Whether the Irascible and Concupiscible Powers Are the Subject of
Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible
powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common
to us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper
to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. It is
therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and
concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive appetite, as we
have said in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2).
Obj. 2: Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of
a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's body:
for the Apostle says (Rom. 7): "I know that good does not dwell in my
flesh." Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of
virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is
not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body is
ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a
man make good use of his body: "For instance, if my coachman, through
obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving;
this is all due to me." But just as the soul rules the body, so also
does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the
irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due
to the rational powers. Now "virtue is that by which we live
rightly," as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore virtue is
not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the
rational powers.
Obj. 4: Further, "the principal act of moral virtue is choice"
(Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and
concupiscible powers, but of the rational power, as we have said
above (Q. 13, A. 2). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible
and concupiscible powers, but in the reason.
_On the contrary,_ Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and
temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic.
iii, 10) says that "these virtues belong to the irrational part of
the soul."
_I answer that,_ The irascible and concupiscible powers can be
considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are
parts of the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not
competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be
considered as participating in the reason, from the fact that they
have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or
concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so
far as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human
act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues.
For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and
concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from one power
according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless
both powers be well disposed to the act: for instance, the act of a
craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his
instrument be well disposed to act. Therefore in the matter of the
operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as
they are moved by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting
in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the
irascible and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of
the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity
with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the
irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but a certain
habitual conformity of these powers to reason.
Reply Obj. 1: The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in
themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and
dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation,
and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this
way they can be the subject of human virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of
virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as
being moved by reason, we "yield our members to serve justice"; so
also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed,
have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the _fomes:_
whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, the good of
reason is begotten in them.
Reply Obj. 3: The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and
concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the
body obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those
things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul:
whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "soul rules the
body with a despotic command" as the master rules his slave:
wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul.
For this reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the
irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; on
the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at
times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i,
3) that the "reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a
political command" such as that by which free men are ruled, who have
in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must
there be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, by
which these powers are well disposed to act.
Reply Obj. 4: In choice there are two things, namely, the intention
of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the
preferential choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs
to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2, 5). But that the irascible and
concupiscible powers have a right intention of the end in regard to
the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these
powers. And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with
the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but
prudence is in the reason.
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