Whether the Judicial Precepts Were Suitably Framed As to the
Relations of One Man with Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not
suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another.
Because men cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what
belongs to another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law:
since it is written (Deut. 23:24): "Going into thy neighbor's
vineyard, thou mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest." Therefore
the Old Law did not make suitable provisions for man's peace.
Obj. 2: Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states
has been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. ii, 6). But this was introduced by the Old Law; for it is
written (Num. 27:8): "When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance
shall pass to his daughter." Therefore the Law made unsuitable
provision for the welfare of the people.
Obj. 3: Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of human
society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying
and selling, as stated in _Polit._ i. But the Old Law took away the
force of sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year of the
jubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor (Lev. 25:28).
Therefore in this matter the Law gave the people an unfitting command.
Obj. 4: Further, man's needs require that men should be ready to
lend: which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the
pledges: hence it is written (Ecclus. 29:10): "Many have refused to
lend, not out of wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded
without cause." And yet this was encouraged by the Law. First,
because it prescribed (Deut. 15:2): "He to whom any thing is owing
from his friend or neighbor or brother, cannot demand it again,
because it is the year of remission of the Lord"; and (Ex. 22:15) it
is stated that if a borrowed animal should die while the owner is
present, the borrower is not bound to make restitution. Secondly,
because the security acquired through the pledge is lost: for it is
written (Deut. 24:10): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor any
thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take
away a pledge"; and again (Deut. 24:12, 13): "The pledge shall not
lodge with thee that night, but thou shalt restore it to him
presently." Therefore the Law made insufficient provision in the
matter of loans.
Obj. 5: Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited with a
fraudulent depositary: wherefore great caution should be observed in
such matters: hence it is stated in 2 Mac. 3:15 that "the priests . .
. called upon Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things
given to be kept, that He would preserve them safe, for them that had
deposited them." But the precepts of the Old Law observed little
caution in regard to deposits: since it is prescribed (Ex. 22:10, 11)
that when goods deposited are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath
of the depositary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision in
this matter.
Obj. 6: Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire, so do
men let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the tenant to
pay his rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an
unnecessarily hard prescription (Lev. 19:13) that "the wages of him
that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morning."
Obj. 7: Further, since there is often pressing need for a judge, it
should be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore unfitting that
the Law (Deut. 17:8, 9) should command them to go to a fixed place to
ask for judgment on doubtful matters.
Obj. 8: Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or more,
should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably stated
(Deut. 19:15) that "in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word
shall stand."
Objection 9: Further, punishment should be fixed according to the
gravity of the fault: for which reason also it is written (Deut.
25:2): "According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also
of the stripes be." Yet the Law fixed unequal punishments for certain
faults: for it is written (Ex. 22:1) that the thief "shall restore
five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Moreover,
certain slight offenses are severely punished: thus (Num. 15:32,
seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath day: and
(Deut. 21:18, seqq.) the unruly son is commanded to be stoned on
account of certain small transgressions, viz. because "he gave
himself to revelling . . . and banquetings." Therefore the Law
prescribed punishments in an unreasonable manner.
Objection 10: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11),
"Tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment,
indemnity, prison, stripes, retaliation, public disgrace, exile,
death, slavery." Now some of these were prescribed by the Law.
"Indemnity," as when a thief was condemned to make restitution
fivefold or fourfold. "Prison," as when (Num. 15:34) a certain man is
ordered to be imprisoned. "Stripes"; thus (Deut. 25:2), "if they see
that the offender be worthy of stripes; they shall lay him down, and
shall cause him to be beaten before them." "Public disgrace" was
brought on to him who refused to take to himself the wife of his
deceased brother, for she took "off his shoe from his foot, and" did
"spit in his face" (Deut. 25:9). It prescribed the "death" penalty,
as is clear from (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or mother,
dying let him die." The Law also recognized the "lex talionis," by
prescribing (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Therefore it
seems unreasonable that the Law should not have inflicted the two
other punishments, viz. "exile" and "slavery."
Objection 11: Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But
dumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable
in punishing them (Ex. 21:29): "If the ox . . . shall kill a man or a
woman," it "shall be stoned": and (Lev. 20:16): "The woman that shall
lie under any beast, shall be killed together with the same."
Therefore it seems that matters pertaining to the relations of one
man with another were unsuitably regulated by the Law.
Objection 12: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 21:12) a murderer to
be punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of
much less account than the slaying of a man. Hence murder cannot be
sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it
is unfittingly prescribed (Deut. 21:1, 4) that "when there shall be
found . . . the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is
guilty of the murder . . . the ancients" of the nearest city "shall
take a heifer of the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor
ploughed the ground, and they shall bring her into a rough and stony
valley, that never was ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall
strike off the head of the heifer."
