Whether Moral Virtues Observe the Mean?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the
mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is
extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it
is stated in _De Coelo_ i that "virtue is the limit of power."
Therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean.
Obj. 2: Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues
tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors,
and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in _Ethic._ iv,
2, 3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.
Obj. 3: Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the
mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the
contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some
moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus
virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the
extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to the
poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that
it is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral
virtue is a habit of choosing the mean."
_I answer that,_ As already explained (Q. 55, A. 3), the nature of
virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is
properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to
some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive
movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good
of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with
its rule: thus the good things made by art is that they follow the
rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in
discordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by
their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is
clearly the case in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident
that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of
reason. Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean
is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue
observes the mean.
Reply Obj. 1: Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason,
while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore we
compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which it has
of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity;
while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz.
deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter,
then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes the passion
conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,
6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state," in so far as
the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an
extreme in reference to the 'best' and the 'excellent, '" viz. as to
its conformity with reason.
Reply Obj. 2: In actions and passions the mean and the extremes
depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from
being extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while
the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through
being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity
and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity of the
respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and
a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other
circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since these
virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason,
i.e. _where_ it is right, _when_ it is right, and for an _end_ that
is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum _when_
it is not right, or _where_ it is not right, or for an undue _end;_
and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto _where_ one
ought, and _when_ one ought. This agrees with the saying of the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man observes the
extreme in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his action."
Reply Obj. 3: The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of
magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and
poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e.
according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if
this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition,
or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done
when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by
deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity
or poverty.
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