Whether Pain or Sorrow Is Assuaged by Every Pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every
pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far
as it is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic.
ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated
above (Q. 35, A. 4). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every
sorrow.
Obj. 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But
some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in _Ethic._ ix, 4, "the
wicked man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore not every
pleasure assuages sorrow.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from
his country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, now
dead: "for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not
wont to see him." Hence we may gather that those things which united
us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we
mourn their death or absence. But nothing united us more than the
pleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures become
burdensome to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages
every sorrow.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow
is driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any
other, provided it be intense."
_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been said above (Q. 23,
A. 4), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a suitable
good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appetite.
Consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow,
what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to a
non-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain
weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore just as all
repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing
from any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings relief by
assuaging any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever.
Reply Obj. 1: Although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to
every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4).
And consequently, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any
sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure.
Reply Obj. 2: The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow
while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so far as
wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This
sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures.
Reply Obj. 3: When there are two causes inclining to contrary
movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and
more persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made
sorrowful by those things in which he took pleasure in common with a
deceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary
movements. For the thought of the friend's death or absence, inclines
him to sorrow: whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure.
Consequently each is modified by the other. And yet, since the
perception of the present moves more strongly than the memory of the
past, and since love of self is more persistent than love of another;
hence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives out the sorrow.
Wherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that
his "sorrow gave way to his former pleasures."
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