Whether Goodness or Malice Is First in the Action of the Will, or in
the External Action?
Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external
action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives
goodness from its object, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 1, 2). But the
external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for a
man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in
the act of the will.
Obj. 2: Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: since
what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its
relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an
end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2), the act of another power can
be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to
being in the act of the will.
Obj. 3: Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to
the external action, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 6). But that which is
formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in
the act of the will.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the
will that we sin, and that we behave aright." Therefore moral good
and evil are first in the will.
_I answer that,_ External actions may be said to be good or bad in
two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances
connected with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required
conditions be observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said
to be good or evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of
alms for vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the
will's proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil,
which the external action derives from its relation to the end, is to
be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the
external action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the
external action has of itself, on account of its being about due
matter and its being attended by due circumstances, is not derived
from the will, but rather from the reason. Consequently, if we
consider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes
from reason's ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the
goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as
it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the
goodness of the will, which is its principle.
Reply Obj. 1: The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch
as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended and
ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act
of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the
action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.
Reply Obj. 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows
in the order of execution.
Reply Obj. 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter
in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order of
nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in
every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its
efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as
existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action.
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