Whether the Will Can Be the Subject of Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of
virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a
power by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the
reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the
Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good,
according to reason. And to this good every virtue is ordered, since
everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as
Tully says in his Rhetoric, is a "habit like a second nature in
accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic.
i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect
and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in
the irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational by
participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will.
Obj. 3: Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are
voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of
some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in
respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue
in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same
act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot be the
subject of virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Greater perfection is required in the mover than
in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible
powers. Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than
in the irascible and concupiscible powers.
_I answer that,_ Since the habit perfects the power in reference to
act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well,
which habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not
suffice for the purpose.
Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its
object. Since, therefore, as we have said above (Q. 19, A. 3), the
object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will,
in respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it. But
if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity,
whether as regards the whole human species, such as Divine good,
which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the
individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will
need virtue. And therefore such virtues as those which direct man's
affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as
charity, justice, and such like.
Reply Obj. 1: This objection is true of those virtues which are
ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude,
which are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is
clear from what we have said (Q. 35, A. 6).
Reply Obj. 2: Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are
rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e.
in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the
appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must
be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on
(Q. 62, A. 3).
Reply Obj. 3: Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated
passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these
cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the
power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need exists
only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good.
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