Whether Intention of the End Is the Same Act As the Volition of the
Means?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intention of the end and the
volition of the means are not one and the same movement. For
Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 6) that "the will to see the window, has
for its end the seeing of the window; and is another act from the
will to see, through the window, the passersby." But that I should
will to see the passersby, through the window, belongs to intention;
whereas that I will to see the window, belongs to the volition of the
means. Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means
are distinct movements of the will.
Obj. 2: Further, acts are distinct according to their objects. But
the end and the means are distinct objects. Therefore the intention
of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the
will.
Obj. 3: Further, the willing of the means is called choice. But
choice and intention are not the same. Therefore intention of the end
and the willing of the means are not the same movement of the will.
_On the contrary,_ The means in relation to the end, are as the
mid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same movement that
passes through the mid-space to the terminus, in natural things.
Therefore in things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end
is the same movement as the willing of the means.
_I answer that,_ The movement of the will to the end and to the means
can be considered in two ways. First, according as the will is moved
to each of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are
really two movements of the will to them. Secondly, it may be
considered accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake
of the end: and thus the movement of the will to the end and its
movement to the means are one and the same thing. For when I say: "I
wish to take medicine for the sake of health," I signify no more than
one movement of my will. And this is because the end is the reason
for willing the means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it
is an object, come under the same act; thus it is the same act of
sight that perceives color and light, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad
2). And the same applies to the intellect; for if it consider
principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each by a distinct
act; but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the
principles, there is but one act of the intellect.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of
seeing, through the window, the passersby, according as the will is
moved to either absolutely.
Reply Obj. 2: The end, considered as a thing, and the means to that
end, are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the end is
the formal object in willing the means, they are one and the same
object.
Reply Obj. 3: A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ,
according to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and end,
as in the case of ascent and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in
so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to
the end, it is called "choice": but the movement of the will to the
end as acquired by the means, is called "intention." A sign of
this is that we can have intention of the end without having
determined the means which are the object of choice.
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