Whether It Is Necessary for the Human Will, in Order to Be Good, to
Be Conformed to the Divine Will, As Regards the Thing Willed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be
conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we
cannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object
of the will. But in many things we know not what God wills. Therefore
the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing
willed.
Obj. 2: Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about
to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his will
to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow
that a man is bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible.
Obj. 3: Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial
piety. But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes
be contrary to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death
of a father: if his son were to will it also, it would be against
filial piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the
Divine will, as to the thing willed.
_On the contrary,_ (1) On Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," a
gloss says: "That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills."
But everyone is bound to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is
bound to will what God wills.
(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every
act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will,
it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.
(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different
things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has
an evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the
Divine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will.
_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been said above (AA. 3,
5), the will tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the
reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways by the reason,
so as to appear good from one point of view, and not good from
another point of view. And therefore if a man's will wills a thing to
be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and the
will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as it
appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing
a thief to be put to death, because this is just: while the will of
another--e.g. the thief's wife or son, who wishes him not to be put
to death, inasmuch as killing is a natural evil, is also good.
Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or
intellect; the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the
more universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in
the example given above: because the judge has care of the common
good, which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief's death,
which has the aspect of good in relation to the common estate;
whereas the thief's wife has to consider the private good of the
family, and from this point of view she wishes her husband, the
thief, not to be put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is
that which is apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of
all things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of
the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the
whole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension of a creature,
according to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to
that nature. Now a thing may happen to be good under a particular
aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as
stated above. And therefore it comes to pass that a certain will is
good from willing something considered under a particular aspect,
which thing God wills not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa.
And hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in
respect of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects,
they wish a particular thing to be or not to be.
But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he
refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite
of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is
the end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing
whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man
will some particular good with a right will, he must will that
particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good,
formally. Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the
Divine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound to
will the Divine and universal good; but not as to that which is willed
materially, for the reason given above.
At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed
to the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is
conformed to the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed,
it is conformed thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch
as it is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed
materially, it is conformed to that will considered as efficient
cause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the
particular apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing
from God as its efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that a
man's will, in this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because
it wills what God wishes him to will.
There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal
cause, consisting in man's willing something from charity, as God
wills it. And this conformity is also reduced to the formal
conformity, that is in respect of the last end, which is the proper
object of charity.
Reply Obj. 1: We can know in a general way what God wills. For we
know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good.
Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a
will conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing
willed. But we know not what God wills in particular: and in this
respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.
But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he
wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that
particular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in
all things not only formally, but also materially.
Reply Obj. 2: God does not will the damnation of a man, considered
precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered precisely as
death, because, "He wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4); but He
wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard to
such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of God's
justice and of the natural order.
Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.
To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said
that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect of reason of
the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who
conforms his will to God's, in the point of the very thing willed;
because the will tends more to the end, than to that which is on
account of the end.
To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act
are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the
object considered materially.
To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills
when several people desire different things, but not under the same
aspect: but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same
aspect, one man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is
no question of this here.
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