CAP. 15.

Of the great error of inquiring knowledge in Anticipations. That I

call Anticipations the voluntary collections that the mind maketh of

knowledge; which is every man's reason. That though this be a solemn

thing, and serves the turn to negotiate between man and man (because

of the conformity and participation of men's minds in the like

errors), yet towards inquiry of the truth of things and works it is

of no value. That civil respects are a lett that this pretended

reason should not be so contemptibly spoken of as were fit and

medicinable, in regard that hath been too much exalted and glorified,

to the infinite detriment of man's estate. Of the nature of words

and their facility and aptness to cover and grace the defects of

Anticipations. That it is no marvel if these Anticipations have

brought forth such diversity and repugnance in opinions, theories, or

philosophies, as so many fables of several arguments. That had not

the nature of civil customs and government been in most times

somewhat adverse to such innovations, though contemplative, there

might have been and would have been many more. That the second

school of the Academics and the sect of Pyrrho, or the considerers

that denied comprehension, as to the disabling of man's knowledge

(entertained in Anticipations) is well to be allowed, but that they

ought when they had overthrown and purged the floor of the ruins to

have sought to build better in place. And more especially that they

did unjustly and prejudicially to charge the deceit upon the report

of the senses, which admitteth very sparing remedy; being indeed to

have been charged upon the Anticipations of the mind, which admitteth

a perfect remedy. That the information of the senses is sufficient,

not because they err not, but because the use of the sense in

discovering of knowledge is for the most part not immediate. So that

it is the work, effect, or instance, that trieth the Axiom, and the

sense doth but try the work done or not done, being or not being.

That the mind of man in collecting knowledge needeth great variety of

helps, as well as the hand of man in manual and mechanical practices

needeth great variety of instruments. And that it were a poor work

that if instruments were removed men would overcome with their naked

hands. And of the distinct points of want and insufficiency in the

mind of man.

Valerius Terminus: Of the Interpretation of Nature · 第 21 / 30 题