Whether Human Virtue Is a Habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For
virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit
of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the
limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue
is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf.
De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will." But use
of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act.
Obj. 3: Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions:
otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But we do
merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts.
Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue is
the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering
which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy,
and using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, denominates
either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but
an action or a relation.
Obj. 5: Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there
natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers.
Neither therefore are human virtues habits.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science
and virtue are habits.
_I answer that,_ Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now
a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But
the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect,
according as it is determinate to its act.
Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to
their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore
these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the
rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one
particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they
are determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we
have said above (Q. 49, A. 4). Therefore human virtues are habits.
Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which
the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act:
for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to
the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When
therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken
for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can
reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a
hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say
'strength,' which is the original signification of the Latin
'virtus': thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to
indicate its 'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty.
But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of
power.
Reply Obj. 2: Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the
same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to
which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue
is nothing else than the good use of free-will.
Reply Obj. 3: We are said to merit by something in two ways. First,
as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus
we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by
the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive
power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.
Reply Obj. 4: When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of
love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us
love is set in order by virtue.
Reply Obj. 5: Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one
act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we
have said.
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