Whether Human Law Should Be Changed in Any Way?
Objection 1: It would seem that human law should not be changed in
any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as
stated above (Q. 95, A. 2). But the natural law endures unchangeably.
Therefore human law should also remain without any change.
Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure
should be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human
acts, as stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it should remain
without change.
Obj. 3: Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as
stated above (Q. 95, A. 2). But that which is right once is right
always. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "A temporal
law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 91, A. 3), human law is a
dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be
two causes for the just change of human law: one on the part of
reason; the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law.
The cause on the part of reason is that it seems natural to human
reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence,
in speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early
philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by
those who succeeded them. So also in practical matters: for those who
first endeavored to discover something useful for the human
community, not being able by themselves to take everything into
consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in
many ways; and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made
institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of
the common weal.
On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be
rightly changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom
different things are expedient according to the difference of his
condition. An example is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6):
"If the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are
most careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law
allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the
government of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same
people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the
government to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing
their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and the
choice devolves to a few good men."
Reply Obj. 1: The natural law is a participation of the eternal law,
as stated above (Q. 91, A. 2), and therefore endures without change,
owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason,
the Author of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and
imperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover the
natural law contains certain universal precepts, which are
everlasting: whereas human law contains certain particular precepts,
according to various emergencies.
Reply Obj. 2: A measure should be as enduring as possible. But
nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to
change. And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.
Reply Obj. 3: In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and
therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But
right is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to
which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated above:
wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change.
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