Whether Habits Are Distinguished by Their Objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their
objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of
science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the
unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects
specifically distinct.
Obj. 2: Further, different sciences are different habits. But the
same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the
physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated
in _Phys._ ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by
their objects.
Obj. 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the
same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if
it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it
be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in
order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same
object can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of
habits does not follow diversity of objects.
_On the contrary,_ Acts differ in species according to the diversity
of their objects, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5). But habits are
dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished
according to the diversity of objects.
_I answer that,_ A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the
specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in
which forms differ specifically; or according to that mode of
distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are
distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their
active principles, since every agent produces its like in species.
Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply
order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of
the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition
implying a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation
consequent to nature.
Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three
things. First, in respect of the active principles of such
dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of
specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.
Reply Obj. 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must
consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect,
which may differ in species or even in genus. And though the
distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet
they are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the
other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of
cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.
Reply Obj. 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by one
means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means
of mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the
sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the
movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the
whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism producing
science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And
consequently various means are as so many active principles, in
respect of which the habits of science are distinguished.
Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic.
vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in
speculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a
diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does.
Moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above
all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said
(Q. 18, A. 6; Q. 19, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 34, A. 4).
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