_On the contrary,_ It is recalled as a special blessing (Ps. 147:20)
that "He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His
judgments He hath not made manifest to them."
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), quoting
Tully, "a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the
law and by community of welfare." Consequently it is of the essence
of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered by
just laws. Now the relations of one man with another are twofold:
some are effected under the guidance of those in authority: others
are effected by the will of private individuals. And since whatever
is subject to the power of an individual can be disposed of according
to his will, hence it is that the decision of matters between one man
and another, and the punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction
of those in authority, to whom men are subject. On the other hand,
the power of private persons is exercised over the things they
possess: and consequently their dealings with one another, as regards
such things, depend on their own will, for instance in buying,
selling, giving, and so forth. Now the Law provided sufficiently in
respect of each of these relations between one man and another. For
it established judges, as is clearly indicated in Deut. 16:18: "Thou
shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all its [Vulg.: 'thy'] gates
. . . that they may judge the people with just judgment." It is also
directed the manner of pronouncing just judgments, according to Deut.
1:16, 17: "Judge that which is just, whether he be one of your own
country or a stranger: there shall be no difference of persons." It
also removed an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by
forbidding judges to accept bribes (Ex. 23:8; Deut. 16:19). It
prescribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and it
appointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we shall state
farther on (ad 10).
But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the
Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should be
distinct, and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly
granted to others by the will of the possessors. These three points
were provided for by the Law. Because, in the first place, the
possessions themselves were divided among individuals: for it is
written (Num. 33:53, 54): "I have given you" the land "for a
possession: and you shall divide it among you by lot." And since many
states have been ruined through want of regulations in the matter of
possessions, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 6); therefore
the Law provided a threefold remedy against the irregularity of
possessions. The first was that they should be divided equally,
wherefore it is written (Num. 33:54): "To the more you shall give a
larger part, and to the fewer, a lesser." A second remedy was that
possessions could not be alienated for ever, but after a certain
lapse of time should return to their former owner, so as to avoid
confusion of possessions (cf. ad 3). The third remedy aimed at the
removal of this confusion, and provided that the dead should be
succeeded by their next of kin: in the first place, the son;
secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the father's
brother; fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order to
preserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that heiresses
should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in Num. 36:6.
Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things
should belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards the care of them;
for it was prescribed (Deut. 22:1-4): "Thou shalt not pass by, if
thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt
bring them back to thy brother," and in like manner as to other
things. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on
entering a friend's vineyard to eat of the fruit, but not to take any
away. And, specially, with respect to the poor, it was prescribed
that the forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of grapes and fruit,
should be left behind for them (Lev. 19:9; Deut. 24:19). Moreover,
whatever grew in the seventh year was common property, as stated in
Ex. 23:11 and Lev. 25:4.
Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner.
There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written (Deut.
14:28, 29): "The third day thou shalt separate another tithe . . .
and the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the
widow . . . shall come and shall eat and be filled." And there was a
transfer for a consideration, for instance, by selling and buying, by
letting out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all
of which we find that the Law made ample provision. Consequently it
is clear that the Old Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual
relations of one man with another.
Reply Obj. 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8), "he that loveth his
neighbor hath fulfilled the Law": because, to wit, all the precepts
of the Law, chiefly those concerning our neighbor, seem to aim at the
end that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love
that men give their own goods to others: because, as stated in 1 John
3:17: "He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up
his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?" Hence
the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to
others readily: thus the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:18) commands the rich "to
give easily and to communicate to others." Now a man does not give
easily to others if he will not suffer another man to take some
little thing from him without any great injury to him. And so the Law
laid down that it should be lawful for a man, on entering his
neighbor's vineyard, to eat of the fruit there: but not to carry any
away, lest this should lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and
cause a disturbance of the peace: for among well-behaved people, the
taking of a little does not disturb the peace; in fact, it rather
strengthens friendship and accustoms men to give things to one
another.
Reply Obj. 2: The Law did not prescribe that women should succeed to
their father's estate except in default of male issue: failing which
it was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line
in order to comfort the father, who would have been sad to think that
his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law observed due
caution in the matter, by providing that those women who succeeded to
their father's estate, should marry within their own tribe, in order
to avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in Num. 36:7, 8.
Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 4), the regulation
of possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state or
nation. Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by the
law in some of the heathen states, "that anyone should sell his
possessions, except to avoid a manifest loss." For if possessions
were to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen to come into the
hands of a few: so that it might become necessary for a state or
country to become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to
remove this danger, ordered things in such a way that while provision
was made for men's needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to
avail for a certain period, at the same time the said danger was
removed, by prescribing the return of those possessions after that
period had elapsed. The reason for this law was to prevent confusion
of possessions, and to ensure the continuance of a definite
distinction among the tribes.
