Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Dispensable?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are
dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural
law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like
human nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure
of law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for
dispensation, as stated above (Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4). Therefore a
dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the decalogue.
Obj. 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God
does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law
made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are
ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our
superiors are God's viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2
Cor. 2:10): "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything,
for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ." Therefore
superiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue.
Obj. 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one
forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men
in this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of
human law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain.
Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
Obj. 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a
precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this
precept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:4): "And they determined in
that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the
Sabbath-day, we will fight against him." Therefore the precepts of
the decalogue are dispensable.
_On the contrary,_ are the words of Isa. 24:5, where some are
reproved for that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken
the everlasting covenant"; which, seemingly, apply principally to the
precepts of the decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue
cannot be changed by dispensation.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4), precepts
admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which,
if the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver
is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first
and chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and
virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If
therefore there be any precepts which contain the very preservation
of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such
precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are
indispensable. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted,
such as this--that no man should work for the destruction of the
commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man
should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of
dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the
above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these
latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the
omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial
to the former precepts which contain the intention of the lawgiver.
For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were
enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch
as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on
account of some greater utility.
Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the
lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which
direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final
good, which is God; while the precepts of the second table contain
the order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be
done to anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this
sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently
the precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law
which contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing
principle that "justice should be preserved." But he is speaking in
reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to
apply in certain cases.
Reply Obj. 2: As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), "God continueth
faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself if He
were to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He is
justice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be
lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to
His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one
another.
Reply Obj. 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in
so far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this
sense the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law
cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not
undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence
this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and such a
killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine
observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man's property is
taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, this is not
theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue.
Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away
the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to
them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay
his son, he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be
slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it
is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and
ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be
the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no
murderer any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking unto
himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not
guilty either of adultery or of fornication: because he took unto
himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the
institution of marriage.
Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the
essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to
any determination by application to individual actions--for instance,
that this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not--in this point
they admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in
such matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage
and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such
matters as are subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men
stand in the place of God: and yet not in all respects.
Reply Obj. 4: This determination was an interpretation rather than a
dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does
something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Matt.
12:3, seqq.).
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