FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 4]

Whether Faith and Hope Can Be Without Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith and hope are never without

charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be

more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused

moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith

and hope be without charity.

Obj. 2: Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says

(Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection

thereof, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore faith cannot be

without charity.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can be

no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this love

that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Matt. 1:2 says that "faith begets hope,

and hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can

be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without

charity.

_I answer that,_ Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be

considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as

complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good

works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a

perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is

good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but

not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will

the habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect

character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he

does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless

he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of

prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without

prudence.

Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without

charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without

charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since

to believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will: to will

not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one

ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every

right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine

says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but

not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be

without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope

consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if

it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without

charity. But to expect future bliss through merits which one has not

yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be

an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently,

faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are

not virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires

that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we

should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).

Reply Obj. 1: Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused

prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this

involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the

ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not

depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without

charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect

virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look

to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this

is not without charity.

________________________

Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 420 / 746 题