Whether the Theological Virtues Observe the Mean?
Objection 1: It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean.
For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean.
Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore
much more does theological virtue observe the mean.
Obj. 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite
being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists
in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue
perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 3).
Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean.
Obj. 3: Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean
between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course
between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii):
thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we observe
the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the
existence of two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches,
who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue
observes the mean.
_On the contrary,_ Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible
to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by
excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it
is written (Ecclus. 43:33): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as
you can: for He is above all praise." Therefore theological virtue
does not observe the mean.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the mean of virtue depends
on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may
exceed or fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological
virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue,
and thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself:
because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity,
according to His goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His
omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human
power: so that never can we love God as much as He ought to be loved,
nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore
can there be excess in such things. Accordingly the good of such
virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we
approach to the summit.
The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with
us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought,
yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving,
according to the measure of our condition. Consequently it is
possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue,
accidentally and in reference to us.
Reply Obj. 1: The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in
a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded:
whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered
in itself, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect
and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the
theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and
measure. Wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply Obj. 3: Hope observes the mean between presumption and
despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be
presumptuous, through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of
his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which
according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no
excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. In
like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not
by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe
too much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a middle
position between contrary opinions, as was explained above.
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