THAT THE END AND SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE HATH BEEN GENERALLY MISTAKEN, AND
THAT MEN WERE NEVER WELL ADVISED WHAT IT WAS THEY SOUGHT; BEING THE
9TH CHAPTER, WHEREOF A FRAGMENT (WHICH IS THE END OF THE SAME
CHAPTER) IS BEFORE.
It appeareth then how rarely the wits and labours of men have been
converted to the severe and original inquisition of knowledge; and in
those who have pretended, what hurt hath been done by the affectation
of professors and the distraction of such as were no professors; and
how there was never in effect any conjunction or combination of wits
in the first and inducing search, but that every man wrought apart,
and would either have his own way or else would go no further than
his guide, having in the one case the honour of a first, and in the
other the ease of a second; and lastly how in the descent and
continuance of wits and labours the succession hath been in the most
popular and weak opinions, like unto the weakest natures which many
times have most children, and in them also the condition of
succession hath been rather to defend and to adorn than to add; and
if to add, yet that addition to be rather a refining of a part than
an increase of the whole. But the impediments of time and accidents,
though they have wrought a general indisposition, yet are they not so
peremptory and binding as the internal impediments and clouds in the
mind and spirit of man, whereof it now followeth to speak.
The Scripture speaking of the worst sort of error saith, ERRARE FECIT
COS IN INVIO ET NON IN VIA. For a man may wander in the way, by
rounding up and down. But if men have failed in their very direction
and address that error will never by good fortune correct itself.
Now it hath fared with men in their contemplations as Seneca saith it
fareth with them in their actions, DE PARTIBUS VITAE QUISQUE
DELIBERAT, DE SUMMA NEMO. A course very ordinary with men who receive
for the most part their final ends from the inclination of their
nature, or from common example and opinion, never questioning or
examining them, nor reducing them to any clear certainty; and use
only to call themselves to account and deliberation touching the
means and second ends, and thereby set themselves in the right way to
the wrong place. So likewise upon the natural curiosity and desire
to know, they have put themselves in way without foresight or
consideration of their journey's end.
For I find that even those that have sought knowledge for itself, and
not for benefit or ostentation or any practical enablement in the
course of their life, have nevertheless propounded to themselves a
wrong mark, namely satisfaction (which men call truth) and not
operation. For as in the courts and services of princes and states
it is a much easier matter to give satisfaction than to do the
business; so in the inquiring of causes and reasons it is much easier
to find out such causes as will satisfy the mind of man and quiet
objections, than such causes as will direct him and give him light to
new experiences and inventions. And this did Celsus note wisely and
truly, how that the causes which are in use and whereof the
knowledges now received do consist, were in time minors and
subsequents to the knowledge of the particulars out of which they
were induced and collected; and that it was not the light of those
causes which discovered particulars, but only the particulars being
first found, men did fall on glossing and discoursing of the causes;
which is the reason why the learning that now is hath the curse of
barrenness, and is courtesanlike, for pleasure, and not for fruit.
Nay to compare it rightly, the strange fiction of the poets of the
transformation of Scylla seemeth to be a lively emblem of this
philosophy and knowledge; a fair woman upwards in the parts of show,
but when you come to the parts of use and generation, Barking
Monsters; for no better are the endless distorted questions, which
ever have been, and of necessity must be, the end and womb of such
knowledge.
But yet nevertheless here I may be mistaken, by reason of some which
have much in their pen the referring sciences to action and the use
of man, which mean quite another matter than I do. For they mean a
contriving of directions and precepts for readiness of practice,
which I discommend not, so it be not occasion that some quantity of
the science be lost; for else it will be such a piece of husbandry as
to put away a manor lying somewhat scattered, to buy in a close that
lieth handsomely about a dwelling. But my intention contrariwise is
to increase and multiply the revenues and possessions of man, and not
to trim up only or order with conveniency the grounds whereof he is
already stated. Wherefore the better to make myself understood that
I mean nothing less than words, and directly to demonstrate the point
which we are now upon, that is, what is the true end, scope, or
office of knowledge, which I have set down to consist not in any
plausible, delectable, reverend, or admired discourse, or any
satisfactory arguments, but in effecting and working, and in
discovery of particulars not revealed before for the better endowment
and help of man's life; I have thought good to make as it were a
Kalendar or Inventory of the wealth, furniture, or means of man
according to his present estate, as far as it is known; which I do
not to shew any universality of sense or knowledge, and much less to
make a satire of reprehension in respect of wants and errors, but
partly because cogitations new had need of some grossness and
inculcation to make them perceived; and chiefly to the end that for
the time to come (upon the account and state now made and cast up) it
may appear what increase this new manner of use and administration of
the stock (if it be once planted) shall bring with it hereafter; and
for the time present (in case I should be prevented by death to
propound and reveal this new light as I purpose) yet I may at the
least give some awaking note both of the wants in man's present
condition and the nature of the supplies to be wished; though for
mine own part neither do I much build upon my present anticipations,
neither do I think ourselves yet learned or wise enough to wish
reasonably: for as it asks some knowledge to demand a question not
impertinent, so it asketh some sense to make a wish not absurd.