Whether the Will Is Evil When It Is at Variance with Erring Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at
variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the
human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as
stated above (A. 4). But erring reason is not derived from the
eternal law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human
will. Therefore the will is not evil, if it be at variance with
erring reason.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower
authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher
authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something
that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes
proposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God
Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring reason
does not bind. Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance
with erring reason.
Obj. 3: Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of
malice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not
reducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason
err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to
do so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will
is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason.
_On the contrary,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 13),
conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some
action. Now knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when the will is at
variance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such
will is evil; for it is written (Rom. 14:23): "All that is not of
faith"--i.e. all that is against conscience--"is sin." Therefore the
will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason.
_I answer that,_ Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason,
for it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in
the First Part (Q. 19, A. 13), to inquire whether the will is evil
when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire
"whether an erring conscience binds." On this matter, some
distinguished three kinds of actions: for some are good generically;
some are indifferent; some are evil generically. And they say that if
reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good
generically, there is no error: and in like manner if it tell us not
to do something which is evil generically; since it is the same
reason that prescribes what is good and forbids what is evil. On the
other hand if a man's reason or conscience tells him that he is bound
by precept to do what is evil in itself; or that what is good in
itself, is forbidden, then his reason or conscience errs. In like
manner if a man's reason or conscience tell him, that what is
indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground,
is forbidden or commanded, his reason or conscience errs. They say,
therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in matters of
indifference, either by commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so
that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil
and sinful. But they say that when reason or conscience errs in
commanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good in
itself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in
such cases the will which is at variance with erring reason or
conscience is not evil.
But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will
that is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some
way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the
will depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is
in its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by
reason as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of
the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above (A.
3), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as
being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the
case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good
or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can receive
the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which
is good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil,
can receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason
apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is
good: yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it
is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose
it as an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil.
Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that
which is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through
being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe
in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the
will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the
reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something
evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were
evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the
apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
9) that "properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not
follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also one who does not
follow false reason." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely
speaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right or
erring, is always evil.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the judgment of an erring reason is not
derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as
being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is
all truth.
Reply Obj. 2: The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known
that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the
command of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the
command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in
scorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of
the emperor. In like manner if a man were to know that human reason
was dictating something contrary to God's commandment, he would not
be bound to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely
erroneous. But when erring reason proposes something as being
commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn
the commandment of God.
Reply Obj. 3: Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it
apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being
something contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for
some such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that species
of malice.
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