Whether Man Chooses of Necessity or Freely?
Objection 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end
stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that
which follows from the principles, as declared in _Ethic._ vii, 8. But
conclusions follow of necessity from their principles. Therefore man
is moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the
means).
Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2), choice follows the
reason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason judges of
necessity about some things: on account of the necessity of the
premises. Therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity.
Obj. 3: Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved
to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato says
(Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions
of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not moved
towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this
in the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world. Now, if
that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot be
chosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as less
(eligible). Therefore if two or more things are available, of which
one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of
the others. Therefore that which appears to hold the first place is
chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to
something that seems in some way better. Therefore every choice is
made necessarily.
_On the contrary,_ Choice is an act of a rational power; which
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to
opposites.
_I answer that,_ Man does not choose of necessity. And this is
because that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now
the reason why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be
gathered from a twofold power in man. For man can will and not will,
act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or
that. The reason of this is seated in the very power of the reason.
For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good.
Now the reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. "to will"
or "to act," but also this, viz. "not to will" or "not to act."
Again, in all particular goods, the reason can consider an aspect of
some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect of evil:
and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as
to be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good alone, which is
Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as
lacking in any way. Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity,
nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice
is not of the end, but of the means, as stated above (A. 3); it is
not of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other particular
goods. Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely.
Reply Obj. 1: The conclusion does not always of necessity follow from
the principles, but only when the principles cannot be true if the
conclusion is not true. In like manner, the end does not always
necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the means are
not always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if
they be such, they are not always considered in that light.
Reply Obj. 2: The reason's decision or judgment of what is to be done
is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such
matters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles
that are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally;
as, for instance, "If he runs, he is in motion."
Reply Obj. 3: If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect,
nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular
point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one
rather than towards the other.
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