THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 3]

Whether Pain or Sorrow Are Assuaged by the Sympathy of Friends?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends

does not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary

effects. Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice

together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and

inflamed one by the other." Therefore, in like manner, when many are

sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater.

Obj. 2: Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine

declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the

sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain

of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further

cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to

increase.

Obj. 3: Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as

though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other self"

(Ethic. ix, 4, 9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the

sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he

sympathizes.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those

who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.

_I answer that,_ When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy

of a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher

indicates a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because,

since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we

strive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened

by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were bearing the burden

with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the

load of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in

the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason is

because when a man's friends condole with him, he sees that he is

loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated above (Q. 32,

A. 5). Consequently, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated

above (A. 1), it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing

friend.

Reply Obj. 1: In either case there is a proof of friendship, viz.

when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the

sorrowful. Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason

of its cause.

Reply Obj. 2: The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow:

but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to

pleasure.

And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 265 / 746 题