Whether the Passions of the Concupiscible Part Are Different from
Those of the Irascible Part?
Objection 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the
irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ii, 5) that the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are
followed by joy or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the
concupiscible part. Therefore all the passions are in the
concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the
concupiscible part.
Obj. 2: Further, on the words of Matt. 13:33, "The kingdom of heaven
is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have
prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty;
desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the
concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary,
as is stated in _Topic._ ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the
concupiscible and irascible faculties.
Obj. 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically according
to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible
passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same
passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
_On the contrary,_ The acts of the different powers differ in
species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the
concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is
divided, as stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Therefore, since
the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above
(Q. 22, A. 3), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically
distinct from those of the concupiscible part.
_I answer that,_ The passions of the irascible part differ in species
from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers
have different objects, as stated in the First Part (Q. 77, A. 3),
the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to
different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different
faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object
is required to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify
the species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical
order, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the potentiality
of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form
in the same matter; so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to
different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while
acts and passions regarding different specific objects, included
under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species
of that genus.
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible,
and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of
these powers. For we have stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2),
that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil,
simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since
the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at
times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in
so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily
acquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is
of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible
faculty. Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely,
belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love,
hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which regard good or
bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to
the irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2), the
irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the
obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards
its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by
making some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible
passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that
even the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by
joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.
Reply Obj. 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible
faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible
passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the
irascible power.
Reply Obj. 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the
concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this
very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power:
and hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same
applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty.
Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different
from the irascible passions.
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