SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 6]

Whether Venial Sin Can Be in Anyone with Original Sin Alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with

original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is

a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 88, A. 3). Therefore

in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin

exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have venial

together with original sin, and without mortal sins.

Obj. 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection

with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an

unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin

without committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin

without committing a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is

first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that

time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal

sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible

for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however

short it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original

sin alone and without mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ Man is punished for original sin in the children's

limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on

(II-II, Q. 69, A. 6): whereas men are punished in hell for no other

than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be

punished for venial sin with no other than original sin.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with

original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is

because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of

years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin,

wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does

anything which is such generically. But when he begins to have the

use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or

mortal sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about

then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself

to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of

original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due

end, as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he

will sin mortally, through not doing that which is in his power to

do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him

without mortal, until afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to

him through grace.

Reply Obj. 1: Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a

necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes

disposes to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.

Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin

alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on

account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: The child that is beginning to have the use of reason

can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free

from the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as

possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has

discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to

himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the

intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's

affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (Zech. 1:3):

"Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you."

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TREATISE ON LAW (QQ. 90-108)

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 581 / 746 题