Whether Sorrow Is the Same As Pain?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering."
But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is
not pain.
Obj. 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow
can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow for
the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite
different from pain.
Obj. 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of
touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is
not pain, and extends to more objects.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2): "I have great sorrow
[Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart,"
thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.
_I answer that,_ Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold
apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and
from the interior apprehension of the intellect or of the
imagination. Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects
than the exterior apprehension: because whatever things come under
the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not
conversely. Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an
interior apprehension is called joy, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 3):
and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior
apprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure which is
caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy;
so too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is
called pain indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of
pain, as joy is a species of pleasure.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word:
because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains,
which are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.
Reply Obj. 2: External sense perceives only what is present; but the
interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future.
Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas
bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can
only regard something present.
Reply Obj. 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far
as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in
so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the
other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive
power, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are
subordinate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is
a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the
other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no
pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as
stated in _Ethic._ iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects
of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far as it is
contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary
to joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is
its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according
to the distinction of interior and exterior apprehension; although,
on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily
pain. But if pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of
sorrow, as stated above.
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