Whether the Sin of Consent to the Act Is in the Higher Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not
in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power,
as stated above (Q. 15, A. 1): whereas the reason is an apprehensive
power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher
reason.
Obj. 2: Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and
consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
[*_Rationes aeternae,_ cf. I, Q. 15, AA. 2, 3, where as in similar
passages _ratio_ has been rendered by the English _type,_ because St.
Thomas was speaking of the Divine _idea_ as the archetype of the
creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is
identified with the eternal law, (cf. A. 8, Obj. 1; A. 9)]. But
sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal
law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he
consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not
always in the higher reason.
Obj. 3: Further, just as man can regulate his external actions
according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal
pleasures or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without
deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as
Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful
act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.
Obj. 4: Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does
the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act
through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any
deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves
his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may
consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent
to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses,
so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its
consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered
the forbidden fruit to her husband."
_I answer that,_ Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which
consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and
delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical
reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we
must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final
sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in
speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is
delivered by referring it to the first principles; since, so long as
there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be
submitted to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the
final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that
human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule
is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; and
further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above (Q.
19, A. 4). Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the
higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the
judgment is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is
intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced
on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes
last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, and the
delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble
thereto. Therefore the consent to an action belongs properly to the
higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the
delectation belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a
lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the
delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment of the lower
court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not
conversely.
Reply Obj. 1: Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not
absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and
judging, as stated above (Q. 15, A. 3). Because the fact that the
consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will
tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment.
Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The higher reason is said to consent, from the very
fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine
law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of
God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it
by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always
proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a
sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of
moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it
become the servant or slave of the evil deed."
Reply Obj. 3: The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can
direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or
restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of
the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating
the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of
this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation belongs to
the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal law, man
persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to
the higher reason.
Reply Obj. 4: The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden
and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or
lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower
reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher
reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it
does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly be imputed to it.
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