Whether the Reason Can Be Overcome by a Passion, Against Its
Knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a
passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by
the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the
strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion,
which is weak and soon passes away.
Obj. 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the
apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is
really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge;
and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not
really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But
what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason.
Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge.
Obj. 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its
knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about
a particular matter--on the contrary, if a universal and a particular
proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g.
"Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one
another, they are contrary to one another, as stated in _Peri Herm._
ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to
pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have
two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible.
Obj. 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the
particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who
knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal
is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from
_Poster._ i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g.
that "no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition to
contain, for example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of
fornication." Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the
particular.
Obj. 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words
express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that man,
while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an
evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even
in particular.
Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against
its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have
universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law
in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating
me in the law of sin." Now the law that is in the members is
concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then
concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason
counter to its knowledge.
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the
opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by
passion; wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge,
and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right,
because, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good,
it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear
good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend
to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it
is written (Prov. 14:22): "They err that work evil."
Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge
that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according
to the words of Luke 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will of
his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes,"
and of James 4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it
not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right,
and it is necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a
distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a
twofold knowledge, viz. universal and particular, a defect in either
of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed,
as stated above (Q. 76, A. 1). It may happen, then, that a man has
some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and
yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is
fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not to
follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be
observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from
not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to
have correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular,
and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it
does not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not
actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in
particular what he knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of
attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to
the consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to
consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually what
he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g.
some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; and, in this way,
a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular
what he knows in general, in so far as the passions hinder him from
considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of
distraction, as explained above (A. 1). Secondly, by way of
opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to
what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation,
the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not
to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, on account
of some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That
this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that
sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the use of
reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through
excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws the
reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in
general.
Reply Obj. 1: Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not
hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge,
since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing
that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal
knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.
Reply Obj. 2: The fact that something appears good in particular to
the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this
particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the
reason.
Reply Obj. 3: It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge
or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at the
same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or
vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual
knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a
false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is directly
opposed, not to a habit, but to an act.
Reply Obj. 4: He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on
account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to
draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal
proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws
his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions,
two particular and two universal, of which one is of the son, e.g. No
fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to
be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from
arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the
passion lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second.
Reply Obj. 5: Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to
words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to
judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state
of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and
so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in
_Ethic._ vii, 3.
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