Of the errors of such as have descended and applied themselves to
experience, and attempted to induce knowledge upon particulars. That
they have not had the resolution and strength of mind to free
themselves wholly from Anticipations, but have made a confusion and
intermixture of Anticipations and observations, and so vanished.
That if any have had the strength of mind generally to purge away and
discharge all Anticipations, they have not had that greater and
double strength and patience of mind, as well to repel new
Anticipations after the view and search of particulars, as to reject
old which were in their mind before; but have from particulars and
history flown up to principles without the mean degrees, and so
framed all the middle generalities or axioms, not by way of scale or
ascension from particulars, but by way of derivation from principles;
whence hath issued the infinite chaos of shadows and notions,
wherewith both books and minds have been hitherto, and may be yet
hereafter much more pestered. That in the course of those
derivations, to make them yet the more unprofitable, they have used
when any light of new instance opposite to any assertion appeared,
rather to reconcile the instance than to amend the rule. That if any
have had or shall have the power and resolution to fortify and
inclose his mind against all Anticipations, yet if he have not been
or shall not be cautioned by the full understanding of the nature of
the mind and spirit of man, and therein of the seats, pores and
passages both of knowledge and error, he hath not been nor shall not
be possibly able to guide or keep on his course aright. That those
that have been conversant in experience and observation have used,
when they have intended to discover the cause of any effect, to fix
their consideration narrowly and exactly upon that effect itself with
all the circumstances thereof, and to vary the trial thereof as many
ways as can be devised; which course amounteth but to a tedious
curiosity, and ever breaketh off in wondering and not in knowing; and
that they have not used to enlarge their observation to match and
sort that effect with instances of a diverse subject, which must of
necessity be before any cause be found out. That they have passed
over the observation of instances vulgar and ignoble, and stayed
their attention chiefly upon instances of mark; whereas the other
sort are for the most part more significant and of better height and
information. That every particular that worketh any effect is a
thing compounded (more or less) of diverse single natures, (more
manifest and more obscure,) and that it appeareth not to whether of
the natures the effect is to be ascribed, and yet notwithstanding
they have taken a course without breaking particulars and reducing
them by exclusions and inclusions to a definite point, to conclude
upon inductions in gross, which empirical course is no less vain than
the scholastical. That all such as have sought action and work out
of their inquiry have been hasty and pressing to discover some
practices for present use, and not to discover Axioms, joining with
them the new assignations as their sureties. That the forerunning of
the mind to frame recipes upon Axioms at the entrance, is like
Atalanta's golden ball that hindereth and interrupteth the course,
and is to be inhibited till you have ascended to a certain stage and
degree of generalities; which forbearance will be liberally
recompensed in the end; and that chance discovereth new inventions by
one and one, but science by knots and clusters. That they have not
collected sufficient quantity of particulars, nor them in sufficient
certainty and subtilty, nor of all several kinds, nor with those
advantages and discretions in the entry and sorting which are
requisite; and of the weak manner of collecting natural history which
hath been used. Lastly that they had no knowledge of the formulary
of interpretation, the work whereof is to abridge experience and to
make things as certainly found out by Axiom in short time, as by
infinite experiences in ages.