FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 75, Art. 1]

Whether Sin Has a Cause?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the

nature of evil, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 6). But evil has no cause,

as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause.

Obj. 2: Further, a cause is that from which something follows of

necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for

every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause.

Obj. 3: Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or

evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for

"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matt. 7:18). Likewise

neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment

is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin.

Therefore sin has no cause.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to

Job 5:6, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is

something done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law

of God." Therefore sin has a cause.

_I answer that,_ A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as

it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but,

so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a

negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be

assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of

affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of

the negation in itself; since the result of removing the cause is the

removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of

darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which

a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting

negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of its principal

tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these

suffices to cause a simple negation. But, since the inordinateness of

sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of

that which something ought naturally to have, such an inordinateness

must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which

naturally is and ought to be in a thing, is never lacking except on

account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say

that evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient

cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause

is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its

inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and on the part of

the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness

of sin is a result of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the

will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine

law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly,

and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the

intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of

direction in the will.

Reply Obj. 1: Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which

privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the

subject of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this

evil has a cause, has been explained.

Reply Obj. 2: If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it

must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not

impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of

something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on

account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all

things happen of necessity, as is proved in _Metaph._ vi, text. 5.

Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is

a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule

of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact of

not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in

itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before

it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the

cause of the first sin, but some good lacking some other good.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 495 / 746 题