Whether the Seven Capital Vices Are Suitably Reckoned?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital
vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony,
lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal
virtues, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 2). Therefore there are only four
principal or capital vices.
Obj. 2: Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as
stated above (Q. 77). But there are four principal passions of the
soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the
above sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and
sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and
sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are
unfittingly enumerated.
Obj. 3: Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it
should not be placed among the principal vices.
Obj. 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin,
so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above (A. 2). But avarice
is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also
should be placed among the capital vices.
Obj. 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused
through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through
ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g.
steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are
insufficiently enumerated.
_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates
them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the capital vices are those
which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this
kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of the
condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong
inclination for one particular end, the result being that he
frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does
not come under the consideration of art, because man's particular
dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a
natural relationship of the ends to one another: and it is in this
way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this
kind of origin can come under the consideration of art.
Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends
have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is
in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are
differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First,
directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek
it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it.
Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were:
thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a
good on account of some attendant evil.
Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a
certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility,
merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and
praise, and this good is sought inordinately by _vainglory._
Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the
preservation of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is
pursued inordinately by _gluttony,_ or the preservation of the
species, e.g. sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately
by _lust._ Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which
_covetousness_ is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately
the contrary evils.
Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some
property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first
place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect
good, to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by
_pride_ or _vainglory._ Secondly, it implies satiety, which
_covetousness_ seeks in riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it
implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in
_Ethic._ i, 7; x, 6, 7, 8 and this _gluttony_ and _lust_ pursue.
On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil
occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one's own
good, and thus we have _sloth,_ which is sadness about one's
spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily labor: or else it
happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without
recrimination, belongs to _envy,_ which is sadness about another's
good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be
with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is _anger._ Again,
these same vices seek the contrary evils.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since
virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, or
to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the
appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the
principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues.
Reply Obj. 2: Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the
passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the
concupiscible part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure
or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the
capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated
above (Q. 25, A. 4).
Reply Obj. 3: Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a
distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special
kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against
another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. of the right
to vengeance.
Reply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the
order of the end, as stated above (A. 2): and it is in the same order
that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore
pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the others,
but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral.
xxxi, 27). But covetousness is said to be the root from another point
of view, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).
Reply Obj. 5: These vices are called capital because others, most
frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from
arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the
sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which
pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual
goods on account of the attendant labor; for the ignorance that can
cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2). That
a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to
ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should not be done
that good may come of it.
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