FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 1]

Whether There Are Any Theological Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological

virtues. For according to _Phys._ vii, text. 17, "virtue is the

disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect,

I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which is

Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are

not virtues of a man.

Obj. 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But

the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 5),

which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are

not virtues of man.

Obj. 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because they

direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all

things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is

directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no

need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and

will to God.

_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.

Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope,

and charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): "Ye that fear

the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love

Him." Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to

God. Therefore they are theological virtues.

_I answer that,_ Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions

whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (Q. 5, A.

7). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (Q. 5,

A. 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit,

which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is

a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the

power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about

which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made

"partakers of the Divine nature." And because such happiness

surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles

which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not

suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary

for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he

may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to

his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not

without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called

"theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch

as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused

in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known

to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.

Reply Obj. 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in

two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues

surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled

wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man

becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that

these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of

which he is made a partaker.

Reply Obj. 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were

virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us

virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but

exemplate virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to

God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in

proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their

nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the

object of supernatural happiness.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 402 / 746 题