors are not entitled to full and entire credit, ...
for they wrote under the sanction and by the appointment of Ferdinand.
In every other part, their history, as far as it has reached me, is
written with sound judgement and admirable impartiality.
[28] These bitter expressions of the father have never transpired, and
this very concealment seems to confirm what all other circumstances
render probable, that his abdication at Aranjuez was produced by fear
and compulsion. The Queen is said (with an effrontery scarcely credible
even when the greatest criminality derives boldness from the highest
rank) to have told her son in the presence of the King her husband that
he had no right to the crown, for that Charles was not his father.
Buonaparte, in his letter to Ferdinand, had indirectly told him he
was the child of an adulterous intercourse: and it is more probable
that this story of the Queen’s avowal should have been invented and
promulgated by him or his agents, for the sake of blackening the royal
family, and weakening the popularity of Ferdinand, by destroying his
hereditary right, than that so flagitious a declaration should really
have been made. I know not whether there be likeness enough of family
features to disprove the aspersion of his spurious birth, but I am
sure, that in conduct and temper Ferdinand has sufficiently proved
himself a Spanish Bourbon.
[29] _“Les observateurs de sangfroid, Français et Espagnols, voyaient
une crise s’approcher, et la voyaient avec plaisir. Sans une leçon
sévère il étoit impossible de ramener à des idées de raison cette
multitude égarée.”_--Moniteur.
[30] It was reported that a decree was passed for seizing the church
plate, and raising a heavy contribution, as had been done in Portugal.
A poor ignorant Spaniard, believing this, bought a razor, and sallying
out with it, attacked every Frenchman he met. The man was soon
secured. Upon his examination he was asked if the razor was his; yes,
he replied, by this token, that he had bought it at such a place for
five and thirty quartos. Had the French whom he had assaulted and
cut, offered him any injury?... No.... For what reason then had he
attacked them?... That he might kill them, and as many more Frenchmen
as he could; these villains were come to plunder the temples of the
living God, and to rob the people of the fruit of their labours, and he
had supposed that every honest man would do the same as himself, but
he found himself alone when he began. The author of the “Manifiesto
Imparcial y Exacto” relates this anecdote, and adds, _En Roma y en
Grecia este hombre hubiera parecido bien en la lista de los Horacios
y de los trescientios. ¡En Madrid estaba destinado a un suplicio!_ In
any country such a man would either have been put to death like a wild
beast, or confined as a madman: but the fact, and still more the manner
in which it is related, shows the feeling of the Spaniards towards
their treacherous invaders.
[31] One of the falsehoods published officially in the Moniteur
concerning these transactions was that the Queen of Etruria and the
Infante Don Francisco solicited and obtained permission to go to
Bayonne, because of the insults to which they were every day exposed,
... and this is so worded as to make it appear that it was the people
who insulted them.
[32] This building had been the residence of the British ambassador,
Sir Benjamin Keene, in the middle of the last century; there he died,
and there he was interred; for there is no burial-place for protestants
at Madrid, and the body of a heretic could not be suffered to pollute a
Catholic church!
[33] The Moniteur stated the French loss at twenty-five killed, and
from forty-five to fifty wounded, that of the Spaniards at “_plusieurs
milliers des plus mauvais sujets du pays_.” On the other hand, D.
Alvaro Florez Estrada, on the alleged authority of a return sent by
Murat to Berthier, states the loss of the French at 7100, and that
of his own countrymen, according, he says, to an account afterwards
taken by the government, as not exceeding 200. Both statements are
palpably false: in Estrada’s there may probably have been a mistake,
(not of the printer, for the numbers are written in words), copied
from some misprinted document; because there are accounts which reckon
the French loss at 1700. Azanza and O’Farrill quote the Council of
Castille as authority for affirming, that of the people 104 were
killed, 54 wounded, and 35 missing. This is probably much below the
truth: the Council at that time was acting under the fear of Murat,
and Azanza and O’Farrill endeavour to pass as lightly as they can over
the atrocities committed by that party which they afterwards served to
the utmost of their power. Baron Larrey, in his _Memoires de Chirurgie
Militaire_, (t.iii. 139) says, that the wounded of both nations were
carried to the French military hospital, and that before night they had
received there about 300 patients, 70 of whom belonged to the Imperial
Guards. It may be suspected that there were very few Spaniards in this
number, ... some of the wounded, we know, having been sent to the
military tribunal, and delivered over not to the surgeons, but to the
executioners: and it is certain, that in a contest of this kind, where,
on the one part, stabbing instruments were almost the only weapons
used, there would, on the other, be more persons killed than wounded.
Wherever the French were found in small parties, they were massacred.
An Englishman who was in the midst of this dreadful scene, told me
the carnage was very great, and that he believed the French lost more
than the Spaniards. This gentleman happened to be lodging with the
same persons with whom I had lodged in the year 1796. Two women were
killed in the house. The mistress (an Irish Catholic) dressed up a
stool as an altar, with a crucifix in the middle, St. Antonio on one
side, and St. I know not who on the other, and before these idols she
and her husband and the whole family were kneeling and praying while
the firing continued. This poor woman actually died of fear.--In the
_Memoires d’un Soldat_ the Mamalukes are said to have made a great
slaughter that day. One of them breaking into a house from which a
musket had been fired, was run through with a sword by a very beautiful
girl, who was immediately cut down by his companions. A man who got his
livelihood by the chase, and was an unerring shot, expended eight and
twenty cartridges upon the French, bringing down a man with each; when
his ammunition was spent, he armed himself with a dagger, and rushing
against a body of the enemy, fought till the last gasp.
