Whether It Is More Grievous to Sin Through Certain Malice Than
Through Passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin
through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance
excuses from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is
greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins
through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers
from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false
estimation of the end, which is the principle in matters of action.
Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain
malice, than for one who sins through passion.
Obj. 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous
his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into
sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain
malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than
that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than
to sin through passion.
Obj. 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through
choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil.
Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain
malice.
_On the contrary,_ A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very
reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26: "He hath
struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on
purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment is not increased
except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through
being done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice.
_I answer that,_ A sin committed through malice is more grievous than
a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because,
as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other
things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the
movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is
committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the
will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin
is committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by
something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the
very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much
the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being
committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is
stronger. Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to
sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon
returns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a
man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice,
abides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a
sick man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the
incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers
intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice
is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle
in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the
case of the man who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a
good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the
passion, for the time being. Now the worst of all defects is defect
of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through
malice is more grievous than one committed through passion.
Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers,
neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 4).
Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to
be less grave.
Reply Obj. 2: The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a
defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is
inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply Obj. 3: It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to
sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while
choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for
him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the
passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the
passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice,
chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained (AA. 2,
3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the
principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin "through"
choosing.
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