Whether Human Law Should Be Framed for the Community Rather Than for
the Individual?
Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for
the community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher
says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular
acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject
of decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are
framed about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for
the community, but also for the individual.
Obj. 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above
(Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). But human acts are about individual matters.
Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community, but
rather for the individual.
Obj. 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated
above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). But a measure should be most certain, as
stated in _Metaph._ x. Since therefore in human acts no general
proposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual
cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for
individual cases.
_On the contrary,_ The Jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit.
iii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that "laws should be made to suit the
majority of instances; and they are not framed according to what may
possibly happen in an individual case."
_I answer that,_ Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to
that end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore
says (Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private
benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens." Hence human
laws should be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good
comprises many things. Wherefore law should take account of many
things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the
community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is
procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for only a
short time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one
another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21; xxii, 6).
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal just,
i.e. positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid down
simply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these he
says that "the legal is that which originally was a matter of
indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer": as the
fixing of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the community
in one respect, and individuals in another. These are called
"privileges," i.e. "private laws," as it were, because they regard
private persons, although their power extends to many matters; and in
regard to these, he adds, "and further, all particular acts of
legislation." Other matters are legal, not through being laws, but
through being applications of general laws to particular cases: such
are decrees which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he
adds "all matters subject to decrees."
Reply Obj. 2: A principle of direction should be applicable to many;
wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things
belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle
in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures as there
are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since
their use consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law
would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one single
act. Because the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of
directing individual actions; whereas law is a general precept, as
stated above (Q. 92, A. 2, Obj. 2).
Reply Obj. 3: "We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all
things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as
natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as
being true in the greater number of instances, though at times and
less frequently it fail.
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