Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Takes Place in an Instant or
Successively?
Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does
not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already
stated (A. 3), for the justification of the ungodly, there is
required a movement of free-will. Now the act of the free-will is
choice, which requires the deliberation of counsel, as stated above
(Q. 13, A. 1). Hence, since deliberation implies a certain reasoning
process, and this implies succession, the justification of the
ungodly would seem to be successive.
Obj. 2: Further, the free-will's movement is not without actual
consideration. But it is impossible to understand many things
actually and at once, as stated above (I, Q. 85, A. 4). Hence, since
for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of
the free-will towards several things, viz. towards God and towards
sin, it would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to
be in an instant.
Obj. 3: Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g. blackness
or whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now grace may
be greater or less, as stated above (Q. 112, A. 4). Hence it is not
received suddenly by its subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion
of grace is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would
seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an instant.
Obj. 4: Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates in
justification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from grace,
without which there is no merit, as we shall state further on (Q.
114, A. 2). Now a thing receives its form before operating by this
form. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is moved
towards God and to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at once.
Obj. 5: Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be an
instant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin is forgiven
there must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it cannot be the
same instant, otherwise opposites would be in the same
simultaneously. Hence they must be two successive instants; between
which there must be time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1).
Therefore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at
once, but successively.
_On the contrary,_ The justification of the ungodly is caused by the
justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to
men's minds suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: "And suddenly there came
a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming," upon which the gloss
says that "the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts." Hence
the justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous.
_I answer that,_ The entire justification of the ungodly consists as
to its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that
free-will is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace
takes place in an instant and without succession. And the reason of
this is that if a form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it
is either because that subject is not disposed, or because the agent
needs time to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the
matter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial form
accrues to the matter; thus because the atmosphere of itself is
disposed to receive light, it is suddenly illuminated by a body
actually luminous. Now it was stated (Q. 112, A. 2) that God, in
order to infuse grace into the soul, needs no disposition, save what
He Himself has made. And sometimes this sufficient disposition for
the reception of grace He makes suddenly, sometimes gradually and
successively, as stated above (Q. 112, A. 2, ad 2). For the reason
why a natural agent cannot suddenly dispose matter is that in the
matter there is a resistant which has some disproportion with the
power of the agent; and hence we see that the stronger the agent, the
more speedily is the matter disposed. Therefore, since the Divine
power is infinite, it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to
its form; and much more man's free-will, whose movement is by nature
instantaneous. Therefore the justification of the ungodly by God
takes place in an instant.
Reply Obj. 1: The movement of the free-will, which concurs in the
justification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest sin, and to draw
near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes,
indeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the
substance of justification, but a way of justification; as local
movement is a way of illumination, and alteration to generation.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I, Q. 85, A. 5), there is nothing to
prevent two things being understood at once, in so far as they are
somehow one; thus we understand the subject and predicate together,
inasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation. And in
the same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once in
so far as one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's movement
towards sin is ordained to the free-will's movement towards God,
since a man detests sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to
cling. Hence in the justification of the ungodly the free-will
simultaneously detests sin and turns to God, even as a body
approaches one point and withdraws from another simultaneously.
Reply Obj. 3: The reason why a form is not received instantaneously
in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or less; for
thus the light would not be suddenly received in the air, which can
be illumined more or less. But the reason is to be sought on the part
of the disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 4: The same instant the form is acquired, the thing begins
to operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is generated moves
upwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it would be
terminated in the same instant. Now to will and not to will--the
movements of the free-will--are not successive, but instantaneous.
Hence the justification of the ungodly must not be successive.
Reply Obj. 5: The succession of opposites in the same subject must be
looked at differently in the things that are subject to time and in
those that are above time. For in those that are in time, there is no
last instant in which the previous form inheres in the subject; but
there is the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent
form inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the reason, that
in time we are not to consider one instant, since neither do instants
succeed each other immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is
proved in _Physic._ vi, 1. But time is terminated by an instant.
Hence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving
towards its form, it is under the opposite form; but in the last
instant of this time, which is the first instant of the subsequent
time, it has the form which is the term of the movement.
But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be
any succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (as
in the angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time,
but by discrete time, even as the things measured are not continuous,
as stated above (I, Q. 53, AA. 2, 3). In these, therefore, there is a
last instant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which
the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in between, since there is
no continuity of time, which this would necessitate.
Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time,
but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with
continuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it
considers the intelligible species, as stated above (I, Q. 85, AA. 1,
2). We must, therefore, decide from this about its change as regards
the condition of temporal movements, i.e. we must say that there is
no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time; whereas there is a
first instant that grace inheres; and in all the time previous sin
inhered.
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