Whether Concupiscence Is Infinite?
Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For
the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end.
But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2).
Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.
Obj. 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it
proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and
therefore unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.
Obj. 3: Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and
thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject
of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term.
Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight would ever
ensue.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since
concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), concupiscence is twofold;
one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence
cannot be actually infinite: because it is of that which nature
requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence
man never desires infinite meat, or infinite drink. But just as in
nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of
concupiscence be infinite successively; so that, for instance, after
getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything
else that nature requires: because these bodily goods, when obtained,
do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of
Samaria (John 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst
again."
But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as
stated above (A. 3), it follows from the reason, and it belongs to
the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may
desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as
rich as possible.
Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit.
i, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another infinite.
Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is
desired for its own sake, e.g. health: and thus greater health is
more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of
itself dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet more.
On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite,
because the concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to
the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an
infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on
account of the necessities of life, desire a finite measure of
riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher
says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the concupiscence of any
other things.
Reply Obj. 1: Every object of concupiscence is taken as something
finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once
actually desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it
cannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that "from
which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be
taken" (Phys. iii, 6).
Reply Obj. 2: The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain
sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears in
the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken
in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact the universal
which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it
contains potentially an infinite number of singulars.
Reply Obj. 3: In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for
him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the
realization of each object of his concupiscence.
________________________