SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 2]

Whether the Intellectual Virtues Remain After This Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not

remain after this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8, 9) that

"knowledge shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be

because "we know in part." Now just as the knowledge of science is in

part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other

intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. Therefore all the

intellectual virtues will cease after this life.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since

science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is

not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness.

But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore science

and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so

that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be no act

of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing

without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life,

the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of

the body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this

life.

_On the contrary,_ The knowledge of what is universal and necessary

is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now

the knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this

life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered,

according to Luke 16:25: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good

things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much

more, therefore, does the knowledge of universal and necessary things

remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues.

_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 6) some have

held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive

intellect except when it actually understands; and that so long as

actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in

the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs, viz. in the

powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the

body is corrupted: and consequently, according to this opinion,

neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after

this life when once the body is corrupted.

But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De

Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is in act when it is

identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is

in potentiality to consider it actually." It is also contrary to

reason, because intelligible species are contained by the "possible"

intellect immovably, according to the mode of their container. Hence

the "possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De

Anima iii) because it preserves the intelligible species.

And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this

life, by applying the intelligible species to them as stated in the

First Part (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1, ad 5), cease as soon as the

body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned,

which are the quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues,

these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the

intelligible species, which are in the "possible" intellect, the

intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal

element of the intellectual virtues. Therefore these remain after

this life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated

concerning the moral virtues (A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as

referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of

understanding; because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when

the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the

phantasms.

Reply Obj. 2: Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its

material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible

species, which are in the "possible" intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 89, A. 1), the

separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to

the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet not as to the same

mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues

(A. 1).

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