FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 5]

Whether Natural Contingents Are Subject to the Eternal Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject

to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as

stated above (Q. 90, A. 4). But a law cannot be promulgated except to

rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement.

Therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law;

and consequently natural contingents are not.

Obj. 2: Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason,"

as stated in _Ethic._ i. But the eternal law is the supreme type, as

stated above (A. 1). Since then natural contingents do not partake of

reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that

they are not subject to the eternal law.

Obj. 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural

contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the

eternal law.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 8:29): "When He compassed the

sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should

not pass their limits."

_I answer that,_ We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of

the eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends

only to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is

because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the

government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a

law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of

irrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself

moving those things, for these irrational creatures do not move

themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2).

Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however

much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws on rational

beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pronouncement

of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule which is a principle

of action.

Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward

principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God

imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions.

And so, in this way, God is said to command the whole of nature,

according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass

away." And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are

subject to the eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are

subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence;

but not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine

commandment.

Reply Obj. 1: The impression of an inward active principle is to

natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law,

by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human

actions, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are

obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine

Reason by obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over

more things than human reason does. And as the members of the human

body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of

reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate to reason; so too

irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account,

being rational.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the defects which occur in natural things are

outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the

order of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God,

from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the First Part

(Q. 22, A. 2). And since the eternal law is the type of Divine

providence, as stated above (A. 1), hence the defects of natural

things are subject to the eternal law.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 602 / 746 题