Whether the Debt of Punishment Is an Effect of Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an
effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing,
does not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is
accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention of the
sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is
good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an
effect of sin, which is evil.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate
affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur a
further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely.
Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 2:9): "Tribulation and anguish
upon every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to
sin. Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the
words "tribulation and anguish."
_I answer that,_ It has passed from natural things to human affairs
that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some
detriment therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one
contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which
reason "hot water freezes more rapidly," as stated in _Meteor._ i,
12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man is to
repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all
things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to
the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up against
an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And
because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins,
commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in
consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment.
Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment
corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject.
In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his
own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who
governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member
either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to
the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these
orders is disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason,
and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold
punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience;
another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.
Reply Obj. 1: Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by
reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental
to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt
of punishment.
Reply Obj. 2: Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by
God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin,
not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of
punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is."
Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the
effect of sin.
Reply Obj. 3: This punishment of the _inordinate affection_ is due to
sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a
further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or
human law.
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