Whether Anyone Sins Through Certain Malice?
Objection 1: It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through
certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain
malice. Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22): "They
err that work evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice.
Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works
intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the
intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of _malitia_
(malice) from _malum_ (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not
denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental.
Therefore no one sins through malice.
Obj. 3: Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a
cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely,
which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 34:27): "[Who] as it were on
purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not
understand all His ways." Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore
some sin purposely or through certain malice.
_I answer that,_ Man like any other being has naturally an appetite
for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is
due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man:
for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now
the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite,
both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin
occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as
when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in
the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too
does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will.
Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good.
Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to
suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one
loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a
limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when
an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure,
more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or
some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of
some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some
temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so
a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply,
whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a
temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or
on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.
Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that
a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through
ignorance: sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular
action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through
passion: and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular
evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular
good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus
that a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice.
Reply Obj. 2: Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but
it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or
obtaining another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone
would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without
suffering loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to
enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before
him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's
anger, to being deprived of the pleasure.
Reply Obj. 3: The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to
denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit
is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through
malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also
denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of
evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as he
sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean
some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when
anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this
imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is the
cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not
indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous
sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above
(Q. 75, A. 4, ad 3).
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