Whether an Effect of Law Is to Make Men Good?
Objection 1: It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men
good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in
_Ethic._ ii, 6 is "that which makes its subject good." But virtue is
in man from God alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without
us," as we stated above (Q. 55, A. 4) in giving the definition of
virtue. Therefore the law does not make men good.
Obj. 2: Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But
the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good.
Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the
law does not make men good.
Obj. 3: Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above
(Q. 90, A. 2). But some behave well in things regarding the
community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore
it is not the business of the law to make men good.
Obj. 4: Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says
(Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his
subjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not
make men good.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the
"intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens."
_I answer that,_ as stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2; AA. 3, 4), a law
is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his
subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate thing
consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is
regulated: thus we see that the virtue of the irascible and
concupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason;
and accordingly "the virtue of every subject consists in his being
well subjected to his ruler," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But
every law aims at being obeyed by those who are subject to it.
Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead
its subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue is "that which
makes its subject good," it follows that the proper effect of law is
to make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in some
particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on
true good, which is the common good regulated according to Divine
justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good
simply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that
which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in
opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good
simply, but in respect to that particular government. In this way
good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man
is called a good robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to
his end.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is twofold, as explained above (Q. 63, A. 2),
viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an
action contributes to both, but in different ways; for it causes the
acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves
and fosters it when it already exists. And since law is given for the
purpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to
virtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore the Philosopher says
in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers make
men good by habituating them to good works."
Reply Obj. 2: It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue
that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of
punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is
a beginning of virtue, as stated above (Q. 63, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 3: The goodness of any part is considered in comparison
with the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is
the part that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then every man is
a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good, unless he
be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well
consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the
common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be
virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is
enough for the good of the community, that the other citizens be so
far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the
Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "the virtue of a sovereign is
the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen
is not the same as that of a good man."
Reply Obj. 4: A tyrannical law, through not being according to
reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of
law; and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it
aims at the citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature of a
law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his
subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make them
good, not simply, but with respect to that particular government.
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