FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 5]

Whether the Act of the Will Is Commanded?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded.

For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands the mind to

will, and yet it does not." But to will is the act of the will.

Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.

Obj. 2: Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can

understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command;

for the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to

understand. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.

Obj. 3: Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same

reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are

commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the

will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated above (A. 1);

for if that act of the will be also commanded, this command will be

preceded by another act of the reason, and so on to infinity. But to

proceed to infinity is not possible. Therefore the act of the will

is not commanded.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is in our power, is subject to our

command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power;

since all our acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are

voluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), command is nothing else than

the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something to

act. Now it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the

will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it

can direct by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an

act of the will can be commanded.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind

commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that

sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it

commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that

the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command:

wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command

perfectly.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as each of the members of the body works not for

itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body

that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the

intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers;

and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too.

Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will,

commands the act of the will for himself.

Reply Obj. 3: Since command is an act of reason, that act is

commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will

is not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of

nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 4).

Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 126 / 746 题