But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates,
therefore the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like movable
goods. Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas
there was a fixed limit to the amount of estates, which could not be
exceeded, while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On
the other hand, houses situated not in a town, but "in a village that
hath no walls," could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses
are built merely with a view to the cultivation and care of
possessions; wherefore the Law rightly made the same prescription in
regard to both (Lev. 25).
Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of the Law was to
accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one
another's assistance: because this is a very great incentive to
friendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in
the matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of
mutual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more frequent
and benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for this
purpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that men should be
ready to lend, and that they should not be less inclined to do so as
the year of remission drew nigh, as stated in Deut. 15:7, seqq.
Secondly, by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant
a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting necessities of life
in security; and by prescribing that when this had been done they
should be restored at once. For it is written (Deut. 23:19): "Thou
shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury": and (Deut. 24:6):
"Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge;
for he hath pledged his life to thee": and (Ex. 22:26): "If thou take
of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again
before sunset." Thirdly, by forbidding them to be importunate in
exacting payment. Hence it is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend
money to any of my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou
shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner." For this reason, too,
it is enacted (Deut. 24:10, 11): "When thou shalt demand of thy
neighbor anything that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his
house to take away a pledge, but thou shalt stand without, and he
shall bring out to thee what he hath": both because a man's house is
his surest refuge, wherefore it is offensive to a man to be set upon
in his own house; and because the Law does not allow the creditor to
take away whatever he likes in security, but rather permits the
debtor to give what he needs least. Fourthly, the Law prescribed that
debts should cease together after the lapse of seven years. For it
was probable that those who could conveniently pay their debts, would
do so before the seventh year, and would not defraud the lender
without cause. But if they were altogether insolvent, there was the
same reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there was
for renewing the loan on account of their need.
As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through
the neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they perished or
deteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if
they perished or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper
care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if
they were hired for a consideration: because they might have died or
deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of
the lender, so that if the animal had been saved through being lent,
the lender would have gained something by the loan which would no
longer have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed
when animals were hired for a consideration: because then the owner
received a certain price for the use of the animals; wherefore he had
no right to any profit, by receiving indemnity for the animal, unless
the person who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however,
of animals not hired for a consideration, equity demanded that he
should receive something by way of restitution at least to the value
of the hire of the animal that had perished or deteriorated.
Reply Obj. 5: The difference between a loan and a deposit is that a
loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the person to
whom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of
the depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter obligation
of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit. Because
the latter might be lost in two ways. First, unavoidably: i.e. either
through a natural cause, for instance if an animal held in deposit
were to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic cause,
for instance, if it were taken by an enemy, or devoured by a beast
(in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the owner what
was left of the animal thus slain): whereas in the other cases
mentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only to
take an oath in order to clear himself of suspicion. Secondly, the
goods deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for
instance by theft: and then the depositary was bound to restitution
on account of his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held
an animal on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were absent
when it depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for less
negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case
of theft.
Reply Obj. 6: Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are poor men
who toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law commanded
wisely that they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food.
But they who offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be rich:
nor are they in such need of their price in order to gain a
livelihood: and consequently the comparison does not hold.
Reply Obj. 7: The purpose for which judges are appointed among men,
is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now a
matter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded
people: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was prescribed
(Deut. 16:18) that "judges and magistrates" should be appointed in
each tribe, "to judge the people with just judgment." Secondly, a
matter may be doubtful even among experts: and therefore, in order to
remove doubts of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should
foregather in some chief place chosen by God, where there would be
both the high-priest, who would decide doubtful matters relating to
the ceremonies of divine worship; and the chief judge of the people,
who would decide matters relating to the judgments of men: just as
even now cases are taken from a lower to a higher court either by
appeal or by consultation. Hence it is written (Deut. 17:8, 9): "If
thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in
judgment . . . and thou see that the words of the judges within thy
gates do vary; arise and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God
shall choose; and thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical
race, and to the judge that shall be at that time." But such like
doubtful matters did not often occur for judgment: wherefore the
people were not burdened on this account.
Reply Obj. 8: In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing
as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content with a
certain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator employs
to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible for two or
three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor
probable that they succeed in so doing: wherefore their testimony is
taken as being true, especially if they do not waver in giving it, or
are not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might
not easily depart from the truth, the Law commanded that they should
be most carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful
should be severely punished, as stated in Deut. 19:16, seqq.
There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in
token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons, Who are sometimes
mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two
Persons; and sometimes as three: as Augustine observes on John 8:17:
"In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true."
Reply Obj. 9: A severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of
the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First, on account
of the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things
being equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on account of a
habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except
by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account of a great desire for or a
great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily deterred from such
sins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account of the
facility of committing a sin and of concealing it: for such like
sins, when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to
deter others from committing them.
Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be
observed, even in respect of one single deed. The first is when a sin
is committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether
involuntary, man is altogether excused from punishment; for it is
written (Deut. 22:25, seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a
field is not guilty of death, because "she cried, and there was no
man to help her." But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, and yet
through weakness, as for instance when a man sins from passion, the
sin is diminished: and the punishment, according to true judgment,
should be diminished also; unless perchance the common weal requires
that the sin be severely punished in order to deter others from
committing such sins, as stated above. The second degree is when a
man sins through ignorance: and then he was held to be guilty to a
certain extent, on account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge:
yet he was not punished by the judges but expiated his sin by
sacrifices. Hence it is written (Lev. 4:2): "The soul that sinneth
through ignorance," etc. This is, however, to be taken as applying to
ignorance of fact; and not to ignorance of the Divine precept, which
all were bound to know. The third degree was when a man sinned from
pride, i.e. through deliberate choice or malice: and then he was
punished according to the greatness of the sin [*Cf. Deut. 25:2]. The
fourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy:
and then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a destroyer of
the commandment of the Law [*Cf. Num. 15:30, 31].
Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft,
the Law considered what would be likely to happen most frequently
(Ex. 22:1-9): wherefore, as regards theft of other things which can
easily be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice
their value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief,
because they graze in the fields: wherefore it happened more
frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law
inflicted a heavier penalty, by ordering four sheep to be restored
for the theft of one. As to cattle, they were yet more difficult to
safeguard, because they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in
flocks as sheep do; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty was inflicted
in their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored for one ox.
And this I say, unless perchance the animal itself were discovered in
the thief's possession: because in that case he had to restore only
twice the number, as in the case of other thefts: for there was
reason to presume that he intended to restore the animal, since he
kept it alive. Again, we might say, according to a gloss, that "a cow
is useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing,
for food, for milk, and its hide is employed for various purposes":
and therefore for one cow five had to be restored. But the sheep was
useful in four ways: "for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its
wool." The unruly son was slain, not because he ate and drank: but on
account of his stubbornness and rebellion, which was always punished
by death, as stated above. As to the man who gathered sticks on the
sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker of the Law, which commanded the
sabbath to be observed, to testify the belief in the newness of the
world, as stated above (Q. 100, A. 5): wherefore he was slain as an
unbeliever.
Reply Obj. 10: The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the more
grievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed against God, and
for murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one's parents,
adultery and incest. In the case of thief of other things it
inflicted punishment by indemnification: while in the case of blows
and mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation; and likewise
for the sin of bearing false witness. In other faults of less degree
it prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace.
The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases.
First, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail himself of
the privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in
the seventh year of remission: wherefore he was punished by remaining
a slave for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not
wherewith to make restitution, as stated in Ex. 22:3.
The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law:
because God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas all other
nations were given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from
that people absolutely, he would be in danger of falling into
idolatry. For this reason it is related (1 Kings 26:19) that David
said to Saul: "They are cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have
cast me out this day, that I should not dwell in the inheritance of
the Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods." There was, however, a
restricted sort of exile: for it is written in Deut. 19:4 [*Cf. Num.
35:25] that "he that striketh [Vulg.: 'killeth'] his neighbor
ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred against him, shall
flee to one of the cities" of refuge and "abide there until the death
of the high-priest." For then it became lawful for him to return
home, because when the whole people thus suffered a loss they forgot
their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not
so eager to kill the slayer.
Reply Obj. 11: Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not on account
of any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their owners, who had
not safeguarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was
more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone "yesterday or the
day before" (in which case steps might have been taken to avoid the
danger) than if it had taken to butting suddenly.--Or again, the
animal was slain in detestation of the sin; and lest men should be
horrified at the sight thereof.
Reply Obj. 12: The literal reason for this commandment, as Rabbi
Moses declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the slayer was
frequently from the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of the calf
was a means of investigating the hidden murder. This was brought
about in three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore
that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the roads.
Secondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of
his beast, and if the murder was previously discovered, the beast was
not slain. Thirdly, the place, where the heifer was slain, remained
uncultivated. Wherefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men
of the city would readily make known the murderer, if they knew who
he was: and it would seldom happen but that some word or sign would
escape about the matter. Or again, this was done in order to frighten
people, in detestation of murder. Because the slaying of a heifer,
which is a useful animal and full of strength, especially before it
has been put under the yoke, signified that whoever committed murder,
however useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit his life; and
that, by a cruel death, which was implied by the striking off of its
head; and that the murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off
from the fellowship of men, which was betokened by the fact that the
heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated
place.
Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of
Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no sin; nor did
it plough the ground, i.e. it never knew the stain of revolt. The
fact of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated valley signified
the despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and
the devil is shown to be the arch-murderer.
________________________