Whether Every Human Action Is Good, or Are There Evil Actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that every human action is good, and that
none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not,
save in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the
good. Therefore no action is evil.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a
thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according as its
potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is
perfected by act, it is good, as stated in _Metaph._ ix, 9. Therefore
nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is
good. Therefore every action is good, and none is evil.
Obj. 3: Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as
Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect
which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action
is good.
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 3:20): "Every one that doth
evil, hateth the light." Therefore some actions of man are evil.
_I answer that,_ We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good
and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act
that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has
being: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the
First Part (Q. 5, AA. 1, 3). But God alone has the whole plenitude of
His Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its
proper fulness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it
happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and
yet they are lacking in the fulness of being due to them. Thus the
fulness of human being requires a compound of soul and body, having
all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement: wherefore
if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due
to the fulness of his being. So that as much as he has of being, so
much has he of goodness: while so far as he is lacking in goodness,
and is said to be evil: thus a blind man is possessed of goodness
inasmuch as he lives; and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. That,
however, which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to
be either evil or good. But since this same fulness of being is of
the very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of
being, it is not said to be good simply, but in a certain respect,
inasmuch as it is a being; although it can be called a being simply,
and a non-being in a certain respect, as was stated in the First Part
(Q. 5, A. 1, ad 1). We must therefore say that every action has
goodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in
goodness, in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its
fulness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it
lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or
something of the kind.
Reply Obj. 1: Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For if there
were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor
possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient,
there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient
good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain
respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in
act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the
power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is
deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he
walks.
Reply Obj. 3: An evil action can have a proper effect, according to
the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of
human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female,
but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
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