Whether Wonder Is a Cause of Pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of
something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance,
is a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.
Obj. 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were,
the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of
_Metaph._ i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know,
than to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,
7): since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and
hindrances, in the former not; while pleasure arises from an
operation which is unhindered, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12, 13.
Therefore wonder hinders rather than causes pleasure.
Obj. 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to:
wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant. But
"we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in
Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is
the cause of pleasure.
_I answer that,_ It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated
above (Q. 23, A. 4): and therefore the greater the desire for the
thing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the
very increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure,
according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is
loved, since it was stated above (A. 3, ad 3) that desire resulting
from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for
knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of
which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge
or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of
pleasure, in so far as it includes a hope of getting the knowledge
which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is
pleasing, for instance things that are scarce. Also, representations
of things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give
rise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with
another, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper
and connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv).
This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered from great
danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in _Rhetor._ i,
11.
Reply Obj. 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies
ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the
cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that
the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to
another reading:--that he is other than he thought himself to be.]
Reply Obj. 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good, and
perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is more
perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the unknown,
the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing than
the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the second,
it happens that research is sometimes more pleasing accidentally, in
so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for greater desire is
awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man
takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things for the
first time.
Reply Obj. 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do, inasmuch
as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that are of
rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from
the fact that we desire to know something about them, in so far as
they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the
mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are
new," as stated in _Ethic._ x, 4, since more perfect operation
causes more perfect pleasure.
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