Whether There Is Only One Moral Virtue About Operations?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about
operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to
belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is
but one virtue about operations.
Obj. 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are
directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the
other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause
diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common
good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs
a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations
does not cause a diversity of moral virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various
operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity
of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of
justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and
again in distributions, as is set down in _Ethic._ v, 2. Therefore
there are not different virtues about different operations.
_On the contrary,_ Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety,
both of which are about operations.
_I answer that,_ All the moral virtues that are about operations
agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of
something due to another: but they differ in respect of various
special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations,
the order of reason is established, as we have stated (A. 2), not
according as how man is affected towards such operations, but
according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from which
becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the
formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that
a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about
operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. But the
thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something
is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an
inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according
as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already
conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are
various virtues: e.g. _Religion_ whereby we pay our debt to God;
_Piety,_ whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country;
_Gratitude,_ whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.
Reply Obj. 1: Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose
object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But
the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something
due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: That justice which seeks the common good is
another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an
individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and
Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs
man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to
the common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since
it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common
good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that
justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ,
save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical
difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue
that is active through the command of another virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: There is the same kind of due in all the
operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the
same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it
may be that distributive justice is of another species from
commutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on
(II-II, Q. 61, A. 1).
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