Whether Evil Is the Cause and Object of Hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of
hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore
evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack
of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly untrue.
Obj. 2: Further, hatred of evil is praiseworthy; hence (2 Macc. 3:1)
some are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because of
the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred of their souls
[Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil be
the object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is commendable:
and this is clearly false.
Obj. 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and
evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different
subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.
_On the contrary,_ Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of
love is good, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 1). Therefore
the object of hatred is evil.
_I answer that,_ Since the natural appetite is the result of
apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as
the natural appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination
of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which
does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above
(Q. 26, A. 1). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is
evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to
that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has
it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and
this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in
the intellectual appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite
with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is
dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as
repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such,
bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears
the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of
love, so evil is the object of hatred.
Reply Obj. 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but
only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But
being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of
repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is
hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by
comparison with something else.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is
not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it is
not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of
evil nor love of good is good.
Reply Obj. 3: To different things the same thing may be lovable or
hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the
same thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally
unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming
to water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and
the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.
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