Whether Man's Action Is Good or Evil from a Circumstance?
Objection 1: It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a
circumstance. For circumstances stand around (_circumstant_) an action,
as being outside it, as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1). But "good and evil
are in things themselves," as is stated in _Metaph._ vi, 4. Therefore
an action does not derive goodness or malice from a circumstance.
Obj. 2: Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered
principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances are
accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of
art: because "no art takes notice of what is accidental" (Metaph. vi,
2). Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a
circumstance.
Obj. 3: Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its
substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But good
and evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an
action can be good or evil in its genus as stated above (A. 2).
Therefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance.
_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a
virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in
respect of the other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the
vicious man, in the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or
where he should not, and so on with the other circumstances.
Therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances.
_I answer that,_ In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole
fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere
substantial form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives
much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and
the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion,
evil is the result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its
goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain
additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such
are its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is
requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil.
Reply Obj. 1: Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they
are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents
thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the
essence.
Reply Obj. 2: Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for
some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And
thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the
doctrine of morals.
Reply Obj. 3: Since good and being are convertible; according as
being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good
predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in
respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things and
in moral actions.
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