[34] A party of poor Catalan traders (who are privileged to carry
arms) were seized and led to execution. They were met in time by
O’Farrill, who, with the French general Harispe, was endeavouring to
quiet the city, and Harispe being made by his companion to understand
the circumstances of the case, obtained their release. This general
distinguished himself greatly during the war by his military talents,
and it is an act of justice to relate in what manner he was employed
during the dreadful scenes of the 2d of May.
[35] D. Alvaro Florez Estrada says, that care was not taken to dispatch
these victims of an atrocious system, ... that their groans were heard
through the night, and that to strike the more terror, permission was
not given to remove the bodies for interment till after they had lain
there two days.
[36] It appears therefore that men who had not borne arms had been
delivered over to Grouchy’s bloody tribunal; and that though the
commission was suppressed, the French reserved to themselves the
power of trying and punishing the Spaniards who had taken part in the
insurrection.
[37] Azanza and O’Farrill say that they were confirmed in this opinion
by the arrival of Perez de Castro, a day or two afterwards, from
Bayonne, who assured them that Ferdinand and his friends had been in
the greatest alarm lest the Junta should have begun to act upon these
instructions, or lest they should by any means have fallen into the
Emperor’s hands. (_Memoria_, sec. 85.) This is very possible, after the
renunciation had been made, and they had submitted to their fate. But
when the apology proceeds to say how well and bravely the instructions
would have been acted upon had they arrived in time, the writers give
themselves credit for a higher degree of virtue than was evinced either
by their conduct then or afterwards. (_Id._ sec. 90, 91.) Among the
_inconveniences_ of resisting the French, they represent the necessity
of putting the English in possession of certain maritime posts, and the
probability that England would have retained those posts for herself,
to be another reproach to the Spaniards like Gibraltar! (_Id._ sec. 89.)
[38] Sir John Carr adds, that immediately afterwards this man was
seized with frenzy, threw himself from a window, and was killed on
the spot. In an account of these transactions, given in a letter from
Cadiz, and published by Llorente (under his anagram of Nellerto), in
the third volume of his Memoirs for the History of the Revolution of
Spain, Solano is said to have taken the Carthusian by the leg and
thrown him out of the window, ... as if he had waited till the mob
were actually in his apartment before he attempted to escape! The
general accuracy of that letter is confirmed by another (in the same
collection) by the Count de Teba, in explanation of his own conduct.
Llorente (the ex-secretary of the Inquisition) has a notable note upon
the subject: he says, the insurrection in Andalusia was brought about
by the intrigues of the cabinet of London, carried on by the commander
of the blockading squadron, and the governor at Gibraltar; that had it
not been for these machinations the province would have been tranquil,
there would have been no battle of Baylen, King Joseph would have
remained at Madrid, Solano and the Count del Aguila would not have been
murdered ... the Spanish colonies would not have been lost ... and at
the fall of Napoleon, Joseph would have ceased to be King of Spain, as
Jerome ceased to be King of Westphalia. Did Llorente himself believe,
or could he think to make others believe, that Napoleon would have been
overthrown, if he had made himself master of Spain without opposition?
And was it in the expectation and hope that his fall would be brought
about without human means, that he swore allegiance to King Joseph?
[39] This opinion of M. Larrey is confirmed by some cases of death
produced by cordial waters which occurred, I think, at Dublin, a few
years ago. An account was published in some journal, but I cannot
refer to it, having met with it in the course of chance-reading, and
not thinking at the time that I should ever have occasion to notice
it. Except that the dose was stronger, the cases are precisely in
point: and they show also, which is equally in point, that poisons of
this kind which prove fatal in some instances, are taken with perfect
impunity in many others.
[40] M. De Pradt says these addresses were previously submitted to
Buonaparte, and he was not satisfied with that of the Grandees, which
expressed wishes for the happiness of Joseph and Spain, but contained
no direct acknowledgement of him. _Une bonne reconnaissance, bien
formelle, bien prononcée, était ce qu’il fallait a Napoleon._ He lost
his temper, and was heard to say to Infantado, No tergiversation, Sir!
acknowledge him plainly, or plainly refuse to do it. _Il faut être
grand dans le crime comme dans la vertu._ Do you choose to return to
Spain and place yourself at the head of the insurgents? I give you my
word to send you there in safety; but I will tell you, that in eight
days, ... no, ... in four and twenty hours, you shall be shot. The Duke
excused himself upon the plea of composing in a language of which he
was not master, and amended the address.
I have not such implicit reliance upon the authority of M. De Pradt
as to insert this in the text. The Duque del Infantado and the other
persons who had been trepanned with Ferdinand, were compelled to commit
themselves in so many ways, that it would have been very useless to
have equivocated in a single instance. No men were ever more justified
in disclaiming as their own acts what had been done under manifest
compulsion.
[41] Vedel had surrounded and made prisoners one battalion of Reding’s
corps before he knew of Dupont’s surrender. He was in full retreat, two
or three leagues on his way; and, had it not been for the capitulation,
might probably have recrossed the Sierra Morena with as little
opposition as he had passed it. Castaños had with him only 10,000
regular troops, and 15,000 peasants, who were incorporated at Utrera.
This was the whole Spanish force. The French lost 4000 in killed and
wounded, and 17,000 laid down their arms. The success at Baylen,
therefore, was as extraordinary as any of those victories for which
Santiago obtained credit in the heroic age of Spain.
Transcriber’s Notes
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