Whether Any Passion of the Soul Has No Contrary?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a
contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or
in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (A. 1). But both kinds
of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore
every passion of the soul has its contrary.
Obj. 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil
for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive
part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a
passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a
contrary.
Obj. 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach
or withdrawal, as stated above (A. 2). But every approach has a
corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every
passion of the soul has a contrary.
_On the contrary,_ Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is
set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 5.
Therefore not every passion has a contrary.
_I answer that,_ The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it
cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal,
or according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused
by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is
present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not
go beyond the limits of _sadness,_ which is a concupiscible passion;
or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which
movement is that of _anger._ But it cannot have a movement of
withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or
past. Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety
of approach and withdrawal.
In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good
and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained,
which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty.
Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other
movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which
repose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible
faculty.
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement
of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is
contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm
is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of
negation or privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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